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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: December 14, 1951

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-22-88 BY SP8/ty/est

Tolson	
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Loar	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

At 9:00 A.M. on December 14, 1951, SAC Hood and Special Agents Kenneth T. Delavigne and Carl Graham, of the Washington Field Office, were briefed in my office on the investigation requested by the President in the above-entitled matter. They were furnished copies of my memorandum dated December 13, 1951, setting forth the results of the interview with Secretary Lovett.

Mr. Hood was advised that this investigation was to be handled on a special basis and it was to be completed as rapidly as possible. He was advised to put whatever personnel is necessary on the investigation to accomplish this. He was advised to submit a daily teletype showing the progress of this matter.

Supervisor Roach, of the Liaison Unit, was called in at the same time and was instructed to contact Admiral Dennison this morning for the purpose of advising him that Secretary Lovett had brought up the question of a possible microphone in the Cabinet Room. Mr. Roach was instructed to advise Admiral Dennison that if it was desired, we would make a check of the Cabinet room to ascertain whether there was a microphone in the room. Mr. Roach called me later from the White House to advise that Admiral Dennison is sick. Because the President's request came through Admiral Dennison, I asked Mr. Roach to try to reach the Admiral by telephone and see whom he should discuss this with. Mr. Roach did so and spoke to Matt Connelly, who stated that by all means a check should be made of the room. Arrangements were made with the Laboratory to immediately send Mr. Pfafman and Mr. Corbett to the White House this morning to contact Mr. Roach for the purpose of checking the Cabinet room.

At approximately 11:00 A.M. I spoke again to SAC Hood and advised him that we must bear down vigorously on this investigation, that the President is personally interested, and

AHB:mer

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will undoubtedly be making inquiry concerning it for the purpose of making examples of any persons responsible. I advised Mr. Hood that Mr. Hennrich was being placed in direct charge of this investigation and Mr. Hood should report to him. I told him that as many men should be put on this as is necessary to handle the investigation expeditiously, bearing in mind that some of the officials may be leaving town for the holidays. I told him that we should work on a 7-day week basis to get this cleared up promptly. I told him that the men to go on this case should be seasoned, mature men and not the type who are going to resign and talk about Bureau investigations afterwards. Mr. Hood was advised that Mr. Hennrich would sit in on some of the interviews on a high level. I pointed out that we were anxious that not only a thorough job be done on this but that the proper impression was made during the interviews.

I advised Mr. Hood that we wanted to be advised daily of developments and if any unusual developments or a break in the case occurred, we wanted to be advised at once. Mr. Hood was advised that the Agents working on this should keep their mouths shut, that we did not want any bull sessions in the WFO, and the investigation was to be considered confidential.

I also briefed Mr. Hennrich along the above lines and told him that we want to keep the Director advised by memorandum each morning and that we want to advise the Director telephonically of any break in the case or unusual incidents of importance. I also advised Mr. Hennrich that we do not want any talk about this case here at the Bureau and it is not to be discussed outside the Bureau at this time.

Well handled. now
keep on top of it.

H

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : C. E. Hendrich

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 15, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Drew Pearson's column which appeared in the Washington Post this morning does not carry the story involved in this investigation. You will recall that our information was that it would appear in his column for today.

During an interview with Colonel Clifton of General Bradley's staff, it was disclosed that Robert Allen's column in the New York Post for December 13 did carry a column purportedly very similar to that which had been displayed by Jack Anderson to Acting Secretary Whitehair and General Bradley. We were unable to obtain a copy of the New York Post last night in Washington. I called the New York Office and arranged to have the column dispatched by teletype. A copy is attached. SA Barloga of the New York Office advised that this column appeared only in one late edition of the New York Post and that earlier editions did not carry the story. You will note that the column contains what purports to be quotes by the President, General Bradley, General Vandenberg and General Collins. The quoted remarks allegedly were made at a "big conference" after the President's return. SAC Hood has been instructed to make copies of this available to the Agents handling the interviews in order that the authenticity of the alleged quotes can be verified.

Colonel Clifton revealed that Clayton Fritchey, Chief of Public Information for the Defense Department, has stated that he was playing cards with Drew Pearson on the evening of December 12 when Jack Anderson was called over to the Pentagon and on that occasion Pearson exhibited to him a copy of the draft for the column in question. Fritchey is alleged to have made the statement that he did not see anything objectionable in the column as it was originally written nor in the column as it was edited by General Bradley. We will follow through on this and Fritchey will be interviewed.

I have instructed SAC Hood that in connection with the interviews conducted, the interviewees should be asked specifically as to what restrictions they considered themselves

Attachment
CEH:hmb

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DATE 3-2-88 BY SP-8/BJP

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under when disclosing information which went on at the December 10 conference and that we definitely establish the security regulations and precedents in connection with disclosures of items discussed and especially, of course, any specific restrictions which may have been placed on this particular conference.

ACTION:

Interviews as outlined in my memorandum of December 14 are continuing today. It would be advantageous at this point to know whether Pearson actually had the Jack Anderson item on the Bell Syndicate wires and if so whether the complete column was killed. It is suggested that this problem be referred to Mr. Nichols' office for an opinion as to whether we can safely make inquiries in this regard.

In the event inquiries can be made, the specific time of filing the column and the specific time of killing the column, if it was killed, should be obtained.

1/17/51
Discussed with Mr. Hennrich.
HBA
gmi

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: December 15, 1951

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-6060)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8WJ/GB

As a matter of interest, there is attached hereto a memorandum dated December 10, 1951, prepared by THOMAS K. FINLETTER, following his attendance at the President's Conference at the White House on December 10, 1951.

It is requested that the original and a copy be returned to the Washington Field Office.

Att.
RBH:DDJ

DECLASSIFIED BY 6060 Calloway
ON 10/13/72

This is interesting.
We should find out
who saw this, how
many copies etc.
K.

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DEC 15 1951

12/15/51
12/22/51

1. The conference with the President today on the Korean situation failed to bring out certain important points.
2. At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire.
3. What wasn't said, however, is that once we get a cease-fire, from that moment on our military position deteriorates. The Chinese, free from our interdiction campaign, can bring in men and materiel - and no inspection teams of ours are going to stop them. Our morale will go down. Our fighting ability will go down. And our domestic support for the operation will go down further than it already has.
4. Moreover, the attaining of the cease-fire may fail to defeat the Russo-Chinese plan of pinning down large quantities of our military power in Korea. This results from the fact that an agreement to permit the gradual withdrawal of UN and Communist troops, without a firm decision in advance by the UN to punish a violation of the cease-fire by aggressive means, is not to our interest, and cannot be carried out without risking all we have fought for in Korea. Once we withdraw our troops they are going to be very hard to put back. On the contrary it would be easy for the Communists to withdraw beyond the Yalu and come back whenever they want to.

In short, a cease-fire without a firm position and statement as to what the UN intends to do if the terms of the cease-fire are broken and without provision for the rapid withdrawal of UN troops, is a disadvantageous operation from our point of view.

5. The question arises what then should we do? The following is suggested:

~~TOP SECRET~~
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a. Make a provision in the cease-fire arrangements which will result in the United Nations ground troops being pulled out as rapidly as they can be after the signing of the cease-fire.

b. Leave a thin line of South Korean troops, and maybe even a token United Nations force, in South Korea.

c. Make arrangements with our major allies to issue a joint statement, approved by the UN, serving notice on China that we no longer intend to hold the Korean front by great ground forces as at present, but that if the Chinese run over our modest forces that will bring down vast retaliatory action by the UN on the mainland of China. We should also consider whether this statement might not contain a request to Russia to use her best efforts to prevent the Chinese from violating the cease-fire agreement.

d. We must agree with our friends in the UN what this vast retaliatory action means. It presumably would mean a naval blockade, harassment of the lines of communication by bombing, continuing the use of guerrilla troops, and maybe releasing Chiang for action on the mainland. The question of certain other special air action would have to be considered; also the use of the A-bomb. These are, however, in a way, questions of detail. The important thing is to get agreement with our friends in UN to be ready to go through with a good tough campaign, but without the use of ground troops other than Chiang's.

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Mr. Quinn	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15 2:00 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN FIFTY ONE,
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP DASH X. GEN. ROBERT LANDRY
AIR FORCE AID TO THE PRESIDENT, ATTENDED MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE DEALING
WITH PROBLEMS IN WESTERN PACIFIC AND WESTERN EUROPE ON DEC. TEN LAST, AND
REGARDS IT AS MOST IMPORTANT HE HAS ATTENDED THERE. HE KNEW OF CONFERENCE
BEING SCHEDULED WHILE AT KEY WEST WITH PRESIDENT. FOLLOWING STAFF CONFERENCE
WITH PRESIDENT AT TEN A.M., DECEMBER TEN LAST, LANDRY INQUIRED IF STAFF
SHOULD ATTEND THE MAIN CONFERENCE, AND PRESIDENT ADVISED AFFIRMATIVELY.
LANDRY STATES NO STENOGRAPHER PRESENT, AND HE KNOWS OF NO NOTES MADE DURING
OR AFTER CONFERENCE. CONFERENCE LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR. HE SAW
NO ONE ENTER OR LEAVE ROOM DURING CONFERENCE. NO AGENDA FURNISHED IN
ADVANCE. PRESIDENT ENTERED, SHOOK HANDS WITH ALL PRESENT AND STARTED
CONFERENCE BY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER WORLD CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN
KOREA. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED FEAR THAT LET-DOWN OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD LOWER MORALE IN THIS COUNTRY AND ALSO STATED HE WAS INTERESTED
ELECTION
BECAUSE IT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT YEAR. PRESIDENT ASKED FOR VIEWS ON
THESE MATTERS AND FOR BRIEFING ON KOREAN SITUATION BY GEN. BRADLEY. BRADLEY
REPORTED LITTLE PROGRESS ON ARMISTICE AND THAT UN COULD NOT YIELD ON ANY
MAJOR POINTS. LANDRY BELIEVES BRADLEY BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF REHABILITATION

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OF RAILROADS, ROADS, ETC., BUT BRADLEY THOUGHT IT NOT A MAJOR ISSUE AND WAS ONE ON WHICH UN MIGHT YIELD. PRESIDENT WANTED ADVISERS OPINIONS ON THIS. BRADLEY ALSO DISCUSSED RED AIR FORCE SITUATION. GEN. COLLINS ASSURED PRESIDENT UN FORCES COULD NOT BE DISLODGED FROM KOREA. DISCUSSION OF WHAT UN TO DO IF ARMISTICE FAILED LED TO STATEMENT THAT THEN UN MIGHT HAVE TO USE CERTAIN THINGS AND REDS SHOULD BE SO ADVISED. ADMIRAL FECHTELER OPPOSED ANY COMMITMENT WE MIGHT BE FORCED TO CHANGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CHARGE, BUT INSISTED ON TAKING A FIRM STAND. GEN. VANDENBERG SPOKE OF AIR SITUATION AND RECOMMENDED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO JAPAN OF OUR FORCES IN KOREA, IN EVENT OF CEASE FIRE, TO AVOID BEING TRAPPED AND TELL REDS IF THEY PROCEED FURTHER, IT MEANS ALL-OUT WAR. VANDENBERG-S VIEW ON THIS DIFFERS FROM OTHERS PRESENT. PRESIDENT FINALLY AGREED WITH BRADLEY-S VIEW ON REHABILITATION OF RAILROADS AND ROADS. SECRETARY LOVETT OPPOSED YIELDING OF ANY MAJOR POINTS TO REDS. ACTING SECRETARY OF NAVY, WHITEHAIR, OF OPINION ASIATIC PEOPLE CONTENT TO CARRY ON NEGOTIATIONS INDEFINITELY. SECRETARY FRANK PACE AGREED WITH BRADLEY AND FELT UN WON ITS POINT IN STOPPING AGGRESSION AND PUSHING ENEMY BACK TO ITS OWN LAND AND THESE POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. PACE ALSO CONCERNED OVER BUILD-UP OF RED AIR FORCE. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, OF STATE DEPARTMENT, OF OPINION PROGRESS MADE ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND STATE DEPT. AND MILITARY MEN ARE IN AGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS. RELATIVE WESTERN EUROPE, SECRETARY LOVETT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER FRENCH FINANCES AND STATED BRITAIN CANNOT MEET MILITARY COMMITMENTS. HIS OPINION GERMANY IS KEY TO BUILD-UP OF STRENGTH OF WESTERN EUROPE. PACE STATED HE FOUND TROOP MORALE AND SPIRIT GOOD IN

AUSTRIA AND GERMANY. LANDRY BELIEVES PRESIDENT CONTENT WITH PRESENT POLICIES OF NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT STATED GLAD FOR THEIR IDEAS AND EMPHASIZED THERE MUST BE NO LET-DOWN. LANDRY DOES NOT RECALL PRESIDENT STOPPING TO CONVERSE WITH ANYONE WHILE DEPARTING FROM CABINET ROOM. ON LEAVING CONFERENCE, LANDRY STOPPED IN MAT CONNOLLY-S OFFICE, AND JOE SHORT, SECRETARY, ASKED IF PRESIDENT DESIGNATED SOMEONE TO SEE SHORT ABOUT ISSUING PRESS RELEASE. ADMIRAL DENNISON AND CONNOLLY WERE PRESENT THEN. LANDRY SAID NO AND SUGGESTED SHORT SEE PRESIDENT OR LOVETT. LANDRY KNOWS OF NOTHING BEING PUT IN WRITING ABOUT THIS CONFERENCE. HE STATES HE HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH NO ONE BUT PRESIDENT SINCE THEN. LANDRY STATES NOT PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED AND HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH DREW PEARSON OR JACK ANDERSON. LAST SAW PEARSON OVER ONE YEAR AGO. HAS NO INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE SOURCE OF LEAK OF INFORMATION.

HOOD

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Langford	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

12-15-51

5:30 PM

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN.

FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP DASH

X. JAMES E. LAY, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL. INTERVIEWED HIS OFFICE THIS DATE. HE FURNISHED

GENERAL INFO AS TO TOPICS DISCUSSED AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE

MORNING OF DEC TEN LAST. LAY STATES HE TOOK PERSONAL NOTES AT

CONFERENCE FOR BENEFIT OF PRESIDENT AND PLACED THEM IN LAY'S

OFFICE SAFE. HE DESCRIBED NOTES AS PERSONAL PROPERTY OF

PRESIDENT, THEREFORE NO REQUEST MADE BY INTERVIEWING AGENTS

TO PRODUCE NOTES PENDING BUREAU AUTHORITY. LAY STATES HIS

SECRETARY WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE BUT DOUBTS ANYONE BUT HE

PERSONALLY COULD INTERPRET THEM. LAY ADVISED HE BRIEFED HIS

DEPUTY, S. EVERETT GLEASON, AS TO COMMENTS OF VARIOUS

INDIVIDUALS PRESENT AT CONFERENCE. STATES GLEASON IS HIS

ALTERNATE AND KEEPS HIM PERSONALLY ADVISED ON SUCH MATTERS

IN ORDER THAT HE BE AS WELL INFORMED AS LAY. LAY COMMENTED

AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING FOLLOWING PORTION OF ROBERT S. ALLEN

ARTICLE AS REFLECTED IN NY TEL. QUOTE THE UN CAN HAVE A

CEASE FIRE IN KOREA BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS

TO THE REDS. THAT'S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT

PET/JAC:eak
65-6060

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OTHERWISE.

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DEC 17 1951
FBI

WFO 65-6060

IN THEIR BIG CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GEN BRADLEY DECLARED THE PROTRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE A FEW CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANT ONE. END QUOTE. LAY DESCRIBED THIS AS A GOOD SUMMATION OF BRADLEY'S IDEAS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE. AS TO THE ALLEGED STATEMENT OF GEN VANDENBERG IN ALLEN'S ARTICLE, QUOTE I WANT A CEASE FIRE IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER. BUT I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIR FIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN'T PUT PAST THEM. UNQUOTE. LAY STATED THAT THIS QUOTATION WAS DEFINITELY ERRONEOUS AND WAS NOT DISCUSSED BY VANDENBERG AT THE CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO LAY, VANDENBERG MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE, BUT INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH SUGGESTION OF GEN BRADLEY THAT POSSIBLY CONCESSIONS ON AIR FIELDS MIGHT BE MADE IN THE FUTURE. LAY COULD NOT RECALL A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO GEN J. LAWTON COLLINS THAT THE COMMUNISTS' REFUSAL TO AGREE ON ROTATION OF TROOPS WAS QUOTE AN UNFAIR DEMAND AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ARE MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIR FIELDS. END QUOTE. LAY FURTHER COULD NOT RECALL A

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STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO COLLINS BY ALLEN AS TO THE REPLACEMENT
ISSUE THAT QUOTE THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON
THAT AND I DON'T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT EXCEPT FOR
TRADING PURPOSES. UNQUOTE. LAY DESCRIBED ALLEN'S REPORT AS TO
THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT REGARDING CONCESSIONS AS AN
EXCELLENT RESUME OF THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE. LAY WAS OF THE
OPINION THAT INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE
AS TO CONCESSIONS COULD ONLY HAVE COME FROM SOMEONE ATTENDING
THE CONFERENCE INASMUCH AS HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH ATTITUDE
WAS CLEARLY KNOWN TO ANYONE UNTIL THE CONFERENCE. UNDERSECRETARY
OF STATE JAMES E. WEBB AND ASS'T SECRETARY OF STATE H. FREEMAN
MATTHEWS INTERVIEWED DEC FOURTEEN LAST. BOTH FURNISHED GENERAL
INFORMATION AS TO MATTERS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE. ROBERT S.
ALLEN ARTICLE NOT AVAILABLE THAT DATE AND THUS THEIR REACTIONS
THERE TO NOT KNOWN AT PRESENT. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO DISCUSS
SAID ARTICLE EARLY NEXT WEEK.

HOOD

cc Mr Belmont

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____
 P.M. _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

15

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

100-443617-1

ADMIRAL WILLIAM M. FECHTELER, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ON INTERVIEW, ADVISED HE ATTENDED WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE TEN THIRTY AM, MONDAY, DECEMBER TEN LAST, ALSO ATTENDED BY MESSRS. LOVETT, WHITEHAIR, PACE, FINLETTER; GENERALS BRADLEY, COLLINS AND VANDENBERG, AS WELL AS MESSRS. WEBB AND MATTHEWS, STATE DEPT. ALSO PRESENT, IN ADDITION, WERE MR. LAY, ADMIRAL DENNISON, ADMIRAL LANDRY, GENERAL VAUGHAN AND GENERAL CABELL. FECHTELER RECALLED ALL PRESENT WERE SEATED WHEN PRESIDENT ARRIVED, AND AFTER SHAKING HANDS AND PERSONALLY GREETING EVERYONE IN ROOM OPENED THE MEETING. GEN. BRADLEY, AS FIRST SPEAKER, GAVE A RESUME OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA, DISCUSSED THE GROUND SITUATION, COMMENTED ON THE AIR BUILD-UP OF THE COMMUNISTS FORCES AND MENTIONED THE NAVY AND AIR INTERDICTION IN THE EASTERN SECTION. FOLLOWING GEN. BRADLEY, MR. LOVETT SPOKE, IN GENERAL DETAILS, CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF THE KOREAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND BROUGHT OUT THAT ALL WERE EXASPERATED BY THE SLOWNESS; HOWEVER, SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THOUGH NOT AS FAST AS WE WISHED. ACCORDING TO FECHTELER, THE PRESIDENT PROCEEDED AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE ASKING FOR VIEWS OF THE STATE DEPT., AND MR. WEBB DEFERRED TO MR. MATTHEWS, WHO

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CEG:DDJ

10-30-97 12:00 PM 6-11:55 AM 6-11:55 AM 6-11:55 AM
10-30-97 12:00 PM 6-11:55 AM 6-11:55 AM 6-11:55 AM

SPOKE BRIEFLY, DETAILS NOT RECALLED. THEREAFTER, MR. FINLETTER MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE IN GETTING AN ARMISTICE AND MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE IN NOT PERMITTING COMMUNISTS TO REBUILD THEIR AIRFIELDS. ADM. FECHTELER STATED HE NEXT VOICED HIS MISGIVINGS RE PROPOSALS OF THE STATE DEPT. TO HAVE THE SIXTEEN NATIONS OF THE UN MAKE CERTAIN THREATS TO THE COMMUNISTS AS TO WHAT WOULD BE DONE IF THEY VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE, AND HE RECALLED, AT THIS POINT, EITHER MR. WEBB OR MR. MATTHEWS OF THE STATE DEPT. VOICED SOME DISAGREEMENT WITH ADM. FECHTELER AND INDICATED THAT A THREAT OF RETALIATION WOULD BE SOME DETERRENT TO THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD THEY VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE. FECHTELER STATED, APPARENTLY, SOME PLACE IN THE CONFERENCE THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD OUT IN KOREA, AND GENERAL COLLINS TOOK SOME EXCEPTION AND MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS CAN'T RUN US OUT OF KOREA. ADM. FECHTELER RECALLED GENERAL VANDENBERG TALKED ABOUT THE RUSSIAN MIGS PAREN RUSSIAN AIRPLANES UNPAREN, AND IN RELATION TO THE MIGS AND THE PRESENT BUILD-UP OF THE COMMUNISTS AIR FORCES, GEN. VANDENBERG POINTED OUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR AIR FORCES IN RELATION TO THE BUILD-UP OF COMMUNISTS AIR FIELDS. FECHTELER STATED MR. WHITEHAIR ALSO MADE A SHORT TALK, ALTHOUGH ON MATTERS GENERALLY NOT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE POINTS UNDER DISCUSSION. HE ALSO RECALLED THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND RECALLED MR. PACE GAVE A GLOWING REPORT ON THE MORALE OF OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. ADM. FECHTELER POINTED OUT HE GATHERED AT THIS CONFERENCE THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME PRIVATE

PRIOR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN OVER THE POINTS IN DISCUSSION AND HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT INSTANT CONFERENCE WAS A SORT OF WINDOW DRESSING TO FORMALIZE THE POLICY. FECHTELER WAS COGNIZANT THAT JACK ANDERSON, PEARSON LEG-MAN, HAD PREPARED A COLUMN RELATIVE TO THIS CONFERENCE, HAVING LEARNED THIS ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER TWELVE, FROM DAN KIMBALL, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. FECHTELER ADVISED HE DID NOT KNOW DREW PEARSON, ANDERSON OR ANY PEARSON EMPLOYEES, AND HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO HOW LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED. ALTHOUGH FECHTELER CONFIDENTIALLY POINTED OUT THAT



b7D

FECHTELER ALSO CONFIDENTIALLY POINTED OUT HE SHARED THE GENERAL FEELING THAT SECURITY AT THE STATE DEPT. WAS NOT ALL THAT COULD BE DESIRED, ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT HE WAS MAKING NO INFERENCES OR ACCUSATIONS, AND AGAIN INSISTED HE HAD NO SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW INSTANT LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED. ADMIRAL FECHTELER WAS MADE COGNIZANT OF THE COLUMN BY ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN, WHICH WAS BASED UPON THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, AND ALTHOUGH FECHTELER ADVISED HE COULD NOT VERIFY ANY OF THE CONTENTS AS TO ACTUAL QUOTATIONS HE CONSIDERED THE ALLEN COLUMN TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY AN ACCURATE REPORT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF IT MUST HAVE BEEN PREPARED ONLY THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE OF A LEAK FROM SOMEONE

~~PRESENT~~. AFTER GOING OVER THE ALLEN COLUMN, FECHTELER CONCLUDED HE COULD SEE NO INACCURACIES IN IT.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ADVISED HE ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE MONDAY, DECEMBER TEN; THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH CONFERENCE HE EVER ATTENDED AND DID SO ONLY AS AN OBSERVER AND TOOK NO PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL CABELL WAS UNABLE TO RECALL SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS SAID, BY WHOM AND IN WHAT ORDER THE SPEAKERS OFFERED THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. CABELL WAS UNAWARE THAT INSTANT INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN, ALSO UNAWARE THAT ANY ALLEGED LEAK HAD OCCURRED CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. CABELL ADVISED HE DID NOT KNOW DREW PEARSON EXCEPT BELIEVES HE MET PEARSON CASUALLY ON ONE OCCASION A LONG TIME AGO AND PROBABLY WOULD KNOW BY SIGHT; DOES NOT KNOW JACK ANDERSON OR ANY OTHER PEARSON EMPLOYEE. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE, CABELL ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL ANY MENTION MADE ABOUT EXTENDING THE CEASE FIRE NEGOTIATIONS DEADLINE, AND SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE PRESIDENT OR ANYONE ELSE PRESENT MENTIONED THIS. HE SAID THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A QUESTION POSED BY SOMEONE IN ATTENDANCE CONCERNING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN THE THIRTY DAY DEADLINE WAS PASSED, AND NO AGREEMENTS REACHED, BUT CABELL POINTED OUT THAT QUESTION HAD ARISEN MANY TIMES PREVIOUSLY, IN VARIOUS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS ATTENDED BY CABELL, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL THAT THAT POINT WAS MENTIONED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF

GENERAL CABELL, AND HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF IT WAS NOT AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, CABELL POINTED OUT THAT HE BELIEVES THE COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS IN THE ALIEN COLUMN WERE MORE IN LINE WITH THINGS GENERAL COLLINS HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY, INCLUDING COMMENTS MADE BY HIM AT FORMER CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS. CABELL BELIEVED THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED BY ALLEN TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN WAS ACCURATE IN SUBSTANCE, BUT WAS NOT A VERBATIM ACCOUNT. IN APPRAISAL OF THE ALIEN COLUMN, CABELL STATED IT CONTAINED A CONTINUOUS THREAD TO INDICATE ALLEN HAD AN INFORMANT WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. CABELL POINTED OUT SOME OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT KNOWN TO HIM; ALSO OTHERS WERE NOT INTIMATELY KNOWN TO HIM, BUT HE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANY PERSON OR PERSONS ATTENDING THAT CONFERENCE AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LEAK.

HOOD

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

8:00 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON. LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. PRESIDENTIAL AIDE GENERAL HARRY VAUGHAN INTERVIEWED THIS DATE. UNABLE SUGGEST IDENTITY PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. STATES, HOWEVER, FROM STANDPOINT OF SECURITY, STATE DEPT. WEAKEST OF ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS THIS AREA, BUT HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC TO INDICATE STATE DEPT. INVOLVED IN LEAK OF INFORMATION UNDER INVESTIGATION. VAUGHAN WAS FURNISHED MATERIAL CONTAINED IN ALLEN ARTICLE, APPEARING IN NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN, AND INFORMS MATERIAL, WHILE NOT CONSISTING QUOTES OF STATEMENTS AND VIEWS EXPRESSED AT CONFERENCE, IS EXTREMELY ACCURATE, AND STATES IT WOULD BE QUOTE MIRACULOUS UNQUOTE IF THE INDIVIDUAL WRITING IT DID SO WITHOUT ACTUALLY HAVING ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE OR WITHOUT HAVING ACCESS TO A PERSON WHO DID ATTEND. DENIES ANY TYPE OF PERTINENT CONTACT WITH PEARSON OR ASSOCIATES AND STATES PEARSON HAS SOME ENMITY TOWARD HIM FOR NUMER OF YEARS.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FRANK PACE INTERVIEWED THIS DATE AND ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED LEAK. THE ARTICLE PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN WAS READ TO PACE, AND HE ADVISED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE, WHO WAS NOT IN ATTENDANCE, COULD HAVE PREPARED IT, BUT THAT THIS WAS IMPROBABLE. HE STATED THAT THE

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KJD/TJJ:DDJ

MATERIAL APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY THAT WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS WITH RESPECT TO QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE DEFINITELY WAS NOT STATED BY GENERAL COLLINS. PACE ADVISED THAT HE HAS MET PEARSON ON TWO OCCASIONS AND HAS NOT SEEN HIM FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS, AND HAS NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO ANY OF PEARSON-S EMPLOYEES OR ASSOCIATES FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS. DENIES THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN POSSIBLY SECRETARY LOVETT OR SECRETARY FINLETTER.

HOOD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 15 1951
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Laughlin	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Gandy	

CONF WASH AND WASH FLD FROM NEW YORK 1 15 12-22 PM
DIRECTOR AND WFO URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-28-81 BY SP8/lt/STH

ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL HENNRICH

COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN, N. Y. POST DEC., THIRTEEN FIFTYONE. REF
TEL CALL INSPECTOR HENNRICH DEC FOURTEEN LAST. NY POST "BLUE FINAL"
EDITION DEC THIRTEEN LAST CONTAINS COLUMN OF ALLEN WHICH IS QUOTED
AS FOLLOWS "REDS- CEASE-FIRE TERMS N. G. BY ROBERT S. ALLEN -
WASHINGTON, DEC, THIRTEEN- THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA,
BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS.

THAT-S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG
CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GEN. BRADLEY DECLARED THE POR-
TRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT "WHERE A FEW CON-
CESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS
REALLY WANT ONE."

"WHAT DO THEY WANT QUESTIONMARK" ASKED THE PRESIDNT.

"THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS," EXPLAINED BRADLEY. "WE ARE DE-
MANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN
DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY
ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT
THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL
ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED
TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO
WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND."

END OF PAGE ONE

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PAGE TWO

GEN. HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT.

"I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER," DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. "BUT I DON-T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN-T PUT PAST THEM."

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME TERMS ON THE AIRFIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN GROOPS.

"THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN," COLINS ARGUED. "I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSION ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ON MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS.

"OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACEMENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON-T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES."

END OF PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL AIRFORCE.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM-

"AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN."

ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY.

COPY OF COLUMN MAILED BUREAU DECEMBER FIFTEEN

SCHEIDT

END

NY R 1 WA LEA

11
44

~~ORIGINAL~~ DIRECTOR

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

9:45 A.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN F
ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASHX. BY
WILLIS MATTHEWS, AID TO GEN OMAR BRADLEY, ADVISED THAT UPON THE RETURN
OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE ABOUT SIX THIRTY PM WEDNESDAY DEC
TWELVE, BRADLEY ADVISED MATTHEWS AND COL CHESTER V. CLIFTON, PRESS
RELATIONS OFFICER FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT PRES TRUMAN WAS GREATLY
CONCERNED OVER FACT THAT DREW PEARSON POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON MONDAY DECEMBER TEN AND THAT A COLUMN HAD BEEN PREPARED
CONTAINING DETAILS OF THAT CONFERENCE. BEFORE ANDERSON ARRIVED GEN.
BRADLEY TELEPHONED SEC ROBERT LOVETT AND FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR AND DISCUSSED
LEAK AND PRESIDENTS CONCERN. COL MATTHEWS STATED MATTER OF CONCERN TO
COL CLIFTON, PRESS OFFICER, AND HE WAS IN AND OUT CONFERENCE ROOM
DURING ANDERSONS VISIT, HOWEVER, HE RECALLED THAT GEN BRADLEY HAD
READ ALOUD THE COLUMN TEXT RELATING TO INSTANT CONFERENCE AND HE
REMEMBERED THAT REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE PRESIDENTS ENTERING THE WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ROOM, SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYBODY AND A REFERENCE TO HIS
SUNTAN WAS MADE. HE ADVISED THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT
WAS QUOTED RATHER FREELY AND IT WAS INDICATED THE INFORMATION EMANATED
FROM A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR AN INFORMED SOURCE. HE RECALLED THERE

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WAS REFERENCE TO CEASE FIRE AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS REBUILDING AIR FIELDS, ROADS, ETC. HE DID NOT RECALL ANY MENTION WAS MADE OF EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS. COL MATTHEWS STATED THERE WERE TWO ITEMS WHICH WERE PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE TO GEN BRADLEY AND ANDERSON AGREED HE WOULD DELETE ANYTHING CONSTITUTING SECURITY VIOLATIONS. HE STATED HE REMEMBERED ONE OBJECTIONABLE ITEM IN WHICH IT WAS STATED THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE AND WOULD GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTH. FURTHER, THE PRESIDENT HAD URGED THAT WE NOT GO AND MAKE ANY FOOLISH MISTAKE THEREAFTER. MATTHEWS COULD NOT RECALL THE SECOND ITEM. HE INDICATED GEN BRADLEY DID NOT COMMENT ON THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF COLUMN AND STATED THAT HE, COL MATTHEWS, URGED GEN BRADLEY TO CIRCLE WITH A PENCIL THE OBJECTIONABLE ITEMS WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY DID. HE STATED THE MEETING WITH ANDERSON ENDED AMICABLY AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COLUMN WAS NOT HARMFUL AS CORRECTED. COL CLIFTON, WHO IS INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESS, AND ANDERSON PARTICULARLY FURNISHED MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION. HE CONFIRMED THE ABOVE REGARDING ARRIVAL OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE AT SIX THIRTY PM DEC TWELVE AND STATED GEN BRADLEY HAD RELATED THAT ANDERSON HAD VISITED FRANCIS WHITEHAIR THE PREVIOUS DAY ON PRETEXT OF WANTING TO MEET HIM AND THEN PRODUCED A PAPER AND READ A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. IN THIS, ANDERSON DIRECTLY QUOTED ADM WILLIAM FECHTELER AND GEN HOYT VANDENBERG WHICH ALARMED WHITEHAIR WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO

WFO 6060

THE PRESIDENT. COL CLIFTON STATED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON DEC TWELVE GEN BRADLEY VISITED WHITE HOUSE TO CLEAR A CABLE TO GEN RIDGWAY AND WAS INFORMED OF THE LEAK BY THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS GREATLY DISTURBED. GEN BRADLEY VOLUNTEERED TO HANDLE THE MATTER AS THE PRESIDENT FELT THE STORY MIGHT UPSET THE ENTIRE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. GEN BRADLEY RELATED WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED PEARSON CONCERNING THE COLUMN AND PEARSON DECLARED NOTHING IN THE COLUMN ENDANGERED SECURITY AND ADDING THE COLUMN HAD ALREADY BEEN DISPATCHED. COL CLIFTON STATED HE DEEMED IT ADVISABLE TO VERIFY THIS AND CONTACTED RUSS WIGGINS, WASHINGTON POST, WHO INFORMED HIM THE STORY DID NOT APPEAR IN COLUMNS PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION DEC THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN. CLIFTON THEREAFTER CONTACTED ANDERSON AND TOLD ANDERSON THERE WAS GREAT ALARM OVER THE COLUMN WHICH ENDANGERED THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IN REPLY ANDERSON TOLD CLIFTON IF THERE WAS ANYTHING IN THE COLUMN THAT WAS A VIOLATION OF SECURITY HE DID NOT WANT TO PUBLISH IT.

ANDERSON AGREED TO BRING THE COLUMN OVER TO GEN BRADLEY'S OFFICE AND GO OVER IT AND SAID HE WOULD DO SO IF IN EXCHANGE COL CLIFTON WOULD TELL HIM HOW CLIFTON HAD FOUND OUT ABOUT THE COLUMN. TO THIS CLIFTON SAID HE AGREED.

SHORTLY THEREAFTER ANDERSON CAME OVER TO THE PENTAGON TO GEN BRADLEY'S OFFICE AND THERE IN THE PRESENCE OF GEN BRADLEY, ANDERSON, CLIFTON AND COL MATTHEWS, THE COLUMN WAS READ ALOUD BY GEN BRADLEY. GEN BRADLEY POINTED TO TWO ITEMS IN THE COLUMN WHICH GEN BRADLEY CONSIDERED DANGEROUS AS REFLECTING THINKING AT HIGH LEVEL WHICH WOULD LEAD COMMUNISTS TO BELIEVE WE WERE TOO

ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE. CLIFTON STATED THE COLUMN INDICATED THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO OBTAIN A CEASE FIRE BUT SHOULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS THAT WE WILL REGRET LATER. HE STATED GEN BRADLEY FELT THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FIRST PORTION SHOULD BE DELETED AND MADE TO READ THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS WHICH WE WOULD REGRET LATER. THE SECOND OBJECTIONABLE ITEM INDICATED THAT WE WOULD GRANT AN EXTENSION OF A FEW DAYS IF DETAILS WERE NOT WORKED OUT BY DEC TWENTY SEVEN FIFTY ONE. GEN BRADLEY INSISTED THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND MADE TO READ: UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE SOME DETAILS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER THE DEC TWENTY SEVEN DEADLINE.

FOLLOWING THE TWO CORRECTIONS AT THE PLACES MARKED ON THE TEXT BY GEN BRADLEY AS COL MATTHEWS HAS STATED IT WAS AGREED ALL AROUND THAT THE COLUMN WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL AND IN FACT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ALTHOUGH GEN BRADLEY DID NOT APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE PUBLICATION AND DID NOT AFFIRM OR DENY THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENTS, THE CORRECTIONS IMPOSED ON HIM BY ANDERSONS PRESENTATION IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED AN APPROVAL. COL CLIFTON INDICATED THIS IS NECESSARY ROUTINE HANDLING OF STORIES WHICH CONSTITUTE ACCOMPLISHED SCOOPS OF NEWS AND ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNABLE TO PREVENT PUBLICATION THEY ENDEAVOR TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTEREST BY PERSUADING REPORTERS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY ITEMS WHICH WOULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY. COL CLIFTON ALSO RECALLED THE COLUMN MENTIONED

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THE PRESIDENTS ENTRANCE INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM WHERE HE GREETED EVERYONE IN GOOD SPIRITS AND ASKED QUOTE HOW DO YOU ALL LIKE MY SUNTAN UNQUOTE. HE ALSO RECALLED AN ITEM SUBHEADED QUOTE SILENT ADMIRAL UNQUOTE WHICH QUOTED A STATEMENT BY ADM FECHTELER THAT THE NAVY STANDS READY TO CARRY ON ITS PART IN THE KOREAN WAR IF CALLED ON ANY TIME, ANY PLACE AND UNDER ANY CONDITIONS. COL CLIFTON ADVISED IN DEALING WITH ANDERSON THE LATTER STATED HE HAD MORE DETAILS THAN SET FORTH IN THE COLUMN AND MENTIONED TWO ITEMS, ONE QUOTING GEN COLLINS CONCERNING ROTATION OF TROOPS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. ANOTHER QUOTED GEN VANDENBERG CONCERNING HOW THE AIR WAR WOULD AFFECT US. ANDERSON CLAIMED THAT HE HAD OMITTED THESE ITEMS AS AFFECTING SECURITY. COL CLIFTON STATED THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NY DAILY MIRROR LAST NIGHT DEC THIRTEEN FIFTY ONE CONTAINED A FULL RESUME OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE AND IN FACT WENT INTO GREATER DETAIL THAN DID THE PEARSON COLUMN. CLIFTON EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT ALLEN HAD SCOOPED PEARSON BY TWO DAYS AND IN ADDITION TO THE MATERIAL USED BY ANDERSON IN THE ORIGINAL COLUMN BEFORE DELETION OF TWO ITEMS BY GEN BRADLEY. THE COLUMN IN THE NY MIRROR BY ALLEN ALSO CONTAINED THE TWO QUOTATIONS FROM GEN COLLINS AND FROM GEN VANDENBERG, WHICH QUOTATIONS JACK ANDERSON HAD DECLINED TO USE ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY. COL CLIFTON STATED HE HAD DISPLAYED THIS COLUMN TO CLAYTON FRITCHEY, CHIEF OF PUBLIC

WFO 6060

INFORMATION, DEPT OF DEFENSE, WHO INFORMED CLIFTON HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE MATTER, THAT HE WAS AT THE HOME OF DREW PEARSON PLAYING BRIDGE ON THE EVENING OF DEC TWELVE WHEN ANDERSON CALLED PEARSON TO INFORM HIM OF THE CALL RECEIVED FROM GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE.

FRITCHEY RELATED TO CLIFTON THAT PEARSON HAD DISPLAYED A COPY OF THE COLUMN TO FRITCHEY WHO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT IT WAS NOT HARMFUL. LATER AFTER THE CHANGES WERE MADE UPON OBJECTION BY GEN BRADLEY AS RELATED BY CLIFTON TO FRITCHEY, CLIFTON STATED

FRITCHEY EXPRESSED THE OPINION HE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH PUBLISHING THE COLUMN IN EITHER FORM. IN CONCLUSION COL CLIFTON REMARKED THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH PEARSONS STYLE OF WRITING AND

INFORMATION TECHNIQUES AND BELIEVED THE SOURCE OF INSTANT LEAK WAS SOME INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTENDED THE PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE.

COL CLIFTON EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT AFTER READING THE STORY BY ROBERT ALLEN IN THE NY MIRROR, CLIFTON CONCLUDED IN ALL PROBABILITY THE SAME SOURCE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING THE STORY TO BOTH COLUMNS.

HOOD

12-16-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

16

9:45

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE THOMAS K. FINLETTER, SECRETARY, AIR FORCE, ON INTERVIEW, ADVISES HE WAS NOT INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR TEN THIRTY AM, DECEMBER TEN LAST, UNTIL ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR BEFORE THAT TIME. HE HAD NO PRIOR BRIEFING FOR THE CONFERENCE. HIS DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT CONFERENCE WAS LESS DETAILED, BUT AGREES SUBSTANTIALLY WITH WHAT OTHER PERSONS INTERVIEWED HAVE SAID. HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT, PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE, HAD THE IDEA THE COMMUNISTS WERE OUT-TRADING THE UNITED STATES, BUT LATER AGREED WITH OTHERS AT THE CONFERENCE THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. FINLETTER PREPARED NO NOTES DURING CONFERENCE. AFTER THE CONFERENCE, GENERAL VANDENBERG DICTATED A MEMORANDUM TO FINLETTER-S SECRETARY CONCERNING HIS VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM KOREA IN EVENT OF CEASE FIRE ORDER. FINLETTER TORE UP THIS MEMO AND PREPARED A SECOND ONE OF HIS OWN ON THE SAME SUBJECT AND PERSONALLY DELIVERED THE ORIGINAL OF THIS TO SECRETARY LOVETT. ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST FINLETTER PREPARED A THIRD MEMO FOR LOVETT. EIGHTEEN OF THE TWENTY PREPARED COPIES WERE AVAILABLE WITH ONE HAVING PREVIOUSLY GONE TO VANDENBERG AS WELL AS LOVETT. ONE COPY OF THIS MEMO FURNISHED BUREAU BY MY MEMO OF DECEMBER FIFTEEN LAST. THE VANDENBERG MEMO AND FINLETTER-S FIRST MEMO WERE TORN

65-6060
RBH:DDJ

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Jones	_____
Mr. Quinn	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

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DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8WJ/ab

65-6060-11

TO PIECES AND ARE STILL MAINTAINED IN FINLETTER-S OFFICE. HE STATES
HE DOES NOT KNOW JACK ANDERSON AND HAS NOT SEEN PEARSON FOR SOME MONTHS,
AND HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH NO UNAUTHORIZED PERSON. HE HAS
NO SUSPICIONS AS TO WHOM MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK OF INFORMATION.

HOOD

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Laughlin	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

12-16-51

8:00 PM

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

16

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER

TEN, FIFTYONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON.

ESPIONAGE - X. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY

INTERVIEWED TODAY, ADVISED HE ATTENDED WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

DECEMBER TEN IN PLACE OF SECRETARY DAN KIMBALL. ARRIVED AND LEFT

ALONE, RETURNING IMMEDIATELY TO PENTAGON WHERE HE FURNISHED RESUME

TO SECRETARY KIMBALL SAME AFTERNOON. MADE NO NOTES OR MEMOS AND

DISCUSSED CONFERENCE WITH NO ONE ELSE. FOLLOWING DAY BETWEEN FIVE

AND SIX PM, JACK ANDERSON, WHOM HE HAD NEVER MET, VISITED HIS OFFICE

WITHOUT APPOINTMENT, INTRODUCED HIMSELF, AND STATED DREW PEARSON

DESIRED THAT HE MAKE ACQUAINTANCE OF WHITEHAIR, AS ANDERSON COVERS

PENTAGON FOR PEARSON. THEY EXCHANGED PLEASANTRIES, THEN ANDERSON

STATED HE UNDERSTOOD WHITEHAIR ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

AND INQUIRED WHO WAS PRESENT, FOLLOWING THIS WITH A QUERY AS TO

WHETHER THERE WERE ANY JOKES TOLD IN THE CONFERENCE. WHITEHAIR

STATED HE ANSWERED NINE OF THOSE QUESTIONS, INDICATING IT WAS

IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY NOT TO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE.

HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PULLED FROM HIS POCKET A GLOSSY PAPER,

FOLDED LIKE A NEWSPAPER, AND ASKED IF IT WERE NOT TRUE THAT

GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE WITH

THE COMMUNISTS AND WITHDRAW, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND

THE YALU RIVER. WHITEHAIR DECLINED TO COMMENT THIS QUERY, AND

MAT/egg

65-6060

10-20-97 Pro/A 6-15-92 Pro/1-5
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PAGE TWO.....

ANDERSON THEN ASKED DIDN'T JIMMY WEBB SAY THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE AND THEN IMPOSE A THREAT IN THE EVENT THE ARMISTICE TERMS WERE VIOLATED. ANDERSON ALSO ASKED IF ADMIRAL FECHTELER HAD NOT OPPOSED THIS PROPOSITION OF INCLUDING A WARNING TO THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHITEHAIR STATED HE DID NOT ANSWER EITHER QUESTION, BUT DID STATE ADMIRAL FECHTELER TALKS VERY LITTLE ABOUT ANYTHING. ANDERSON WAS PERSISTENT, AND INQUIRED WHETHER WHITEHAIR SAW THE PRESIDENT AND MAY HAVE INQUIRED REGARDING THE PRESIDENT BEING TANNED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE MAY HAVE, INDICATING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE THAT HE SAW THE PRESIDENT, WHICH WAS OBVIOUS, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL ABOUT THE SUNTAN OF THE PRESIDENT. HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PUT THE PAPER AWAY AND HE GAVE ANDERSON A LECTURE TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH MATERIAL MAY BE DANGEROUS TO THE US AND GIVE COMFORT TO THE ENEMY, BUT THAT ANDERSON SHOULD DRAW NO INFERENCES FROM ANYTHING STATED BY HIM. WHITEHAIR EXPRESSED THE BELIEF ANDERSON'S ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO MERELY OBTAIN ANECDOTES OR PLEASANTRIES AS WINDOW DRESSING FOR THE COLUMN, AND HAD NOT INTENDED TO REVEAL TO WHITEHAIR HIS MATERIAL, BUT THAT THIS WAS A DEVELOPMENT FROM WHITEHAIR'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE AT THE OUTSET. WHITEHAIR ADVISED THAT ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, AROUND EIGHT O'CLOCK, HE DISCUSSED THIS INCIDENT WITH SECRETARY KIMBALL AND TOLD HIM THE ENTIRE STORY. HE ADVISED, APPARENTLY KIMBALL RELATED THE INCIDENT TO ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND LATER IN THE MORNING, ADMIRAL FECHTELER BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF ADMIRAL DENNISON, WHO HAD COME OVER TO THE PENTAGON ABOUT ELEVEN THIRTY AM ON ANOTHER MATTER. WHITEHAIR SURMISED DENNISON RETURNED AND BROUGHT THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE

PAGE THREE. . .

PRESIDENT, AND LATER DENNISON THEN CONTACTED WHITEHAIR, AND ADVISED HIM THE PRESIDENT DESIRED THAT WHITEHAIR BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF SECRETARY LOVETT, AND AT THE SAME TIME, ADVISED MR. LOVETT THAT THE FBI SHOULD BE ADVISED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE FELT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO STOP THE STORY AND AT HIS SUGGESTION, ADMIRAL DENNISON CALLED BACK AND OBTAINED THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT PEARSON. HE THEREAFTER PHONED DREW PEARSON, WHOM HE HAD MET ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT AS NAVY UNDER-SECRETARY IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR. HE STATED HE APPEALED TO PEARSON ON TWO GROUNDS. FIRST: THAT HE WAS GREATLY EMBARRASSED BY PEARSON'S ACTION IN SENDING HIS YOUNG MAN TO VISIT WHITEHAIR ON A FRIENDLY BASIS AND, SECONDLY: AND MOST IMPORTANT, THAT DISCLOSURES OF THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT INJURE THE COUNTRY. PEARSON REPLIED THAT HE WISHED WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED HIM YESTERDAY. WHITEHAIR DECLARED THAT PEARSON STATED THAT QUOTE YOU NEEDN'T WORRY, YOU DIDN'T TELL ANDERSON ANYTHING UNQUOTE AND ALSO INSISTED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD NOT HURT THE PRESIDENT OR THE COUNTRY, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, PEARSON THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE IT. AS INDICATED, WHITEHAIR ADVISED HE KNEW PEARSON AND EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD FIRST RECEIVED AN INVITATION TO VISIT PEARSON WHEN HE WAS GENERAL COUNSEL ESA, AND WAS INVITED BY PEARSON ALONG WITH MIKE DISALLE, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT ACCEPT THIS INVITATION. ON A SATURDAY AFTERNOON, SHORTLY AFTER HIS APPOINTMENT, HE WAS AGAIN INVITED TO THE HOME OF PEARSON FOR AN INFORMAL BUFFET SUPPER AND ACCEPTED, DRIVING JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND HIS WIFE TO PEARSONS IN WHITEHAIR'S CAR. HE RECALLED

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THAT ON THIS OCCASION, PERSONS PRESENT INCLUDED: MR. AND MRS. ABE FORTAS; WALTER CRONKHITE; A SISTER OF PEARSON, AND FRED BLUMENTHAL, PEARSON'S OFFICE MAN AND REPORTER. HE RECALLED THAT SOMETIME LATER, PEARSON HAD DROPPED INTO HIS OFFICE FOR A BRIEF VISIT, INQUIRING HOW HE LIKED HIS JOB, AND EXCHANGING SMALL TALK. ON ONE OTHER DAY, PEARSON DROPPED IN VERY BRIEFLY WHILE IN THE BUILDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY OF NAVY, KIMBALL. WHITEHAIR STATED HE KNEW NO OTHER REPORTER ASSOCIATED WITH PEARSON, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BLUMENTHAL, WHOM HE HAD ALSO SEEN IN HIS OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH A MATTER RELATING TO THE HARVEY MACHINE COMPANY AND ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A LOAN, WHICH PEARSON APPARENTLY OPPOSED. WHITEHAIR LIKEWISE DID NOT KNOW ROBERT S. ALLEN OR TRIS COFFIN, WITH WHOM PEARSON WAS ASSOCIATED UNTIL RECENTLY. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN OF ROBERT ALLEN DATED DECEMBER THIRTEEN, WAS DISPLAYED TO WHITEHAIR, WHO READ IT AND STATED IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF SOMEONE WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE QUOTATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COLLINS APPEARED REASONABLY ACCURATE, MENTIONING THAT COLLINS HAD STATED THAT QUOTE FOR MY MONEY THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT DRIVE US OUT OF THIS COUNTRY; RATHER THAN UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE. WITH REFERENCE TO BRADLEY'S ALLEGED QUOTATIONS, HE STATED HE DID NOT RECALL THAT BRADLEY HAD PLACED ROTATION OF TROOPS CONTRA UN CONCESSIONS ON AIRFIELDS AS INDICATED IN THE COLUMN, BUT THAT BOTH MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED IN GENERAL BRADLEY'S PRESENTATION OF THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. WHITEHAIR COULD OFFER NO SUSPECT AND HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR

PAGE FIVE.....

SOLUTION OF THE LEAK TO ANDERSON, PEARSON, OR ALLEN. HE AFFIRMATIVELY
DECLARED HE DID PLACE COMPLETE RELIANCE IN ADMIRAL FECHTELER
AND SECRETARY PACE AND OF COURSE PROCLAIMED HIS OWN INTEGRITY.
HE EXPLAINED THIS WAS NO REFLECTION ON ANYONE ELSE PRESENT, BUT
THAT HE HAD MORE INTIMATE ASSOCIATION WITH THESE TWO MEN.

H O O D

cc: Mr. Belmont

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12-17-51

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-6060)

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
 Alleged Leak from White House
 Conference, December 10, 1951
 to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for
 DREW PEARSON
 ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/10

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Hendon	✓
Mr. Jones	✓
Mr. Mumford	✓
Mr. Quinn	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

The following persons have been interviewed by Agents of the WFO in connection with this investigation:

General OMAR BRADLEY
 Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER
 General CHARLES CABELL
 Secretary FRANK C. PACE
 Secretary THOMAS K. FINLETTER
 Acting Secretary FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR
 Acting Secretary JAMES E. WEBB
 H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
 JAMES LAY
 General HARRY VAUGHN
 General ROBERT LANDRY

The following interviews will be held on Monday, December 17, 1951:

General JOE COLLINS
 CLAYTON FRITCHEY (Department of Defense)
 S. EVERETT GLEASON (National Security Council)

Short reinterviews will be had with Messrs. WEBB and MATTHEWS in order to obtain their comments relative to the news column of ROBERT S. ALLEN that appeared in the New York Post December 13 last.

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG is out of the city and the date of his exact return is unknown; however, this will be available to us on December 17.

Admiral DENNISON of the White House has been ill and it is not known if he will be available on December 17.

Admiral SOUERS of the White House is absent from the city until December 19th.

The above interviews will in all probability conclude the inquiries of this office, unless unforeseen developments occur. The investigation will continue to be expedited.

RBH/agg

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COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
 EMPLOYED BY
 (EMPLOYEE CARD)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: December 13, 1951

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 10, 1951,
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON;
Espionage - X.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

In accordance with instructions, Mr. Hennrich and I interviewed Secretary of Defense Lovett at his office in the Pentagon, starting at 6:30 p.m. and ending at 7:45 p.m. today (December 13). Mr. Lovett was alone. The interview concerned information in the possession of Jack Anderson, leg man for Drew Pearson, which information Mr. Lovett believed came from one of the Government representatives attending a White House conference on the afternoon of December 10, 1951, presided over by President Truman. The information concerned was of a "top secret" nature.

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE

In laying the groundwork for the conference itself, Mr. Lovett advised that the Defense Department had been considering four points in connection with the present cease-fire discussions in Korea, as follows, which points were presently matters of conflict between the United Nations Forces and the Communist peace representatives:

1. The UN representatives desire to rotate the soldiers in Korea in order to allow the men who have been in the field to come home after a certain period of service. This rotation by UN is man for man and, as a matter of fact, there are some 5,000 less UN soldiers in Korea now than at the beginning of the peace talks. On the contrary, the Communists have rotated by replacing divisions or armies, with the result that they now have over 200,000 more men in Korea than when the peace talks started.
2. The exchange of prisoners of war. The UN wants to exchange man for man to insure the return of all UN prisoners and also because the UN has a far greater number of Communist prisoners (approximately 175,000 to 10,000) than there are UN prisoners under the control of the Communists. Mr. Lovett advised that there is a humanitarian principle involved also, as it is felt that the Communist prisoners will be liquidated if they are returned in toto.

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3. A special Air Force problem involving the question of whether the Communists should be allowed to build air fields in North Korea after the cease fire preceding the armistice.
4. The question of whether the Communists should be allowed to repair roads, bridges, railroads, etc., after the cease fire has been put into effect.

Mr. Lovett stated that there had been a full agreement on the first three points and, as a result, instructions on these three points had already been sent to General Ridgeway. However, on point No. 4 regarding rehabilitation and repairs, the President called from Key West on Saturday, December 8, as he wanted further explanation of this point because he could not see why we should allow the Communists to build up by such rehabilitation and repairs during the cease-fire period. As a result, a conference was called by the President for 10:30 a.m., Monday, December 10, 1951, and the White House issued invitations to the Secretaries of the three Services, the three Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley and Mr. Lovett from Defense, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On Sunday, December 9, Mr. Lovett requested that the Director of the Joint Staff, General Cabell, be present also. The purpose of the conference was to consider this question of rehabilitation and repairs. The position of the Defense Department was that such rehabilitation and repairs were as necessary in South Korea as they were in North Korea and that we would probably lose more than we would gain if both sides were prohibited from rehabilitating and repairing the areas under their jurisdiction.

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 10, 1951

Mr. Lovett advised that he had made inquiry, since talking with the Director, of Secretary Frank Pace and General Joe Collins, and, as best the three of them could remember, the following were present at the conference:

President Truman

Secretary of Defense Lovett

General Omar Bradley - Chief of Staff

General Joe Collins - Army

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg - Air

Admiral William Fechtler - Navy

General Cabell - Joint Staff

Secretary Frank C. Pace - Army

Secretary Thomas K. Finletter - Air

Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair - Navy

Acting Secretary James E. Webb - State

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews - State

Admiral Sidney Souers - White House

James Lay - National Security Council

General Vaughan - White House

Admiral Dennison - White House

General Robert Landry - White House

In addition to the above, Mr. Lovett said that

Joe Short and Matt Connelly, press representatives of the White

House, were at the conference, but he does not know how long or whether they merely came in and out delivering messages. Mr. Lovett had previously indicated to the Director that Mr. Edward Foley of the Treasury Department may have been present, but he now believes that Foley was not there.

The President came in and shook hands with everyone at the conference and it was remarked that he looked tan and fit. The conference then discussed the question of repairs and rehabilitation and, after it was explained to the President that we would lose as much as we would gain through such prohibition and there was unanimous agreement on this point, the President agreed and approved the instructions authorizing a dispatch to General Ridgeway on that point.

Mr. Lovett advised that the President then asked about the NATO agreement in Rome. Mr. Lovett and General Bradley discussed this at the conference.

A discussion then ensued as to "how tough do you get if there is a violation of the armistice." Mr. Lovett advised it was pointed out that every condition that is put into an armistice points up necessary action if the Communists should violate that particular condition and such a violation would immediately raise a question of what action would the UN Forces take if the Communists violated a condition of the armistice. It was decided it would be better to take a general stand and make general conditions in the armistice, rather than get too specific, and at the same time make it plain to the Communists that if the armistice were not kept "there would be a hell of a war" and that any breaking of faith in the armistice would result in a war extending to other fields, such as China, and that it would not result in a resumption of just the Korean war.

Mr. Lovett advised that the White House conference, which was held in the Cabinet Room, lasted from 10:30 a.m. until approximately 11:45 a.m. on December 10.

Mr. Lovett advised that at the close of the conference the President called aside Mr. Webb and spoke to him briefly near the door. Mr. Short went outside and advised the press, who were present in the White House in great number and who had been clamoring for information, that they had discussed world affairs, including Korea. Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Short made no further statement.

In answer to our questions, Mr. Lovett advised that all of the above-listed individuals were present throughout the conference, with the exception of Short and Connelly. There was no secretary taking notes and no minutes were kept of the meeting. There was no written agenda prepared for the items to be taken up. He noted no one taking notes, although Admiral Dennison, General Vaughan, and General Landry were behind him and he did not know as to them. Mr. Lovett stated that he made no notes and dictated no memorandum following the conference. Mr. Lovett did not know and had not made inquiry as to whether any other persons dictated memoranda following the conference. Relative to the inquiries that Mr. Lovett had indicated he would cause Colonel Randall to make, these were merely inquiries as to who was present at the conference.

ACTIVITIES OF JACK ANDERSON

Mr. Lovett advised that yesterday afternoon (December 12), exact time not known to him, Jack Anderson, leg man for Drew Pearson, contacted Acting Secretary Whitehair (probably not in his office) and showed to Whitehair or read to him a story which purported to be almost a verbatim account of the important things set forth above which occurred at the conference at the White House on December 10. Mr. Lovett said that Whitehair was shocked and told Anderson it would be a bad idea to publish this material. Whitehair spoke to his executive officer about Anderson's visit and they agreed that Admiral Dennison should be advised. Admiral Dennison reported this to the President, who was very much upset. The President got word to General Bradley, who called Pearson or Anderson, and Anderson was asked to come over and bring his story. Anderson came to see General Bradley about 7:00 p.m. and brought the story, which was read by General Bradley and his aides, Colonel Clifton and Colonel Matthews. Bradley attempted to get Anderson to "kill" the story entirely, but Anderson said he had checked with Pearson and that the story was already on the Bell Syndicate wires and would come out this Saturday, December 15. Anderson said it was impossible to "kill" the story. General Bradley and his aides marked in red pencil two parts which they stated would be especially injurious to the security of this country, and Anderson said he would recommend that these two parts be "killed." The first part was a statement attributed to

the President that if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, we should arrange to extend the time. The second part related to concessions we might be prepared to make to the Communists.

In answer to our queries, Mr. Lovett advised that he did not know the full content of Anderson's paper. He stated that neither Whitehair nor General Bradley had secured a copy of Anderson's paper and that the only source from which the contents could be obtained in the Government would be recollections of Whitehair, General Bradley, and Bradley's two aides. He said that when the article comes out on Saturday, it will be possible for these gentlemen to compare it with what they read on Anderson's paper. He advised that he did not know the exact excerpts of Anderson's paper which shocked Whitehair, but rather thought it was the fact that Anderson had what appeared to be an accurate picture of the conference. He pointed out that Anderson's story had background which would indicate that it must have come from someone actually at the conference; for example, it started out by saying that the President, tanned and fit, walked briskly into the conference room and shook hands with everyone, including his own White House aides. Other background information made it appear that the story must have been given to Anderson by someone actually at the conference.

Mr. Lovett was asked whether all of the items in Anderson's story pertained to the conference and, specifically, whether the two items which General Bradley red-penciled occurred at the conference. Mr. Lovett stated that he did not recall any discussion at the conference of extending the time if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, although he conjectured that this might have happened while the President was talking to Mr. Webb at the door. He said that the second point (on concessions we might make) was probably covered in some measure at the conference. We asked whether there were any items mentioned at the conference that were not in Anderson's story. He did not know. We asked whether, in view of the fact that three of the four points covered in the cease-fire agenda had already been acted on and dispatched to General Ridgeway prior to the conference, it would be possible that the story was secured from these

dispatches or from sources other than those within the actual conference. He stated he had not thought of this and that it might be possible. We pointed out that if Anderson's story carried an item concerning the cease fire date of December 27, and this was not discussed at the conference, it was very pertinent and therefore it was very necessary that the exact story by Anderson be furnished us, in so far as possible, for comparison purposes as to exactly what went on at the conference. Mr. Lovett said that when the story comes out, such a comparison can be made. He said that General Bradley would not be back until Saturday, December 15, but that his two aides, Colonels Clifton and Matthews, were available for interview.

Mr. Lovett related that when Anderson came over to see General Bradley, at Bradley's request, he came over on a basis of trade; that is, "if he would bring the article over and give Bradley a chance to screen it, Bradley would tell him where the Defense Department learned that he had this information." After Bradley and his aides had gone over the story and red-penciled it, Anderson asked where they had learned he had the story. General Bradley told him from the President, whereupon Anderson "damn near fell off the chair." After leaving Bradley's office and while walking down the corridor, Anderson commented, "I guess Whitehair must have told."

Mr. Lovett related that when Whitehair told of Anderson's visit to him, he said that he told Anderson, "For god's sake tell Pearson that if he publishes this story it will throw suspicion on me," pointing out that he was the newest member of the conference and that it was known he had a longstanding acquaintance with Pearson. Whitehair definitely told Lovett he did not give out any information on the conference, and Lovett stated this was borne out by the fact that Whitehair reported Anderson's visit to him and that had Anderson got it from Whitehair, he would not have come back to Whitehair to verify it.

ATTITUDE OF MR. LOVETT

Mr. Lovett advised he believed that this story was leaked by a member of the conference and that it was done deliberately. He said he based this feeling on the fact the story had color and background that it would be difficult to secure from anyone who was not at the conference, and that the story set forth what various persons said at the conference.

Mr. Lovett went on to relate that he was extremely concerned about leaks in the Defense Department and he earnestly wanted to find out one person who was responsible for leaks, in order that he could make an example of him. He advised that he believes these leaks occur in four ways:

1. By flannel mouths who talk too much at cocktail parties;
2. Through officials who wanted to show that they "knew it all";
3. Through officials who assumed that everyone in the Pentagon was cleared for all types of security information, with the result that they talked to anyone in the Pentagon;
4. Through leaks by members of Congress.

Mr. Lovett was asked to explain this last point. He said that frequently members of Congress, such as members of the Senate Armed Services Committee or members of other Congressional committees who had to consider such things as appropriations for the armed services, would call the Defense Department for information on the current situation in Korea or in some phase of the Defense Department activities. Rather than write a reply, the Defense Department sends up an officer, who talks to the Congressman and furnishes him the information. This is done with the understanding that it is very confidential and "in 99 out of 100 cases" the Congressman observes the confidence. Mr. Lovett was asked whether it was necessary to furnish such information to the Congressmen. He stated that unless the information is furnished, the Defense Department does not

get its appropriations or satisfactory action from the Congress. Mr. Lovett advised that he could recall four instances where Congressmen betrayed confidences to the papers and, as he recalls these individuals, they were Senator Kane, another Senator, and two Representatives - "Gavin and Zand or someone like that." He was not at all sure of this.

Mr. Lovett advised he was certain that Generals Bradley and Collins and Secretary Pace had not given out any information from this conference and had not fallen into any pitfalls, such as dictating memoranda after the conference. He said he was sure of them.

Mr. Lovett advised that in the matter of dealings with Congress, some difficulty had been experienced with the Air Force, in that Secretary Finletter and General Vandenberg had gone direct to Congress, after rules adverse to the Air Department had been made in the Department of Defense. He said he could not say how this could pertain to this particular matter, however.

Mr. Lovett further advised it was well known that the Armed Services used Pearson "to send up trial balloons" on their problems, in order to find out what the reaction would be.

It was our impression that Mr. Lovett was rather frank with us and he appeared to be sincere in his desire to get to the bottom of leaks in the Defense Department.

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

Mr. Lovett advised that General Bradley called him yesterday (December 12) and said that the President would call Lovett this morning (December 13). Bradley said that the President had asked that Lovett call Director Hoover and see if this leak could be traced. This morning (December 13) Admiral Dennison did call Mr. Lovett and requested him to call the Director and ask that this leak be traced. Lovett asked Dennison why he was being requested to call the FBI and asked whether there was any feeling on the part of the President that the

Defense Department was responsible for this leak. Admiral Dennison said "no," but it was felt that Lovett would follow through more vigorously than their own Executive Staff. Mr. Lovett advised that it occurred to him the President might want the request to come from outside the White House so that it would not exclude the members of the White House staff. Mr. Lovett said that he, Secretary Pace, General Collins, and General Bradley were the only ones in the Defense Department who know of the request for investigation.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that if a full investigation is launched into this matter, it may be necessary to talk with everyone who was at the conference and, on that basis, we would like to know if this request for investigation emanated direct from the President and if we could so state in conducting the investigation. He said it did and we should.

Mr. Lovett said it had occurred to him that possibly there was a microphone in the Cabinet Room.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that we had previously conducted investigations for leaks along this same line and that it was apparent a condition existed in the Defense Department where information supposedly restricted to a very small tight group of officials received wide dissemination as a result of memoranda dictated following the conference, which, in turn, went through many hands.

It was further pointed out to Mr. Lovett that on the basis of our discussion with him, there was doubt whether all of the information contained in Anderson's story covered topics discussed at the conference in question; therefore, it was highly desirable that we know exactly what was in Anderson's story and exactly what topics were discussed at the conference, for comparison purposes. He reiterated that such an analysis can be made when Pearson's article comes out on Saturday, December 15.

RECOMMENDATION:

From the above information, it appears that we will be required to make an investigation. It likewise appears that under the set of circumstances, the chances of success are small. The only accurate sources of information would be Anderson and Pearson, who will not talk if past experience with them is indicative. The individual who gave the information to Anderson would be a fool to talk.

Nevertheless, it is believed we should follow the logical steps, even though they will probably only prove that this information has had rather wide dissemination.

The suggested steps, in order of preference, are:

1. Interview Colonels Clifton and Matthews of General Bradley's office at once for full details as to what was in Anderson's story.
2. Interview Whitehair for the same information and at the same time interview him as a possible source of information to Pearson. Secure from him his recollection of what went on at the conference.
3. Interview General Bradley upon his return Saturday, December 15, for his recollection of what went on at the conference and the details of Anderson's story.
4. Secure a copy of Pearson's column for Saturday, December 15, in order to compare it with the information supplied us as to what went on at the White House conference.
5. Interview every individual who attended the White House conference, with the possible exception of President Truman, to secure their detailed recollections of what went on at the conference and the topics discussed. The purpose of this is to get a composite picture against which we can compare the picture obtained of Anderson's story and the resultant Pearson column. Ascertain from all persons who attended the conference whether they made notes; whether they dictated memoranda; whether they discussed the conference with other persons; and

what distribution was made of any memoranda dictated and through whose hands they passed. Secure copies of these memoranda for comparison with Pearson's column.

6. Follow up any logical leads by interviews with other persons having access to this information.
7. In addition to the above, inasmuch as Mr. Lovett brought up the question as to whether there might not be a microphone in the Cabinet Room, it is recommended that Admiral Dennison be contacted and advised that this question was raised by Mr. Lovett and, if Admiral Dennison so desires, we have Laboratory representatives make a thorough check of the Cabinet Room for a possible microphone.

As this will be a lengthy investigation, it is recommended that the experienced Agents of the WFO who conducted the prior investigation of the alleged Pearson leak be called in for briefing and instructed to conduct this investigation at once.

In keeping with the above recommendation, I contacted SAC Hood of WFO tonight (December 13) and he will bring Agents to my office at 9:00 a.m. on December 14 for proper briefing, in order that this investigation may be immediately instituted.

I approved all
recommendations
last night.
12/14/51 H-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd *pl*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *Q*

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 15, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

At 12:25 P.M. today, Secretary Lovett called to furnish two bits of information which he had picked up subsequent to our interview with him on the night of December 13.

Mr. Lovett advised that it is his understanding now that James Lay did take notes during the conference of December 10.

Mr. Lovett further advised that Clayton Fritchie, Public Relations Department of Defense, came to see him and showed him a column by Robert Allen, former partner of Drew Pearson, which has information similar to that which appeared in the story of Jack Anderson. Mr. Lovett advised that he has not seen the Pearson column as anticipated in today's papers. He advised that Clayton Fritchie informed him that he was at Pearson's house on the evening when Anderson was called down to General Bradley's office and that Fritchie saw the articles at Pearson's home.*

I informed Secretary Lovett that we had obtained a copy of the column by Robert Allen, which Secretary Lovett referred to above, and that we are using this as one basis for questions in the interviews that are presently going on. I advised Secretary Lovett that as he was undoubtedly aware, we had launched an investigation into this matter immediately following our interview with him on December 13 and a number of interviews had been conducted and additional interviews are being conducted over the week end with persons who attended the conference.

Secretary Lovett advised that he would call me in the event any additional information came to his attention. I thanked him for his thoughtfulness.

AHB:hmb *hmb* * We had received this same information during an interview with Colonel Clifton of General Bradley's office on December 14.

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EDITORIAL SECTION

Letters • Cartoons • Columns • Press
Digests • Labor and Business News

Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON FOREIGN

Reds' Cease-Fire Terms N. G.

By Robert S. Allen

Washington, Dec. 13—The UN can have a cease fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. Gen. Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one."

"What do they want?" asked the President.

"The deadlock gets down to this," explained Bradley. "We are demanding the right to continue

to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons. But they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand."

Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"I want a cease fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper," declared the Air Chief of

Staff. "But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

Gen. J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of UN troops.

"That would be a serious blow

to the morale of our men," Collins argued. "I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds on making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields."

"Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful airforce.

President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished.

Then he told them:

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway.



NEW YORK POST
"Blue Final" Edition
DECEMBER 13, 1951

65 DEC 27 1951

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140 DEC 26 1951

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5-28*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 17, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON, Alleged Leak from
White House Conference,
December 10, 1951, to JACK ANDERSON,
Leg-Man for DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Tolson
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Harbo
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Nease
Gandy

I went over the investigations of this case with Special Agent in Charge Hood in some detail on December 17. Interviews have been completed with all but two of the persons who attended the December 10 conference plus those who had knowledge of what was discussed. Those remaining to be interviewed are Secretary Dan Kimball, who will be interviewed on December 18, and Admiral Sidney Souers, who will be interviewed on December 19.

Analysis of the information developed up to this time indicates that there was limited dissemination of information as to what actually went on at the President's conference of December 10, 1951. The Washington Field Office is carefully analyzing this particular problem in order to come up with as definite a picture as possible as to exactly who did have access to the specifics of the conference prior to the time they were known to be in Anderson's possession.

Regarding the problem as to whether Anderson's information and, in addition, Allen's column could have been prepared from information available from sources other than someone who attended or had detailed information regarding the conference of December 10, there is divergent opinion. The consensus is that the information must have come from someone who knew what went on at the December 10 conference. This is modified by statements that certain of the information is not accurate and some not true. It is further modified by the fact that many of the persons interviewed are unable to recall exactly what was discussed at the conference and, of the items discussed, exactly what was said by certain individuals. It has been pointed out that most of the matters discussed had been previously discussed in great detail on many occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those officially interested in the particular problems. The conviction of those who feel that the information in question had to have come from someone who had knowledge of what went on at the December 10 conference

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is generally based on the fact that most of the items in Anderson's paper and Allen's column were actually discussed in some form at the conference. As pointed out above, some of the information was inaccurate.

At this point, it appears necessary that we actually determine when the Pearson column of December 15, appearing in the New York "Daily Mirror," was filed with Bell Syndicate. Since Allen actually printed a similar column in the "New York Post" on December 13, it is important that we know when he filed that column since Allen's information may have been made available by Pearson. We cannot overlook the possibility that Allen may have originally obtained the information and made it available to Pearson. The timing, therefore, of the filing of any columns would have significance in analyzing these questions. It is, I think, a fair assumption that Pearson is aware of our investigation. If the leak originated with someone who attended the December 10 conference they would, in all probability, have notified Pearson that the investigation is going on. Since this is true, I feel that we should now go directly to Bell Syndicate to obtain information as to when Pearson's column was filed. We should obtain a copy of the complete column. I think we should also make similar inquiries regarding the Allen column as to the time of filing.

In the event results of pending interviews do not indicate otherwise, we should, after obtaining the information regarding the Pearson columns, interview Joseph Short, Press Secretary at the White House. Short was not present at the December 10 conference to our knowledge. He did make a brief statement to the press regarding the conference. He should be interviewed to determine if Anderson, or a representative of Pearson or of Allen, was at the White House on that date and, if so, complete details should be obtained as to Short's observations of who they talked to, what questions were asked, etc. Short should also be discreetly questioned regarding his knowledge of Pearson's and Allen's sources in the Government which would have a bearing on this investigation. Thereafter, interviews should be had with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson and Robert Allen. In order that the record may be clear and, on the off chance that we may develop information, it is felt that these interviews will have to be conducted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

If you approve, the New York Office will be telephonically instructed to initiate inquiries at Bell Syndicate in New York. It is not definite whether Bell Syndicate handles Allen's column. In the event it does not, inquiries should be initiated at the "New York Post" for information regarding Allen's column.

OK -
H.

new york
instructed to
handle
JH.

Washington MERRY GO-ROUND

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14.

The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when HST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was "good to be back," asked how they liked his tan.

He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened:

Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: "That's a tough one."

Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions.

Gen. Vandenberg, Air chief, opposed major concessions, was adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire.

Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotation. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale Collins warned.

Silent Admiral

Collins agreed "minor concessions" should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we "would later regret."

Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out "any mission any time any place."

For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blasted out of Korea, could hold on "until hell freezes over."

One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N.-Communist teams, but the Reds want it by "neutral" nations—and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground here and it has been done.

The principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close, with

a settlement within 20 days. Some details will be left to iron out later.

Another matter discussed was the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether—after the armistice. The facts regarding this must not be published now.

0-19

Tolson ☒
Ladd ☒
Clegg ☐
Glavin ☐
Nichols ☐
Rosen ☐
Tracy ☐
Harbo ☐
Alden ☐
Belmont ☒
Laughlin ☐
Mohr ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Nease ☐
Gandy ☐

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Page

Times-Herald

Wash. Post

Wash. News

Wash. Star

N.Y. Mirror 7

N. Y. Compass

Date:

65 DEC 26 1951

12-17-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

17

7:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR
DREW PEARSON; ESP DASH X. CHIEF OF AIR FORCE GENERAL HOYT S.

VANDENBERG WAS INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED THAT HE HAD
ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE ON DECEMBER TENTH,
LAST. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY
NOTES AT THE CONFERENCE AND HAD NOT PREPARED ANY MEMORANDA
OR SEEN ANY MEMORANDA WHICH ANYONE ELSE HAD PREPARED CONCERNING
THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE MEMO WHICH HE HAD PREPARED
WITH MR. FINLETTER ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST, REFERRING TO THE
WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE WAS MATERIAL WHICH WAS NOT DISCUSSED
AT THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND WHICH HE, MR. FINLETTER AND
MR. LOVETT THOUGHT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
PRESIDENT, AND THAT IT PERTAINED TO AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT THE ONLY
PERSONS HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ARE MR. LOVETT
AND MR. FINLETTER. HE STATED THAT THE ORIGINAL OF THE MEMO
PREPARED IN MR. FINLETTER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE BUREAU, WAS DELIVERED
PERSONALLY TO MR. LOVETT BY MR. FINLETTER AND HIM. GENERAL
VANDENBERG STATED THAT A COPY OF THE MEMO WAS GIVEN TO

HIM AND HE GAVE IT TO HIS AIDE, COLONEL

DEC 19 1951

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65-6060

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E.A. Tamm	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Hendon	✓
Mr. Jones	✓
Mr. Mumford	✓
Mr. Quinn	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

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cc Mr. Heunrich

PAGE TWO

CHARLES V. MURPHY, BUT HE REITERATED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MEMO WERE NOT DISCUSSED AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE MEETING ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST. THE ARTICLE BY ROBERT S. ALLAN^E WAS SHOWN TO GENERAL VANDENBERG AND HE ADVISED THAT IN HIS OPINION THIS ARTICLE COULD ~~NOT~~ HAVE BEEN WRITTEN WITHOUT THE WRITER'S HAVING ACCESS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE CONFERENCE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EVERYTHING APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN SOMETIME OR OTHER IN THE PAST PUBLICLY STATED BY THE INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM THE MATERIAL WAS ATTRIBUTED, AND THAT CERTAINLY ANYONE WHO HAD FOLLOWED THE KOREAN SITUATION AND ANALYZED VARIOUS ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE PRESS ON THE SITUATION COULD HAVE PREPARED THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT THE ALLAN ARTICLE WAS, IN FACT, ERRONEOUS IN ITS REPORTING OF WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED. HE STATED THAT THE WHOLE REASON FOR THE CONFERENCE IN HIS OPINION WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE REASONS WHY CERTAIN NEGOTIATION INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN SENT TO GENERAL RIDGEWAY IN JAPAN. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT THE PART OF THE ARTICLE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM WAS ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT AND STATED THAT HE HAD ONLY MADE A SHORT STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE STATED WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL COLLINS' REMARK QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL THIS REMARK AND DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GENERAL COLLINS WOULD MAKE SUCH A REMARK IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESIDENT AND THAT HE FEELS CONFIDENT THAT IF GENERAL COLLINS HAD MADE SUCH REMARK,

PAGE THREE

HE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY REMEMBERED IT. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE ^EALLAN ARTICLE WAS A POOR REPORT ON WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CONFERENCE, AND STATED THAT WHOEVER PREPARED THE ARTICLE MUST HAVE HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED, UNLESS THE WRITER DELIBERATELY SLANTED THE ARTICLE IN THAT FASHION. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON AND BELIEVES THAT HE HAS MET DREW PEARSON ONCE ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO IN THE DEFENSE BLDG., AND THAT THE LAST TIME HE SAW ROBERT S. ^EALLAN WAS IN EUROPE WHEN ^EALLAN WAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR GENERAL PATTON. HE DENIED SEEING OR TALKING TO ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE CONFERENCE IN QUESTION.

HOOD

for. m. to Silvestre (main 4), 507 ci/bd #265, 95

PAGE TWO

FROM THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT CONFERENCE. ADMIRAL DENNISON OF
WHITEHOUSE STAFF ALSO INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISES DID NOT SEE
THE PEARSON RELEASE IN THE POSSESSION OF ANDERSON. CLAIMS DOES
NOT KNOW PEARSON OR ANDERSON AND DENIES ANY DISCLOSURE ON HIS PART
OF INFO INVOLVED. ADVISES ONLY NOTES OF CONFERENCE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE
WERE THOSE MADE BY LAY, WHO TOOK MINUTES OF MEETING. STATES FIRST
KNEW FACT MEETING TO BE HELD ON DECEMBER EIGHTH, WHEN ADVISED BY
PRESIDENT. DOES NOT RECALL DISCUSSION AT MEETING OF DECEMBER
TWENTYSEVENTH CEASE FIRE EXTENSION. STATES UNABLE SUGGEST ANY
SUSPECT AS RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. SUGGESTS STATE DEPT. AS POSSIBLE
SOURCE OF LEAK, BUT HAS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS OTHER THAN PAST
EXPERIENCE IN LEAKS OF INFO. THAT DEPT. HIS ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS
AT CONFERENCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE DEVELOPED THROUGH OTHER
INTERVIEWS. DENNISON READ AND ANALYZED BOTH THE ALLEN AND PEARSON
COLUMNS AND STATES HIS OPINION NEITHER COULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY
OUTSIDE INDIVIDUAL WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. ADVISES HIS RECOLLECTION
THAT OVER ONE HALF OF CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN
SITUATION AND INDICATED HE CONSIDERED IT UNUSUAL THAT NEITHER COLUMN
CONTAINED ANY DETAILS CONCERNING EUROPEAN DISCUSSIONS.

HOOD

cc: Mr. Belmont

2-17-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

17 9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DEC. TEN, NINETEEN FIFTY ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG DASH MAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X. GENERAL JOSEPH COLLINS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE HAD ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE DEC. TEN LAST. COLLINS ADVISED MEETING OPENED BY BRIEFING BY GENERAL BRADLEY, THEN PRESIDENT CALLED ON LOVETT, FOLLOWED BY VANDENBERG AND THEN ADMIRAL FECHTELER. THEREUPON THE PRESIDENT TURNED TO THE SECRETARIES, PACE, FINLETTER AND ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WHITEHAIR, FOR REMARKS. COLLINS ADVISED HE FOLLOWED WHITEHAIR AS SPEAKER AND MADE BRIEF POINTS, SPEAKING AT DIFFERENT TIMES. HIS FIRST REMARKS WERE BASED ON A POINT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY ADMIRAL FECHTELER, AND COLLINS ADVISED HE POINTED OUT SOME DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMIRAL FECHTELER'S REMARKS AND THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE ARMISTICE AND CONCESSIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED. LATER THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE AIR BUILDUP OF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN KOREA. COLLINS THEREUPON INTERJECTED WITH

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THE COMMENT THAT HE WOULD GUARANTEE THAT WE WOULD NOT BE
THROWN OUT OF KOREA. FOLLOWING GENERAL COLLINS' LAST REMARKS,
HE ADVISED MR. WEBB WAS CALLED UPON AND HE REFERRED
TO MR. MATTHEWS, WHO OUTLINED THE POSITION OF THE STATE DEPT.
HE ADDED MR. WEBB ALSO SPOKE A FEW WORDS, DETAILS NOT RECALLED.
COLLINS ADVISED HE WENT TO CONFERENCE IN SAME CAR WITH ADMIRAL
FECHTELER AND RETURNED TO PENTAGON FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WITH
FECHTELER, THEREAFTER, DISCUSSING THE PROCEEDINGS WITH NO ONE
ELSE AND MADE NO RECORD OF SAME. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN,
PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN, RELATIVE TO WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE,
WAS DISPLAYED TO GENERAL COLLINS AND HE ADVISED THAT PORTION
ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AS REFLECTED IN THE ALLEN COLUMN WAS A FAIR
SUMMATION OF HIS PORTION, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE EXACT WORDS AS
RECALLED BY GENERAL COLLINS. HE WAS POSITIVE IN STATING HE DID
NOT USE THE PHRASE QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH
HE WAS NOT CERTAIN ABOUT HIS HAVING MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING
TROOP ROTATION. CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATION AS REFLECTED
BY ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS SAID IT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE PRESIDENT
HAD STATED, BUT NOT AN EXACT QUOTATION, ALTHOUGH IN SUBSTANCE WAS
ACCURATE. HE ADVISED THE ALLEN QUOTATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL
VANDENBERG WAS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT AND THAT THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED

TO GENERAL BRADLEY WERE GENERALLY ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH IN THE CONFERENCES GENERAL BRADLEY HAD NOT STRESSED THAT THE MATTER OF TROOP ROTATION HAD BEEN HELD AS A BARGAINING POINT AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIR FIELDS ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNISTS. GENERAL COLLINS HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO HOW A LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED, IF A LEAK DID OCCUR, AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THE COLUMN BY ROBERT ALLEN COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY SOMEONE WHO HAD PICKED UP A FEW BITS OF DATA HERE AND THERE FROM PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE OBTAINED IT EVEN SECOND OR THIRD HAND, WHICH PERSONS MAY HAVE ALSO POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF PREVIOUS CONFERENCES RELATIVE TO SIMILAR SUBJECT MATTER. CONCERNING THE PERSONNEL PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE, GENERAL COLLINS SAID HE HAD NO PERSONAL SUSPICIONS AND POINTED OUT HE HAD NOT SEEN OR HAD ANY CONTACT WITH DREW PEARSON IN MORE THAN A YEAR. GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW WHO JACK ANDERSON WAS, BUT NEVER HAD MET HIM AND KNEW OF NO OTHER PERSONS IN PEARSON'S EMPLOY. CONCERNING ROBERT S. ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW ALLEN, BUT HAD NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO HIM IN MORE THAN A YEAR. CLAYTON FRITCHEY DIRECTOR PUBLIC INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ADVISED HE POSSESSED NO INFO CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS, WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, DEC. TEN AND DID NOT KNOW WHO ATTENDED OTHER THAN FROM CONJECTURE. HE ADVISED ON AFTERNOON TUESDAY DEC. ELEVEN, JACK ANDERSON VISITED

HIS OFFICE BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE P.M. ANDERSON INQUIRED
REGARDING THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND FRITCHEY INDICATED HE
POSSESSED NO INFORMATION. ANDERSON INFORMED FRITCHEY HE HAD
PRETTY GOOD FILL IN AND FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM ANDERSON'S MANNER
ANDERSON CONSIDERED THE MATERIAL AUTHENTIC. ON WEDNESDAY, DEC.
TWELVE FRICHEY VISITED DREW PEARSON'S HOME FOR DINNER AND BRIDGE,
ALTHOUGH PEARSON DOES NOT PLAY BRIDGE PERSONALLY. ENROUTE FRITCHEY
WENT BY HOME OF FRITCHEY'S ASSISTANT, COLONEL CLARKE NEWLON, WHO
LATER JOINED FRITCHEY AT THE PEARSON RESIDENCE FOR BRIDGE.
DINNER GUESTS AT THE PEARSON HOME INCLUDED PEARSON AND WIFE, EDWARD
PRITCHARD, OF KENTUCKY, MR. FRITCHEY AND ATTORNEY, PETER ANSBURY
AND WIFE. WHILE AT DINNER OR POSSIBLY JUST BEFORE DINNER, JACK
ANDERSON CAME IN AND FRITCHEY WAS INVITED ASIDE AND SHOWN AN
ARTICLE WHICH HE GATHERED WAS PART OF A COLUMN TYPEWRITTEN ON
SEVERAL YELLOW PAGES. FRITCHEY LEARNED FROM PEARSON THAT THE
MATERIAL CONTAINED SEVERAL ITEMS TO WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY OR COLONEL
CLIFTON OBJECTED AND THAT ANDERSON WAS GOING TO PRESENT THEM TO
THESE OFFICERS. PEARSON INVITED FRITCHEY TO READ THE COLUMN MATERIAL
WHICH HE DID AND ADVISED HE FOUND IT RATHER INNOCUOUS AND PRETTY
TAME. HE STATED DESPITE THIS, IT STRUCK HIM THAT THE FACT THAT
THERE APPEARED TO BE A LEAK FROM AN IMPORTANT CONFERENCE WAS IMPORTANT.

HE STATED HE DID NOT SUGGEST THIS TO PEARSON NOR DID HE SUGGEST THAT PEARSON NOT PUBLISH THE COLUMN. STATING THAT HE DID NOT FEEL IT WOULD CAUSE ANY FUROR AS IT IS KNOWN PEARSON HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES AND THIS SORT OF THING OCCURRS REGULARLY. FRITCHEY ADVISED THAT ANDERSON THEN DEPARTED AND AN HOUR OR SO LATER ANDERSON RETURNED WHILE FRITCHEY WAS PLAYING BRIDGE. HE DID NOT SEE THE COLUMN ON THIS OCCASION; HOWEVER, PEARSON SAID THE COLUMN HAD BEEN CHANGED IN ONE OR TWO PLACES IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL BRADLEY'S SUGGESTION AND PEARSON INCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE CHANGED IF SUGGESTED. FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM THIS THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE DISPATCHED AND ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN HAD APPEARED, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AS EDITORS OFTEN EXERCISE THE PREROGATIVE TO DELETE COLUMNS OR PORTIONS. FRITCHEY EXAMINED THE ROBERT ALLEN COLUMN OF THE NEW YORK POST, DEC. THIRTEEN, AND SAID THAT TO HIS RECOLLECTION, THEY ARE PRETTY WELL PARALLEL TO THE PEARSON MATERIAL HE HAD READ. FRITCHEY RELATED THAT ON SATURDAY DECEMBER FIFTEEN, BEFORE NOON, ANDERSON HAD VISITED HIM ON ANOTHER MATTER AND HE TWITTED ANDERSON ABOUT BEING SCOOPED BY ALLEN. HE DECLARED ANDERSON APPEARED GENERALLY SURPRISED AND LEFT IN A HURRY, APPARENTLY IN SEARCH OF A NEW YORK POST CONTAINING THE ALLEN COLUMN. FRITCHEY COULD OFFER NO SUGGESTION AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK NOR FURNISH

WFO 65-6060

Page Six

ANY INVESTIGATIVE LEADS IN THIS DIRECTION. HE ALSO SAID HE
COULD DRAW NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHETHER A COMMON SOURCE MAY
HAVE BEEN USED TO FURNISH INFO FOR THE PEARSON AND THE ALLEN
COLUMNS OR IF A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE HAD BEEN USED.

HOOD

CC: Mr. Belmont

SAC, WFO (65-6060)

December 18, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

Reurlet December 15, 1951.

There is attached the original of Copy No. 10 of 20 copies of a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, bearing the stamped signature of Thomas K. Finletter, dated December 10, 1951, together with one photostatic copy thereof. This is being returned in accordance with your request.

Enclosure

CEH:LL

~~One~~ Two photostatic copy of the above-described memorandum being retained in the files of the Bureau.)

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DEC 19 1951

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Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

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RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
DEC 19 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. C. E. Hendrich

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: ~~ROBERT S. ALLEN~~ COLUMN APPEARING
IN "NEW YORK POST," 12-13-51ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

The New York Office furnished the following information:

The "New York Post" regularly publishes four weekday editions as follows:

- (1) "Night Extra." This is published as of 9:30 A.M. each day.
- (2) "7 Blue Final**" printed at 1:30 P.M.
- (3) "7 Blue Final*" printed at 3:15 P.M.
- (4) "7 Blue Final" printed at 7:20 P.M.

In the editions published by the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951, Robert S. Allen had two different columns. The first column entitled "Must Truman Toss Out McGrath" appeared only in the "Night Extra" edition. The second column which contained the story on Korea was printed in all three of the "7 Blue Final" editions.

This is for your information.

WAB:jmr

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INDEXED - 5

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RECORDED - 4

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DEC 20 1951



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 13, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

1:58

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. TOLSON ✓
LADD ✓
NICHOLS ✓
BELMONT ✓

ad
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Drew Pearson

Secretary of Defense Lovett called me this afternoon and stated that the President wanted him to discuss with me what appears to be a rather serious leak on what occurred at a meeting last Monday at the White House. He said that the President was desirous of trying to trace out the source of this leak. Secretary Lovett stated that the meeting related to plans in Korea and general European matters. He said that the press reports have been very speculative in this regard.

Secretary Lovett stated that to his recollection the following were in attendance at the meeting: The three Chiefs of Service, General Collins, Admiral Fechteler, and General Vandenburg; the three Secretaries or Acting Secretaries, Frank Pace, Francis Whitehair replacing Kimball, and Tom Finletter; Jim Webb and Matthews from the State Department; possibly Ed Foley representing Secretary Snyder; General Bradley, and Secretary Lovett. He stated that from the White House were General Vaughan, Admiral Dennison, and possibly Connelly or Short. He added that he could not remember whether he saw both Connelly and Short, but just before going into the room he recalls seeing them both.

The Secretary related that the following has happened. Yesterday afternoon an individual by the name of Anderson, who appears to be a leg-man for Drew Pearson, went up to Whitehair and said, "I've got a story of the Monday meeting; thought you would like to take a look at it," and Whitehair reportedly said he didn't want to take a look at it. Apparently Anderson either read him or showed him certain excerpts which startled Whitehair so in their apparent accuracy that he came back and spoke to his Navy colleagues about it and they advised Admiral Dennison and Dennison advised the President. The President then called General Bradley and suggested to Bradley that he get hold of Pearson or Anderson and ask to see this report; that Anderson subsequently last night around seven o'clock came over to General Bradley with the report, which was

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*Wm Ladd
12/21/51
Q*

5-21

already on the Bell Syndicate wires and Bradley persuaded Anderson to delete two major statements by red-penciling them, stating that they were either a breach of security or definitely not within the national interest. Anderson, according to Secretary Lovett, appeared to have agreed to this.

Secretary Lovett stated that General Bradley called him after the meeting and said that in his opinion the statement is presumably coming out this Saturday and that it is not too harmful but the story was not killed. He stated that the President appears to be relieved but he is very apprehensive as to the leak of information concerning the meeting. Secretary Lovett stated that he thought it was a terrible thing when the President could not talk to his supposedly intimate advisors without having someone go out and talk about it. He stated that it was the President's desire that he talk with me and find out what could be done.

I told the Secretary that the important thing was first to find out who was at the meeting and then find out if any of them, upon returning, had made any memoranda on the meeting or advised someone in their own office. I told him I would be very glad to assign the matter to Assistant Director Belmont. Secretary Lovett stated that General Bradley is out of town but he would have his Executive Officer, Colonel Randall, try to collect some information on the matter this afternoon.

The Secretary is attending budget hearings this afternoon but will return to his office at 6:30 PM. I told him that Mr. Belmont will be in his office (Secretary Lovett's) promptly at 6:30 to discuss the matter.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.
John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc--Mr. Nease

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-6/JSB

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you that a memorandum prepared by Secretary Finletter, dated December 10, 1951, following the President's conference, was seen by [redacted]

[redacted] Colonel William Hips, Aide to Finletter; General Vandenberg; Colonel Charles V. Murphy, Aide to General Vandenberg; and Secretary Lovett. The memorandum was prepared with twenty copies. Eighteen copies are in the possession of Finletter; one was furnished to Secretary Lovett; and one was furnished to Vandenberg.

b6
b7C

DETAILS:

Concerning a memorandum dated December 10, 1951, prepared by Secretary Finletter, following his attendance at the President's conference at the White House on December 10, 1951, the Director noted: "This is interesting. We should find out who saw this, how many copies, etc."

Inquiries by the WFO have developed that this memorandum was prepared by Secretary Finletter for the specific purpose of pointing out "what was not said at the conference," and in this connection the only reference to the conference is contained in Paragraph 2, which states: "At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire." This statement is set forth in the memorandum as a predication for the comments.

This is the last of three memoranda which were prepared at that time for the purpose of recording and calling to the attention of Secretary Lovett the views of the Air Force which were not expressed at the conference. The first two memoranda were not considered adequate when prepared and were torn up. The torn-up copies are in the possession of Finletter. At this stage in the investigation, it does not appear that the

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contents of the Finletter memorandum are particularly germane to our investigation of the Pearson and Robert Allen columns. The Finletter memorandum is directed at what the UN position will be after a cease-fire, whereas the material discussed in the columns in question had to do with negotiations looking toward the cease-fire.

The Finletter memorandum has been seen by General Vandenberg; Colonel Charles V. Murphy, Aide to General Vandenberg; Secretary Lovett; and by Colonel William Hipps,

The memorandum was prepared with twenty copies. Eighteen copies are in the possession of Finletter; one was furnished to Secretary Lovett; and one was furnished to Vandenberg.

ACTION:

Consideration of the Finletter memorandum will continue in our investigation of this matter.

We certain we point
this out in our report
as this is a point
the President was
particularly interested
in but of course indicate
the fact of it dealing
with another matter
though indirectly with
the President's Conf.

D.

12/20/57
Joe starting
admission
20

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

DATE: December 18, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-25-88 BY SP-4 JAB

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

While talking with Admiral Robert Dennison, Naval Aide to the President, on December 17, 1951, he advised me that the President, when he told Dennison to call Secretary Lovett and request the FBI to conduct investigation in this matter, indicated the reason he designated Lovett was because the question as to whether there was a leak was of principal interest to the Department of Defense, since the conference involved Department of Defense matters. In this connection, Admiral Dennison stated the President gave him the impression he expected the FBI to talk to Jack Anderson and obtain from Anderson information as to who may have leaked the information. Dennison specifically indicated that the President was interested in finding out whether any of the individuals who attended this conference went back and dictated a memorandum as to what went on.

Admiral Dennison further stated that the President did not indicate to him any particular person who the President had in mind as possibly being responsible for the leak.

While discussing the propriety of commenting on what went on at the conference by any of those in attendance, Admiral Dennison stated that there are no written instructions which restrict the comments of either Cabinet members at Cabinet meetings or persons attending conferences such as the one of December 10; that, nevertheless, in the past the President has expressed concern over the possibility of leaks occurring from conferences at the White House. In this regard, he stated that in connection with the Forrestal and Morgenthau papers, there was considerable concern, as a result of which he, Admiral Dennison, had conferred with Mr. Peyton Ford of the Justice Department. Ford had expressed the opinion that legally Cabinet meetings and other important meetings could be per se classified and that considerable thought at the time was given to applying a classification to everything that went on in such meetings. It was ultimately decided, however, to not classify such conferences, since many things are discussed which are really not in a classified status, and the question then of clearing such matters for comment would become involved.

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ACTION:

The above is submitted for your information. It will not be included in the investigative reports in this matter.

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X.

ALEXIS JOHNSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, STATES WAS ADVISED BY H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, ON DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, AFTER MATTHEWS RETURNED FROM CONFERENCE THAT THE PROPOSED DRAFT TO RIDGEWAY HAD BEEN APPROVED AT THE CONFERENCE. NO DETAILS GIVEN TO JOHNSON BY MATTHEWS AS TO CONVERSATIONS OF MEMBERS PRESENT AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. JOHNSON IN TURN ADVISED ROBERT J. MC CLURKIN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR NORTHEAST ASIA AFFAIRS, WHOSE DUTIES COVER ACTIVITIES IN KOREA AND JAPAN, AND WHO WAS MR. JOHNSON'S PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT IN WORKING ON THE DRAFT TO RIDGEWAY, THAT THE DRAFT HAD BEEN APPROVED. NO FURTHER DETAILS FURNISHED MC CLURKIN AS JOHNSON HIMSELF NOT IN POSSESSION OF SAME. SIMILAR INFO FURNISHED BY JOHNSON TO JOHN EMERSON, PLANNING ADVISORY BUREAU, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. JOHN K. EMERSON STATES ADVISED BY MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON, AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND ALSO BY S. EVERETT GLEASON, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH WHOM HE HAD COLLABORATED ON A NATIONAL SECURITY DRAFT CONCERNING KOREAN MATTERS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE

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PAGE TWO

CONFERENCE WOULD CAUSE NO CHANGES IN THAT NSC DRAFT. MR. EMERSON
ADVISED THAT MR. GLEASON FURNISHED HIM NO FURTHER INFO CONCERNING THE
PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. KEN YOUNG, OFFICE SECRETARY DEFENSE, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS, AN INDIVIDUAL WHOM S. EVERETT GLEASON
MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE PERSON WHOM HE TELEPHONED TO ADVISE THAT THE
RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE WERE SUCH THAT NO CHANGES WOULD
BE NECESSARY IN THE NSC DRAFT ON KOREA, IN WHICH YOUNG HAD COLLABORATED,
WAS CONTACTED, AND YOUNG ADVISED THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN NOTIFIED BY
GLEASON CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT
GLEASON WAS DOUBTFUL THAT HE HAD CONTACTED YOUNG, BUT MENTIONED HIS NAME AS A
POSSIBILITY.

HOOD

Mr. [illegible]

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X.

RE INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS BEING SET FORTH OF INTEREST TO THE BUREAU: WEBB STATES THAT SUBSEQUENT TO DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE HAS SEEN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN CONNECTION WITH AN ITEM APPEARING IN THE NY TIMES DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, TO THE EFFECT THAT WEBB CONTEMPLATED LEAVING THE STATE DEPT. [REDACTED] REPRESENTS THE NEWSPAPER IN WEBB'S HOMETOWN AND WAS NATURALLY INTERESTED IN THIS STORY. WEBB ALSO TALKED WITH JOHN HIGHTOWER, WHO COVERS THE STATE DEPT FOR ASSOCIATED PRESS, AND ALSO TALKED WITH JAMES RESTON WHO REPRESENTS THE NY TIMES. WEBB STATES HIGHTOWER RAISED TWO POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, ONE QUOTE WAS THERE A WORLD CRISIS? UNQUOTE AND TWO, QUOTE WAS EUROPE DISCUSSED UNQUOTE. WEBB GAVE HIGHTOWER THIS BACKGROUND: THE PRESIDENT IS FURNISHED WITH A GREAT NUMBER OF WRITTEN REPORTS CONCERNING THE WORLD SITUATION. HE TAKES HIS POSITION SERIOUSLY AND TAKES THE WHOLE SITUATION SERIOUSLY. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO GET THE FULL QUOTE FLAVOR UNQUOTE OF THE THINKING OF THE TOP PEOPLE AS IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH WHAT GOES ON AROUND

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DATE 3-30-88 BY SP-8 JLF/SL

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182 Pearson (4) 3070-186 4-265 915

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THE WORLD. WEBB STATES HE GAVE THIS INFO TO HIGHTOWER FOR BACKGROUND. JAMES RESTON CONTACTED WEBB ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER ELEVEN, AND WAS GIVEN GENERALLY SAME BACKGROUND INFO CONCERNING THE DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE AS WAS GIVEN TO HIGHTOWER. RESTON INQUIRED CONCERNING CHURCHILL'S VISIT AND WANTED TO KNOW THE POLICY OF THE US AS TO CHURCHILL. WEBB ADVISED HIM THAT THE GOVT WAS MAKING A VERY CAREFUL STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, AND INDICATED THAT THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WHETHER CHURCHILL TALKED ABOUT THEM OR NOT. RESTON ALSO INQUIRED AS TO RECENT CHANGES IN THE STATE DEPT AND WEBB DISCUSSED THE SIGNIFICANCE AND HISTORY OF THESE CHANGES. A REPORTED RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON WAS ALSO DISCUSSED.

HOOD

W. J. [unclear]

12-18-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

18

9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. SECRETARY OF NAVY DAN KIMBALL INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE WAS ABSENT FROM TOWN AT TIME OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN LAST AND IN HIS STEAD CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY UNDERSECRETARY FRANCIS WHITEHAIR. KIMBALL RELATED FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WHITEHAIR DISCUSSED SAME WITH HIM ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS AND DID NOT FURNISH TO HIM A SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE BY THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FURNISHING BRIEF RESUME OF REMARKS BY MR. WHITEHAIR AND ADMIRAL FECHTELER. KIMBALL RELATED HE HAD DISCUSSED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS WITH NOONE, MADE NO MEMORANDUM OR NOTES PERTAINING TO CONFERENCE AS RECEIVED FROM MR. WHITEHAIR. HE ADVISED HE LEARNED LATE THE FOLLOWING EVENING OR MORNING DECEMBER TWELVE FROM UNDERSECRETARY WHITEHAIR OF ANDERSON-S CONVERSATIONS WITH WHITEHAIR AND OF THE OBVIOUS LEAK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. HE STATED HE REPORTED THIS MATTER THE SAME MORNING TO ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND ADMIRAL FECHTELER, IN TURN, GAVE THE INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL DENNISON, WHO INFORMED THE PRESIDENT. SECRETARY KIMBALL ADVISED HE HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF ANY POSSIBLE SOURCE TO PEARSON, ANDERSON OR ROBERT S. ALLEN.

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HOOD

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MAT/CAG:DDJ.

165-60573-27
DEC 26 1951

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12-18-51

18

9:30 P.M.

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. COPIES OF

DREW PEARSON COLUMNS NOW AVAILABLE WHICH APPEARED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER AND NEW YORK MIRROR DECEMBER FIFTEEN, FIFTY ONE, DISPLAYED TO CLAYTON FRITCHEY, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, DEFENSE DEPT., TODAY. FRITCHEY STATED BOTH COLUMNS ARE REASONABLE ACCURATE ACCOUNTS OF THE MATERIAL ORIGINALLY DISPLAYED TO HIM BY JACK ANDERSON AT PEARSON HOME NIGHT DECEMBER TWELVE TO BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION. HE NOTED SEVERAL VARIANCES IN TEXT AND STATED HE WOULD PREFER THAT OF PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER AS TABLOIDS HAVE TENDENCY TO EDIT OR DELETE. AT THIS TIME, FRITCHEY ADVISED THAT ON EVENING DECEMBER SEVENTEEN, HE HAD RECEIVED INVITATION FROM MRS. LUVIE PEARSON, WIFE OF SUBJECT, TO PLAY BRIDGE AT THE PEARSON RESIDENCE TONIGHT, DECEMBER EIGHTEEN. HE EXPRESSED THE THOUGHT THAT MR. PEARSON MAY HAVE IN MIND MAKING SOME DISCREET INQUIRIES OF FRITCHEY CONCERNING CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS ARISING FROM THE LEAK, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF INSTANT INVESTIGATION, AND INQUIRED WHETHER HE SHOULD ADMIT THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. FRITCHEY WAS TOLD THAT NO SUGGESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS OF THIS NATURE COULD BE GIVEN TO HIM. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO MR. FRITCHEY THE INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, AND AT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. COLONEL CHESTER V. CLIFTON, PRESS AIDE TO GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY, ALSO WAS RECONTACTED THIS DATE, AND DREW PEARSON COLUMN AS IT APPEARED IN NY MIRROR OF DECEMBER FIFTEEN ABOVE, RECORDED. CLIFTON STATED THAT

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THE COLUMN DISPLAYED TO HIM FOLLOWED GENERALLY HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE MATERIAL WHICH ANDERSON SHOWED TO GENERAL BRADLEY, AND WHICH THE GENERAL READ TO COLONEL WILLIS MATTHEWS AND HIMSELF ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER TWELVE. HE REMARKED THAT ALL OF THE POINTS APPEARED IN THE PUBLISHED COLUMN. HE STATED THE FIRST PARAGRAPH IN THIS COLUMN DID NOT STRIKE HIM AS BEING IDENTICAL IN FORM, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT WAS AN INTRODUCTION CONTAINING MUCH THE SAME THOUGHT AS IN THE ANDERSON MATERIAL. HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THAT THE TWO ITEMS WHICH WERE OBJECTIONABLE AND HAD BEEN MARKED FOR DELETION BY GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT APPEAR AND THAT THE ITEMS CORRECTED AS AGREED UPON DID APPEAR IN THE COLUMN. COLONEL CLIFTON IDENTIFIED THE REPORTER OF ALLEN WHO COVERS THE PENTAGON AS PAUL SCOTT, SAYING HE OCCUPIES ABOUT THE SAME RELATION AS ANDERSON DOES TO PEARSON.

HOOD

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Laughlin	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD 12/19/51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON. ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER TEN FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON. ESPIONAGE X. ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS INTERVIEWED TODAY AND UNABLE IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. ADVISED IN HIS OPINION ACTUAL CONFERENCE INACCURATELY REPORTED IN BOTH PEARSON AND ALLEN COLUMNS WHICH HE STATES APPARENTLY WERE WRITTEN ON BASIS OF INFORMATION FROM IDENTICAL SOURCE. STATES OPINION PEARSON AND ALLEN ARTICLES COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED PRIMARILY ON BASIS OF CURRENT AND ACUTE KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL EVENTS PLUS AT LEAST SOME AID FROM INDIVIDUAL HAVING ACCESS TO WHAT WAS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE. ADVISED IN HIS OPINION CONFERENCE INVOLVED WAS NOT OF UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE, STATED BOTH COLUMNS FAILED TO REPORT ANY OF THE FOUR ITEMS WHICH HE CONSIDERED OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE WHICH WERE DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE.

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HOOD

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RPH
NT
65 DEC 27 1951

cc: Mr. Tolson

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD 12/20/51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON. ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER TEN FIFTYONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW
PEARSON. ESPIONAGE - X.

ADMIRAL DENNISON REINTERVIEWED TODAY AT WHICH TIME SUMMARIZED
FOR AGENTS NOTES MADE COVERING CONFERENCE BY JAMES LAY. AS
INDICATED BEFORE BY OTHER SOURCES, BOTH THE PEARSON AND ALLEN
COLUMNS MISSED SEVERAL IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH WERE ACTUALLY
DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE, REPORTED ON MATTERS WHICH WERE
DISCUSSED WITHOUT COMPLETE ACCURACY. DENNISON ADVISED THAT
AFTER REVIEW OF LAY NOTES, HE IS EVEN MORE CONVINCED IN HIS
OPINION THAT BOTH COLUMNS WERE BASED ON INFORMATION ACTUALLY
FURNISHED FROM CONFERENCE AND THAT THEY WERE NOT WRITTEN PURELY
ON BASIS OF SPECULATION AND ACUTE AWARENESS OF KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS.
LAY NOTES SUBSTANTIATE DENNISON'S STATEMENT THAT CONSIDERABLE
PORTION OF CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO EUROPEAN DISCUSSION WHICH, AS
BUREAU KNOWS, NOT COVERED IN EITHER COLUMN. JOSEPH SHORT INTER-
VIEWED AND HAS FURNISHED COPY OF ACTUAL NEWSPAPER RELEASE MADE
IN CONNECTION WITH CONFERENCE INCLUDING QUESTIONS ASKED BY
REPORTERS AND HIS ANSWERS THERETO, REVIEW OF WHICH DOES NOT
INDICATE EITHER COLUMN COULD HAVE BEEN BASED THEREON.

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HOOD

KTD: VIM

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER *FJB*

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 20, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

At 11:45 a.m., 12/20/51, Supervisor McAndrews of the NYO called in connection with the captioned matter. He stated that in reply to a telephonic request from Inspector C. E. Hennrich, investigation had been made at the Bell Syndicate, New York, on December 20, 1951, and that the following facts had been developed:

Drew Pearson's column was filed with the Bell Syndicate by teletype wire direct from Pearson's home to the New York Office of Bell Syndicate at approximately 4:00 p.m., December 11, 1951. A change for this column came through from Pearson, by wire, on December 12, 1951. Pearson's column carried the date-line, Washington, 12/14/51. The change reads as follows:

"One hour after column's release (that would be 5:00 p.m., 12/11/51), President Truman asked General Bradley to use his influence to stop its publication. As a result, the column in question, half of which pertained to the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Monday (12/10/51) was submitted personally to General Bradley for his perusal. General Bradley did not concur with the President that the column should be killed. However, he has suggested the following changes, which I am happy to make.

"Second paragraph, under caption 'Silent Admiral,' should read: 'President Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we would later regret.'

"Next last paragraph, make third and closing sentence read: 'Some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline.' In other words, omit 'though' and words 'we are sure to grant a short extension to clear them up.'

"Many thanks. (signed) Drew Pearson"

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DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8 BJS/BJT

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The New York Office of the Bureau obtained the original column as filed by Pearson with the Bell Syndicate, as well as the original correction. The NYO is still working on the Post-Hall Syndicate to obtain the requested information concerning Robert Allen's column.

DEC 20 1951

TELETYPE

CONE WASH AND WASH FLD 15 FROM NEW YORK

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DIRECTOR AND SAC

VERY URGENT

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/aj/eb

ATTN. INSP. HENNRICH

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TENTH, FIFTY
ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP - X. b6
b7c

OF BELL SYNDICATE, INC, TWO TWO NINE WEST
FORTYTHIRD ST, NYC, A SUBSIDIARY OF NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE,
INC., WAS INTERVIEWED IN HIS OFFICE ON THE MORNING OF DEC TWENTIETH.
HE ADVISED THAT DREW PEARSON HAS HIS OFFICE IN HIS HOME IN WASH,
DC, IN WHICH IS LOCATED A TELETYPE WHICH HE USES IN DISPATCHING HIS
NEWS RELEASES TO BELL SYNDICATE. UPON RECEIPT OF THESE TELETYPES
FROM PEARSON, THEY ARE READ BY TO DETERMINE IF THEY MIGHT
CONTAIN MATERIAL THAT IS LIBELOUS OR SLANDEROUS AGAINST THE PUBLIC
INTEREST OR AGAINST SECURITY MATTERS IN GENERAL. THEREAFTER THEY
ARE SENT TO ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF EDITORS IN THE SYNDICATE WHO
PROOFREAD THEM FOR GRAMMATICAL CORRECTIONS AND OTHER JOBS NORMALLY
DONE BY AN EDITOR FOR A COLUMNIST. HE STATED HOWEVER THAT IN NO
INSTANCE DO THEY CHANGE THE CONTENT OF ANY OF PEARSONS RELEASES
WITHOUT CLEARING THEM DIRECTLY WITH PEARSON. STATED THAT IN
PRACTICALLY ALL INSTANCES WHEREVER THERE IS SOME MATERIAL THEY ARE
NOT SURE OF HE PERSONALLY CONTACTS PEARSON BY TELEPHONE FOR CLAFI-
FICATION. HE STATED HE RECALLED PEARSONS ARTICLE OF DEC FIFTEEN

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Laughlin	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

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5-26

PAGE TWO

THAT APPEARED IN NY DAILY MIRROR PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A FOLLOWUP TELETYPE WITH SOME CORRECTIONS THEREON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED FROM HIS FILE THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE SENT FROM PEARSONS OFFICE IN WASHINGTON TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOWUP CORRECTION THAT HE HAD RECD FROM PEARSONS OFFICE. IT APPEARS THAT THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM PEARSON WAS DATED DEC ELEVENTH, THE CORRECTED TELETYPE WAS DATED DEC TWELFTH. [] RELEATED THAT THIS IS A MORE OR LESS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN DEALING WITH PEARSON WHEREBY THEY RECEIVE THE STORY AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR DAYS BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION. AFTER RECEIPT OF NEWS STORIES FROM PEARSON THEY SEND OUT THE EDITED COPY BY TELETYPE TO CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO, WHICH OFFICES THEN SEND IT TO OTHER SUBSCRIBERS IN THOSE AREAS VIA MAIL. THERE IS SET FORTH HEREAFTER A COPY OF THE PERTINENT PORTION OF PEARSONS STORY THAT APPEARS IN THE TELETYPES OBTAINED FROM [] A PHOTO-STATIC COPY OF THE BELL SYNDICATES TELETYPE TOGETHER WITH THE CORRECTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.--RELEASE SATURDAY, DEC. 15, 1951.

b6
b7c

DREW PEARSON

ON

THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND

/COPYRIGHT, 1951, BY THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC./

DREW PEARSON SAYS.../CAPS/ TRUMAN GOT FAVORABLE REPORT ON KOREAN

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

TRUCE AT JOINT CHIEFS MEETING. U. S. TROOPS COULD STAY IN KOREA
TILL "HELL FREEZES OVER." TOP EXECUTIVES DESERTING TRUMAN.
/END CAPS/

WASHINGTON.--MOST OF THE WORLD WAS INTRIGUED OVER PRESIDENT
TRUMAN-S MUCH-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHEIFS OF STAFF FOL-
LOWING HIS RETURN FROM KEY WEST. HOWEVER, IT TURNED OUT TO BE
PRETTY MUCH ROUTINE AFTER ALL. HIGHLIGHT OF THE MEETING WAS AN
OPTIMISTIC ASSURANCE FROM GEN. OMAR BRADLEY THAT A CEASE-FIRE
COULD BE WORKED OUT IN KOREA.

THE NATION-S HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CHIEFS WERE WAITING
IN THE CABINET ROOM WHEN PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRODE IN. HE WAS GRINNING
BROADLY. SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYONE AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE,
HE REPORTED THAT IT WAS "GOOD TO BE BACK," AND ASKED HOW THEY LIKED
HIS SUN TAN.

AFTER THAT, HE LET THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DO MOST OF THE TALK-
ING, AND HERE IS A BRIEF, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT
THE MEETING WHICH CAUSED SO MUCH WORLD-WIDE SPECULATION.....

THE PRESIDENT SAT BACK, LISTENED INTENTLY AND CALLED FOR EVERY-
ONE-S VIEWS. OCCASIONALLY, HE BOUNCED HIS FINGERS TOGETHER REFLECTIVE-
LY, IN A QUICK, IMPULSIVE GESTURE, AND MADE SUCH COMMENTS AS...
"THAT-S A TOUGH ONE."

GENERAL BRADLEY LED OFF WITH A SUMMARY OF THE KOREAN SITUATION.
HE REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO BE READY TO COME TO TERMS,
THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IF BOTH SIDES MADE
CONCESSIONS.

END OF PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

HOWEVER, GEN. HOYT VANDERBERG, AIR CHIEF OF STAFF, OPPOSED MAKING ANY MAJOR CONCESSIONS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ADAMANT AGAINST ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS THE RIGHT TO BUILD AIRFIELDS DURING THE CEASE FIRE.

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON TROOP ROTATION. THE CHINESE HAVE PROPOSED A FREEZE ON ALL TROOPS ENTERING KOREA, THUS BLOCKING REPLACEMENTS FOR COMBAT VETERANS WHO HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE CHANCE TO GO HOME ON ROTATION. THIS WOULD BE A "BLOW TO MORALE," COLLINS WARNED.

--SILENT ADMIRAL--

HOWEVER, GENERAL COLLINS READILY AGREED THAT "MINOR CONCESSIONS" ON OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE COMMUNISTS.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN-S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE, BUT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE "WOULD LATER REGRET."

/MORE/

MERRY-GO-ROUND--SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15--PAGE 2.

LEAST TALKATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WAS ADMIRAL FECHTELER, WHO MADE A SHORT, HALF-MINUTE SPEECH IN WHICH HE ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE NAVY IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT "ANY MISSION ANY TIME ANY PLACE."

END OF PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

FOR THE ARMY-S PART, GENERAL COLLINS ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE ARMY COULDN-T BE BLASTED OUT OF KOREA, BUT COULD HOLD ON "UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER."

ANOTHER CONCESSION DISCUSSED WAS THAT OF GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON INSPECTION TEAMS BEHIND THE LINES. WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING OUT FOR INSPECTION BY JOINT U. N. COMMUNIST TEAMS, BUT THE REDS HAVE BEEN ARGUING FOR INSPECTION BY "NEUTRAL NATIONS."

BY NEUTRAL NATIONS, THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS SAID THEY MEANT POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATER, HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER DENMARK, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND AS "NEUTRAL NATIONS." THESE THREE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND GENERAL BRADLEY PROPOSED GIVING GROUND ON THIS POINT. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE.

THE CHIEF THEME OF THE MEETING WAS THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLOSE AT HAND. ALL SIGNS POINT TO A SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY DAYS. THOUGH SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER TWENTYSEVEN DEADLINE, WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP.

ANOTHER MATTER THAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING U. N. TROOPS FROM KOREA ALTOGETHER--AFTER THE ARMISTICE. HOWEVER, THE FACTS REGARDING THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC NOW. UNQUOTE. QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC, 229 W. 43 ST., NEW YORK.

PAGE SIX

CONFIDENTIAL TO EDITORS.

ONE HOUR AFTER THE COLUMN RELEASED FOR DECEMBER 15 WAS ON THE TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, PRESIDENT TRUMAN ASKED GENERAL BRADLEY PERSONALLY TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO STOP ITS PUBLICATION.

AS A RESULT THE COLUMN IN QUESTION, HALF OF WHICH PERTAINED TO THE PRESIDENT-S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MONDAY WAS SUBMITTED PERSONALLY TO GENERAL BRADLEY FOR HIS PERUSAL.

GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE COLUMN SHOULD BE KILLED. HOWEVER, HE HAS SUGGESTED TWO CHANGES WHICH I AM HAPPY TO MAKE.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER CAPTION "SILENT ADMIRAL" SHOULD READ "PRESIDENT TRUMAN COMMENTED THAT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE -WOULD LATER REGRET.-"

ALSO IN THE NEXT TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE STORY MAKE THE THIRD AND CLOSING SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH READ..."SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE." IN OTHER WORDS, OMIT THE WORD "THOUGH" AND THE WORDS "WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP."

MANY THANKS,

DREW PEARSON

THE FOLLOWING INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM THE POST HALL SYNDICATE INC., TWO NINE FIVE MADISON AVE., NYC, [REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THE COLUMN FROM ROBERT S. ALLEN FOR DECEMBER THIRTEEN

END OF PAGE SIX

PAGE SEVEN

LAST WAS RECEIVED BY THE POST HALL SYNDICATE ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST THROUGH THE MAIL AND DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE MAIL BY THE SYNDICATE ON THE SAME DATE MARKED FOR RELEASE ON OR AFTER DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. THE COLUMN CONTAINS INFO ABOUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND DATA CONCERNING INCOME TAX AND LABOR SITUATIONS IN ADDITION TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN IN THE "NEW YORK POST." THE ORIGINAL RECEIVED FROM MR. ALLEN IS MARKED WITH CORRECTIONS WHICH ARE OF INDIVIDUAL WORDS AND NOT OF ANY PERTINENT PARAGRAPHS. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THESE CORRECTIONS WERE MADE AFTER DICTATION BY MR. ALLEN AND THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY IN ALL OF HIS COLUMNS TO RECEIVE MATERIAL SO MARKED. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE AVAILABLE THE ORIGINAL COPY OF MR. ALLEN-S WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY OBTAINING MR. ALLEN-S PERMISSION, WHICH HE INDICATED HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO DO, HOWEVER, HE PERMITTED THE AGENTS TO LOOK OVER THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE COLUMN AND IT WAS NOTED THAT NO MATERIAL, PHRASES OR PARAGRAPHS WERE DELETED THEREFROM. [REDACTED] FURTHER ADVISED THAT POST HALL SYNDICATE EXAMINED THE COPY FOR POSSIBLE LIABILITY AND HE STATED THAT THIS IS CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN PUBLISHING ALL OF THEIR COLUMNS THAT ARE HANDLED BY THEIR SYNDICATE AND THAT THEY DID NOT IN THIS CASE MAKE ANY DELETIONS OR CORRECTIONS. IN REGARD TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN AS IT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY DISTRIBUTED BY POST HALL A PHOTOSTAT COPY OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY MAIL, IS AS

END OF PAGE SEVEN

PAGE EIGHT

FOLLOWS..."WHAT THE REDS WANT DASH THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA, BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS. THAT-S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GENERAL BRADLEY DECLARED THE PROTRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT -WHERE A FEW CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANT ONE.- -WHAT DO THEY WANT /Q/- ASKED THE PRESIDENT. -THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS,- EXPLAINED BRADLEY. -WE ARE DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND.- GENERAL HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT. -I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER,- DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. -BUT I DON-T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANY-

END OF PAGE EIGHT

PAGE NINE

THING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN'T PUT PAST THEM.-

GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME TERMS ON THE AIRFIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN TROOPS. -THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN,- COLLINS ARGUED. -I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSIONS ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ON MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS. OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACEMENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON-T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES.- BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL

END PAGE NINE

PAGE TEN

AIRFORCE. PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM...-AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. // WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN.- ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY. HE WANTS TO INCREASE THE ROK DIVISIONS FROM ELEVEN TO TWENTY. NO DECISION WAS REACHED ON THE MATTER, BUT PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRONGLY APPROVED THE PLAN. -I AM FOR PROMPT ACTION ON THAT,- HE SAID. -IT SEEMS TO ME A VERY SOUND THING TO DO. SIMILARLY, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED MOVING TO KOREA ONE OF THE TWO NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS NOW IN JAPAN. THIS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY RIDGWAY IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF ONE OF THE BATTLE DASH EXPERIENCED DIVISIONS IN KOREA TO EUROPE. GENERAL EISENHOWER HAS REQUESTED THAT." IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY IS IDENTICAL WITH THE COLUMN THAT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" BLUE EDITION OF DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. HOWEVER, IT WILL FURTHER BE NOTED THAT THE "NY POST" COLUMN CONCLUDES WITH THE STATEMENT "ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE

END PAGE TEN

PAGE ELEVEN

SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY," WHEREAS THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY CONTINUES AS QUOTED ABOVE.

A MIMEOGRAPHED COPY OF THE ENTIRE RELEASE WAS MADE AVAILABLE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO THE AGENTS AND IS BEING RETAINED IN THIS OFFICE. [REDACTED]

b7D

STATED THAT THIS MIMEOGRAPHED COPY WAS SENT TO ALL OF THE NEWSPAPERS SUBSCRIBING TO ALLEN-S COLUMN AND THAT IN HIS OPINION THE COLUMN IN THE "NY POST" BLUE FINAL EDITION OF DEC THIRTEEN LAST WAS CUT FOR SPACE SAVING REASONS. HE ADVISED THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR NEWSPAPERS RECEIVING COPIES OF THE COLUMNS TO PRINT ANY PORTION OR ALL OF THE COLUMN AT THEIR DISCRETION. HE DID STATE THAT THE "PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS" USUALLY PUBLISHES THE ENTIRE RELEASE AS SENT OUT BY POST HALL BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD DONE IT ON THIS OCCASION. NO LEAD IS BEING SET OUT FOR THE PHILA OFFICE, IT IS LEFT TO THE BUREAU-S DISCRETION. IT IS NOTED THAT [REDACTED] REQUESTED THAT HIS IDENTITY IN THIS MATTER BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE BUREAU BE DISCREET IN USING THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH BOTH THE POST HALL SYNDICATE AND THE BELL SYNDICATE.

b7D

SCHEIDT

11
44

END

NY R 15 WA JG

REC COPY WFO

cc Mr Belmont
Mr Hennrich

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 20, 1951

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON;

ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

12-11-51 TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR

DREW PEARSON;

ESPIONAGE - X

INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8WJ/bel

Attention: Inspector Carl Hennrich

ReNYtel to Bureau and WFO dated December 20, 1951, captioned as above.

In accordance with the information contained in referenced teletype, there are attached for the Bureau two photostatic copies of a teletype received by the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, which teletype was received by them from DREW PEARSON in Washington, D. C. The first teletype, which is four pages in length, contains information concerning the President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as other miscellaneous material for the use of the Bell Syndicate in the PEARSON column. Attached to these four pages is a teletype received from PEARSON by Bell Syndicate on December 12, 1951, which contains several corrections to be made in the teletype of December 11, as well as other information concerning PEARSON's column. One copy of the above is also being directed to the WFO.

There are also attached for the Bureau two copies of a column prepared by ROBERT S. ALLEN and dated December 11, 1951, which was directed to the Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. This release is six pages in length, part of which appeared in ALLEN's column in the New York Post on December 13, 1951. This material was obtained from [redacted] of the Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc.. There is also attached for the information of the WFO one photostatic copy of the above-mentioned press release of ROBERT ALLEN. RUC.

b7D

~~EXPEDITE PROCESSING~~

TGS:RAA

65-

Encs.

cc - Washington Field (Encs.)

RECORDED - 112

DEC 21 1951

INDEXED - 112

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

DEC 28 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 14, 1951 ✓

FROM : C. E. Hennrich ✓

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 JFJ

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

On the morning of December 14, 1951, I discussed the investigation of this case in detail with Special Agent in Charge Hood of the Washington Field Office. Arrangements were made for three interviewing teams of Agents to handle the interviewing of persons who attended the conference of December 10, 1951, as follows:

Special Agents Kenneth T. Delavigne and Thomas J. Jenkins will interview the White House representatives who were present at the conference (except the President); Special Agents Joseph A. Connors and Paul J. Tierney will interview representatives who attended the December 10, 1951, conference, and Mr. James Lay of the National Security Council who also attended the December 10, 1951, conference; Special Agents Maurice A. Taylor and Carl Graham will interview the representatives of the Armed Services who attended the conference of December 10, 1951, and also interview Colonels Mathews and Clifton of General Omar Bradley's office who reviewed Jack Anderson's paper together with General Bradley.

It was arranged that as soon as the two teams handling the White House and State Department interviews had completed they would fill in and assist in the interviews with the Armed Services representatives.

I called a conference of all of the Agents who will participate in the interviews in the office of SAC Hood at the Washington Field Office and went over with them in detail the background of the case and the basic points which must be covered in all interviews. I arranged to be notified so that I could participate in the interviews of Admiral Souers, General Bradley, Mathew Connelly, and Joseph Short. I instructed that I be kept advised of any significant items developed during interviews, and that if any particular problems were anticipated in the interviews, I should be notified so that I would have an opportunity to participate if deemed advisable.

During that day attempts were made to arrange interviews with every individual who participated in the December 10, 1951, conference. The following interviews were scheduled for December 14, 1951, and are being conducted:

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DEC 14 1951

CEH:djb

105-60573-35

Secretary Thomas K. Finletter
James E. Webb
H. Freeman Matthews
General Robert Landry
Colonel Matthews (General Bradley's Staff)
Colonel Clifton (General Bradley's Staff)

Interviews have been scheduled for December 15, 1951, with the following:

General Omar Bradley (tentative)
General Hoyt Vandenburg (tentative)
Admiral William Fechteler
Secretary Frank Pace
Acting Secretary Francis Whitehair (tentative)
James Lay
General Vaughan
General Cabell

The following will not be available on December 15, 1951, and will be interviewed as indicated:

General Joseph Collins will be interviewed at 10:45 A.M., December 17, 1951; Admiral Sidney Souers will be interviewed December 19, 1951, upon his return to Washington; Admiral Dennison (sick) will be interviewed on his return to the office.

Matt Connelly was contacted by Mr. Roach of the Liaison Section and he specifically stated that he was not present during any part of the conference of December 10, 1951. He stated that he walked with the President to the door of the conference room but did not enter the room at any time during the conference. Connelly said that he knew for a fact that Joseph Short was not present during the conference. He said Admiral Dennison had come out of the conference after it was over and told Short what he might say to the press. In view of this, interviews are not contemplated immediately with Connelly and Short unless interviews with others definitely place them in the conference.

I was with SAC Hood at 7:00 P.M. tonight and he informed me that the interviews were progressing under most difficult conditions and that traffic has been almost impassable, and some of the interviews were scheduled at the homes of the interviewees, and because of impassable traffic, interviews had to be postponed until later this evening. SAC Hood contemplates that some of the interviews

will not be held until late in the evening. I arranged with him to submit in summary form tonight the results of any of the interviews that are completed at a reasonable hour, and to advise telephonically of any significant developments in connection with any of the interviews.

ACTION:

I will follow with the Washington Field Office on December 15, 1951, in order to correlate available information with material appearing in Pearson's column which will then be available and we will continue to press this matter.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *DL*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AH*

SUBJECT: LEAK OF TOP SECRET INFORMATION
TO DREW PEARSON;
DECEMBER 10, 1951 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

DATE: December 14, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/ab

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☐

Clegg ☐

Glavin ☒

Rosen ☐

Tracy ☐

Harbo ☐

Belmont ☐

Lois ☐

Tele. Room ☐

Nease ☐

Gandy ☐

Pursuant to my instructions, Mr. Roach contacted Admiral Dennison, Naval Aid to the President, and pointed out to him that Secretary of Defense Lovett had indicated that he felt a security check for microphones and listening devices should be made at the Cabinet Room of the White House (this is where the conference in question was held). Admiral Dennison who is ill at home informed Mr. Roach that the matter should be discussed with Mr. Matthew J. Connelley, Secretary to the President, who was familiar with the entire matter. Connelley stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Dennison that the check should be made as one phase of the investigation.

Through arrangements with Mr. Connelley, Mr. Roach, accompanied by two laboratory technicians, Mr. Pfafman and Corbett made a complete and thorough examination of the Cabinet Rooms, as well as the room under the Cabinet Room and a survey of the roof above. This check resulted negatively so far as any listening devices were concerned. It should be noted that Mr. Connelley has not as yet been informed of the results of this check.

It was also determined by Mr. Roach that contrary to what Secretary Lovett had said, neither Mr. Connelley nor Mr. Short, Press Secretary to the President, were present at the conference. Mr. Connelley informed Mr. Roach that he at no time was in the Cabinet Room during the meeting, and that the only Presidential Aids present were the military aids, namely General Vaughn, Admiral Dennison and General Landry.

Arrangements are being made for interview with Vaughn, Dennison and Landry.

RRR:mkf

ADDENDUM: 12-14-51

On my instructions, Mr. Matthew J. Connelley was advised by Mr. Roach that the check was completed negatively.

AHB:mer

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DEC 20 1951

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EX - 11

65-60573-36

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON

DATE: December 21, 1951

ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON,
LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-28-88 BY SP847/ab

I talked with Secretary Robert A. Lovett on the morning of December 21. I advised him we have now interviewed all the persons who attended the President's conference on December 10 and, in addition, have interviewed those individuals who were indicated as having been furnished information regarding any phase of the conference. I told him that the information furnished to us was that relatively little dissemination of the facts of the conference was made by those in attendance. I pointed out we had developed no substantial information indicating the identity of any person who may have leaked information.

I pointed out to Secretary Lovett that a most significant development of the investigation was the close social contacts of Clayton Fretchey, Director of Public Information, Department of Defense, with Drew Pearson. I pointed out that the evening when General Bradley had Jack Anderson over to the Pentagon to go over the proposed column, Fretchey was having dinner and playing bridge at the Pearson home. I pointed out it had been developed that Fretchey was to play bridge at the Pearson home again during the week of December 17. I pointed out in this connection that we had developed no information indicating that Fretchey was in possession of facts regarding the conference, and Mr. Lovett hastened to assure that Fretchey was not in possession of any such information. Mr. Lovett made no specific comment concerning the Fretchey-Pearson relationship. His demeanor was such, however, that I gathered he was not pleased.

We then discussed the Pearson and Allen columns in general. Mr. Lovett indicated that the theory had been presented to him that an astute newspaperman could have written the columns without actually having access to the facts discussed at the conference. He noted that many items in the columns were inaccurate; also that the columns made no reference to many items actually discussed at some length at the conference, including NATO.

CEH:LL

RECORDED - 87

65-60573-37
DEC 29 1951

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I advised Secretary Lovett that in our interrogation of the persons who attended the conference, we have accepted their word as to the extent of dissemination or discussion of matters pertaining to the conference, and have made no effort to question any secretaries, aides, or assistants for the purpose of verifying such statements, but that we have, of course, followed through where it has been indicated information was passed on, in order to determine whether further dissemination was made by those receiving such information. Secretary Lovett stated he definitely felt that no inquiries should be made at this time to verify the statements of persons who attended the conference.

Secretary Lovett was informed it would appear to be logical at this point to consider interviews with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and Robert Allen. He was requested to advise as to whether he desires these interviews to be conducted. He commented that the desirability of such interviews, of course, is a matter of judgment and that it was his judgment no affirmative results could be expected from such interviews. On the other hand, he commented that such interviews might well result in a blast at the Administration from the press generally. He concluded that these interviews should not be conducted at this time.

Secretary Lovett stated that in the absence of a clear-cut indication that some particular individual had actually leaked information from the conference, he was of the definite feeling at this time that no further inquiries should be made in this matter and that he would be prepared to so recommend to the President. I told Secretary Lovett that a report is being prepared reflecting our investigation to date, so that he can have an opportunity to go over in detail the interviews conducted. I told him we would be glad to confer with him at any time regarding the investigation and to conduct any further investigation which is desired. He indicated he felt that no further investigation would be desired.

The Washington Field Office is now preparing the report in this matter and have advised it will be completed over the week end. Our present plans are to deliver a copy of the investigative report to Secretary Lovett, together with a cover letter confirming his decision that Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and Robert Allen not be interviewed at this time. This cover letter will also request his desires as to further investigation.

9:58 A.M. 12/21/51
Admiral Dennison advised
O.H. Bartlett

[Handwritten initials]

no
sh

Since the investigation has indicated some contact with Pearson and Jack Anderson on the part of Under Secretary Whitehair, and definite association on the part of Clayton Fréchet, I think it might be desirable, when we deliver the report to Secretary Lovett and when we advise Admiral Dennison of its delivery to Lovett, that we orally point out to these two men that so long as association between responsible individuals in the Defense establishment and elsewhere and columnists such as Drew Pearson continues, it can be expected that leaks will occur.

with Saddle
I agree, find I think
Sowers should be briefed
as to investigation & also
have pointed out to him
Fitch's & Whitehair's
association with Pearson.

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December 26, 1951

RECORDED - 87

65-60573-37

VIA LIAISON

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/tyf

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing one copy of the report of
Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood, dated at
Washington, D. C., December 22, 1951, covering the
investigation of the reported leak of information
from the White House conference on December 10,
1951. In accordance with your request of Mr.
Hennrich on December 21, 1951, we have conducted
no interviews with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson,
or Robert S. Allen.

No further investigation is being con-
ducted pending your review of the enclosed report.
I would appreciate it if you would advise whether
additional investigation is desired.

With assurances of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

cc-Liaison Desk

CEH:LL

12-27-51

DECLASSIFIED BY 6080 P/L/M/P
ON 10/3/77

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

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December 26, 1951

VIA LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-22-88 BY SP8WJ/et

RECORDED - 87

65-60573-37

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers
Special Consultant to the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral:

There is enclosed one copy of the
report of Special Agent in Charge R. B.
Hood, dated at Washington, D. C., December
22, 1951, covering the investigation of the
reported leak of information from the White
House conference on December 10, 1951.

A copy of this report has been
furnished to the Honorable Robert A. Lovett,
Secretary of Defense, with the request that
he advise of any further investigation de-
sired.

With expressions of my highest
esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

12-27-51
to Pat Connel
to send for Admiral
Souers. return on
Jan 3, 1952
E.S.

Enclosure

cc-Liaison Desk

CEH:LL

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
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DECLASSIFIED BY 6080 C/JAP
ON 10/3/77

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 27, 1951

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON

ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON,
LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/ty/fat

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Re memo dated December 21, 1951, addressed to you by Mr. Hennrich which recommended that a copy of the Bureau's investigation in this matter be furnished to Secretary Lovett and that we orally advise Admiral Dennison, of the White House, that the report had been so delivered.

The Director approved the furnishing of the report to Secretary Lovett and the advising of Admiral Dennison as indicated and stated, "I think Souers should be briefed as to investigation and also have pointed out to him Fritchey's and Whitehair's association with Pearson. H."

On December 27, 1951, the letter of transmittal to the Secretary of Defense, and a copy of the report was furnished by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders, to [redacted]

[redacted] who advised that Mr. Lovett was in conference and probably would be for most of the afternoon. She stated she would immediately place the sealed envelope on Mr. Lovett's desk and in that manner he could review the report immediately upon the termination of the conference being held in his office.

Special Agent Edward S. Sanders also delivered to Pat Coyne on December 27, 1951, a copy of the investigative report with a letter of transmittal, dated December 26, 1951, to Admiral Souers. Coyne advised that he would personally hold this letter and report until Admiral Souers returns on January 3, 1952.

Admiral Dennison, of the White House, was advised on December 27, 1951, by Special Agent O. H. Bartlett that the investigative report had been furnished to Secretary Lovett.

It is contemplated that Admiral Souers will be briefed in this connection by Mr. Hennrich as soon as the Admiral returns to Washington, which will apparently be on January 3, 1952.

RECORDED - 87

ESS:dm

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65 DEC 29 '51DEC 20 1951
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RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information.

SHORT

MONDAY

DECEMBER 10, 1951

12.10 pm

SHORT: This meeting this morning discussed the world situation. No policy decisions were made. Do you know who were there?

Q. No, we don't.

S. Secretary of Defense, the Joint Secretaries, with Whitehair for Kimball, who is out of town. The Joint Chiefs.

Q. They were all there, including the Chairman?

S. That's right, and Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Webb, and H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Q. Where did they meet, in the Cabinet Room?

S. In the Cabinet Room.

Q. How long did it last?

S. It was more than an hour.

Q. Particularly pressing problem right now is the problem of urgency -- the attempt to get an Armistice out in Korea, isn't it, Joe?

S. Korea was among the subjects discussed, Bill. It was not, however, confined ---

Q. (interposing) Got ^a December 27th deadline out there for agreement though?

Q. It was, however, not confined?

S. Not confined to that subject.

Q. European Army. Was the European Army discussed?

S. Well, beyond that, the world was covered.

Q. Joe, the President said last night at the airport that he might see McGrath today?

S. He won't see him.

Q. When will ~~xxxxxx~~ he see him, tomorrow?

S. I am not quite sure about that.

Q. Will not see him today?

S. That's right.

Q. What is the program for the rest of the day?

S. He has quite a bit of work today.

Q. No swim?

Q. Is there any indication when he will see McGrath?

S. No, I can't tell you now when he will see him.

Q. Well, Joe, what I meant ---

S. (adding) Soon.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-2012 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/RYSW

65-60573-39
ENCLOSURE

Q. (continuing) --- Is what is he going to do this afternoon, the calling list doesn't show anybody, but do you know of any callers?

S. No, I don't.

Joint

Q. Was this meeting a regular meeting with the Chiefs of Staff moved up a week, or something?

S. Well, you know the President meets with the Joint Chiefs every two weeks.

Q. Was this the date for one of them?

S. Well, it was similar to those regular meetings.

Q. I thought the last one was taken care of by General Hull?

S. That was.

Q. You mean when he met Hull?

S. When Hull and Matthews came down. State is always in on these Joint Chief meetings.

Q. Are there any special aspects of the world situation that can be mentioned as having been discussed?

S. I can't go beyond what I have said, Bob.

Q. Joe, can you say whether the President came back earlier than he had anticipated because the meeting was scheduled today and he would have had them come to Key West if he hadn't come back?

S. Didn't the President pretty well cover that before he left Boca Chica yesterday afternoon?

Q. Mr. Pretty well, but he ~~did~~ didn't nail it down.

S. I think he handled the situation.

Q. Do you anticipate anything in the way of hard news for the rest of the day -- I mean, have you got anything in the works?

S. Smitty, there are always a number of things in the works, and one or more of them might jell this afternoon.

Q. Not before lunch?

S. No.

Q. Has the President any plan to see Mr. McKaill? ?????

S. What?

Q. McKaill or McKinney?

~~xxxx~~ Q. McKinney.

S. I don't know of any appointments for either one of them.

Q. Joe, was this meeting this morning a part of a continuing series, perhaps, on given situations that is, will he -- will he carry this -- today's discussions further to seek to arrive at any policy decisions?

S. Bob, there will undoubtedly be other meetings of approximately the same group. I don't know when, though. If you mean, is there going to be another one tomorrow, or the next day, I know ~~of~~ nothing of any such plans. He sees approximately this ~~same~~ same group every two weeks.

Q. Well now, yesterday apparently there was a conference between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Mobilization Director. Is that -- were their discussions ~~praxxyxwaxk~~ preliminary to or part of today's discussions?

S. I don't know. I didn't even know that there was such a meeting that you are talking about.

Q. It was out of the Pentagon, I understand.

Q. The President said something about a meeting with the people coming back from Europe. What is that, who are they and what do they do?

S. The Cabinet officers who have been to Europe are the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury.

Q. Is Acheson back yet?

S. No. Acheson and Snyder are due back Wednesday, and Mr. Harfiman is still a week.

Q. Do you know whether he is going to come back this week, Joe?

S. My understanding is that it was about ten days from now. That is pretty rough, Bill. I wouldn't want to pin it down to the 20th. Roughly ten days.

Q. In other words, he is not due in this week?

S. No.

Q. The President also said something in Key West about coming back and putting in a hard week's work before he went out to Independence for Christmas.

S. You mean a hard two weeks.

Q. He said a week.

Q. He said he had a terrific week ahead of him.

Q. I think what he was ~~emh~~ emphasizing ~~ex~~ was that this week would be a terrific one. What I want to know is what Joe thinks.

S. I think there is a lot of work that will have to be done between now and the time he goes to Kansas City.

Q. No change in the Independence departure time, December 24?

S. Not so far as I have been advised.

Q/ That is what you really wanted to ask.

Q. Are there any new directives in the ~~max~~ making on the handling of the cease-fire talks in Korea?

S. Bob, I don't know of any, but that doesn't mean anything.

Q. Can you say whether these discussions this morning revolved around the -- General Vandenberg's recent statements, that he would like to increase the size of the Air Force?

S. I will stand on what I have already said about Korea.

Q. There was a story ~~tx~~ in this morning's paper that Under Secretary Webb is about to quit. Have you got anything on that?

S. I haven't any comment on that, Frank.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. This lid is on for lunch then, so far as you know, other than the President ---

S. (interposing) The President ~~xxxx~~ is still in the House, and I don't give lids as long as he is here, Tony.

Q. You would let us know when you hear ~~McGrath~~ McGrath is coming in? In other words, we would like to find out about it rather than wait ~~and~~ for the posting of the calling list, if possible?

S. I will see what I can do.

Q. Thank you.

END

Office Memorandum • UNIT GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENDRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 20, 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

While interviewing Mr. Joseph Short, Press Secretary to the White House, on December 20, he advised it was his belief that Drew Pearson extensively uses newspaper reporters who are associated with reputable news media and who feed to Pearson, for a price, off-the-record comments which are made in the course of legitimate interviews and which the news media represented by the particular reporter would not use because it is "off the record." In this connection, he named [redacted] formerly of Trans-Radio Press, and Tris Coffin, who was "peddling" to Pearson while employed by CBS. He stated that these two had been caught but that he had no doubt there are others.

In this regard, he stated that while Mrs. Roosevelt was in the White House she used to comment extensively off the record and was "not security conscious." He said that Mrs. Roosevelt's comments begun appearing in Robert Allen's material and that Mrs. Short, who was then covering Mrs. Roosevelt's press conferences, together with another unnamed woman reporter, observed a woman reporter feverishly making notes of Mrs. Roosevelt's off-the-record comments and actually tailed her to Robert Allen's office. She was confronted and was fired from the agency which she represented. It was Mr. Short's observation that the information concerning the instant investigation may have come into Pearson's hands through such a contact as mentioned above. It was his opinion, although Short stated he had no facts upon which to base it, that the leak in this particular case would have emanated from a "second echelon" who possibly had been briefed by someone who actually attended the conference. Short was unable to relate any facts that would reflect upon the identity of the person responsible for the leak.

Mr. Short furnished a transcript of the press conference which he held immediately following the December 10 conference, which is attached. While no particular significance is attached to the questions and answers set forth, the details of the transcript indicate that the press conference was very carefully covered, probably by microphone.

ACTION: For your information.

CEH:LL
 Attachment

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 b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/BJT/bal

ENCL.

INDEXED - 71 RECORDED - 71 106-6573-39

EX-95

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON (Column of December 15, 1951);
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson;
ROBERT S. ALLEN (Column of December 13, 1951);
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 29, 1951

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Nease ☒

Gandy ☒

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8BJF/pt

PURPOSE:

To recommend that I call Admiral Dennison of the White House and advise him:

1. That the Bureau's report in this matter is factual and that we do not draw conclusions;
2. That I offer to discuss the facts with him at his convenience;
3. That he be advised that Secretary Lovett has stated he will indicate further investigation desired, if any, after consultation with the President.

DETAILS:

The attached memorandum from Mr. Keay reflects that Mr. Bartlett received a call from Admiral Dennison on the evening of December 28. Admiral Dennison stated that Secretary Lovett had discussed the report with Dennison; that Dennison is sorry it resulted in no definite conclusion. Dennison further indicated that after he has read the report in detail and discussed it with the President, he may have some additional questions and that it might be logical for him to discuss the matter with Mr. Hennrich.

You will recall that Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett originally requested the investigation of this matter on the basis of the President's request through Admiral Dennison. In view of this, we directed our report to Lovett and it was Lovett who indicated that interviews with Pearson, Allen and Anderson were not desired and that no further inquiries should be made pending receipt of the report. Lovett has now directed a letter to the Bureau, stating that after he has discussed the matter with the President, he will indicate whether any

CEH:LL

Attachment

RECORDED - 131
INDEXED - 131

65-60573-41
JAN 3 1952
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157 memo dir
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further inquiries are desired. You will also recall that we have furnished a copy of the report to Admiral Souers and upon his return to Washington he will be briefed regarding the matter on January 4, 1952.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is felt we should definitely maintain our present position of dealing with Secretary Lovett in this matter. He originally requested the investigation and he has been consulted regarding certain interviews. It was on his advice that the investigation was discontinued, pending his review of the report. We should avoid being caught in a cross-fire between requests from Admiral Dennison and requests from Secretary Lovett. I feel, however, that we should immediately indicate our willingness to discuss any of the facts in the report with Admiral Dennison, as he has suggested, at the same time pointing out to him that the Bureau does not draw conclusions, but that our investigations are directed strictly at developing facts.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, I will call Admiral Dennison and offer to discuss the report in this matter with him at any time at his convenience. I will point out the fact that the Bureau does not draw conclusions from the facts developed and that with regard to further investigation, Secretary Lovett has indicated he will convey to us his desires relative to further investigation, if any, after consultation with the President.

O.K. but I think
any requests for Act.
Dennison should be
promptly acted upon
& not referred to Sec.
Lovett.

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

ADDRESSEE Hon. J. Edgar Hoover		SD 32 NO.	NO. 31713
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN Sec. of Defense		CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER
TELEPHONE NO. 74386			
SUBJECT (Use short title, i. e. short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Dresses" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of Document). one sealed envelope (Personal and Confidential)			
COPIES			
ORIGINAL	CC	OTHERS	ENCLOSURES
DATE RECEIVED 28 Dec 51	RECEIVED BY (Signature) <div style="text-align: center;"> ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-29-88 BY SP8 Jey/ab </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <small>16-53000-1 GPO</small> </div>		

SD FORM 120
1 NOV 50

White copy—Custodian. Pink copy—Recipient.
Post Card—Classified Files.

Office Memo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 2, 1952

FROM : Mr. V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: Drew Pearson, (Column of 12-15-51);
 Jack Northman, Anderson, AKA Jack Anderson;
 Robert S. Allen, (Column of 12-13-51);
 Espionage - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-23-88 BY SP8CJF/ab

Admiral Dennison, Naval Aid to the President at the White House, telephoned Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Unit on the evening of December 28, 1951 concerning the report in the above mentioned matter that was furnished to Secretary Lovett earlier this week. You will recall that we already advised Admiral Dennison that this report had been submitted by us to Secretary Lovett.

Admiral Dennison advised that he had discussed this report with Mr. Lovett and that he, Admiral Dennison, is sorry it resulted in no definite conclusion. Admiral Dennison further advised that Mr. Lovett is sending the report over to him so that he may read it in detail and discuss it with the President. After reading the report, Admiral Dennison said, he may have some additional questions and that it might be logical for him to discuss this matter again with Mr. Hennrich.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Mr. Hennrich be designated to discuss instant case with Admiral Dennison in view of the fact that he is fully familiar with the facts in this matter.

The Liaison Unit should be instructed as to what answer Admiral Dennison should be given when he calls within the next few days.

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 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

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12/29/52

Memo. for Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 131

INDEXED - 131

JAN 3 1952

SE 43

32 JAN 4 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON (Column of December 15, 1951);
JACK NORTHEMAN-ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson;
ROBERT S. ALLEN (Column of December 13, 1951);
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 31, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/STJ/STJ

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Admiral Dennison called from the White House on the afternoon of December 31. He said he had reviewed the Bureau's report of the investigation in this matter. He asked if the Bureau had formed any conclusions as a result of the investigation. I informed him that the Bureau does not draw conclusions from the facts developed in its investigations, but that we report the facts as we find them. He then asked for the Bureau's opinion as to whether further investigation in this matter should be conducted. I pointed out to Admiral Dennison that after developing the investigation to the point where it now is, we had consulted with Secretary Lovett, who had suggested that no further investigation be conducted until he had had an opportunity to go over the report of facts developed. I told Admiral Dennison that I thought the decision as to what further investigation was to be conducted was one of policy to be decided by the White House. Dennison agreed with this. He said he was well pleased with the investigation in so far as it went; that he was disappointed there was no clearcut finding of who was responsible for the leak. He said it was his personal opinion that no further investigation should be conducted. He said he thought he would recommend to the President that the President write a letter to each of the persons who were in attendance at the December 10, 1951, conference, calling their attention to the apparent leak and stating that while he does not question the individual integrity of any of the members present, nevertheless he feels that somewhere along the line, through the injudicious handling of the information as to what went on at the conference, a leak resulted, and that he (the President) expects that each will take the necessary action to insure that such leaks do not occur in the future.

Admiral Dennison indicated he would talk with Secretary Lovett on the afternoon of December 31 and would confer with the President on January 1. He stated he expected that the results of his conference with the President would be reported to the Bureau by Secretary Lovett.

RECORDED - 131

165-60573-43

JAN 4 1952

SE 25

JAN 3 1952

20

During my conversation with Admiral Dennison,
he commended the Bureau on the accuracy of its reporting,
particularly pointing out that the reporting of the
interview with him was most accurate and succinct.

ACTION:

For your information.

card received

Please furnish me search slips, build-ups and break-downs on the following individuals: Matter must be handled expeditiously.

1. Drew Pearson — OK
2. Robert Sharon Allen — OK
3. Jack Anderson — OK
- 16 4. Robert Abercrombie Lovett F
- 15 5. General Omar Nelson Bradley F
- 14 6. General Joseph Lawton Collins F
- 3 7. General Hoyt Stanford Vandenberg F
- 8 8. William Morrow Fechtler — F
- 5 9. General Charles Pearre Cabell — F
- 4 10. Secretary Frank C. Pace — F
- 9 11. Secretary Thomas Knight Finletter F.
- 2 12. Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair F
- 1 13. Acting Secretary James Edwin Webb — F
- 7 14. Mr. H. Freeman Matthews — F
- 11 15. Admiral Sidney William Souers F
- 12 16. Mr. James Felden Lay, National Security Council F
- 13 17. General Harry Hawkins Vaughan F
- 10 18. Admiral Robert Lee Dennison F
- 6 19. General Robert B. Landry — F
- 17 20. S. Everett Gleason F
- 18 21. Dan A. Kimball F

Mr. Edward H. Foley, Jr.
General Willis Matthews
Colonel Chester V. Clifton

did not attend
conference

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8WJ/ab

63-60573-44
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

DATE: December 24, 1951

FROM : A. J. Marchessault

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE-X

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY 60814/6

PURPOSE:

To advise you that the Bureau files fail to reflect a common tie-in between Pearson, Allen and Anderson with those individuals who attended the White House conference on December 10, 1951.

BACKGROUND:

For the purpose of ascertaining whether or not our files reflect a close relationship, a common incident, or a tie-up between Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson and Robert Sharon Allen with those individuals who attended the White House conference December 10, 1951, namely; Robert Abercrombie Lovett, General Omar Nelson Bradley, General Joseph Lawton Collins, General Hoyt Stanford Vandenberg, William Morrow Pechtler, General Charles Pearre Cabell, Secretary Frank C. Pace, Secretary Thomas Knight Finletter, Acting Secretary Francis B. Whitehair, Acting Secretary James Edwin Webb, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Admiral Sidney William Souers, Mr. James Felder Day, National Security Council, General Harry Hawkins Vaughan, Admiral Robert Lee Pennison, General Robert B. Landry, S. Everett Gleason, Dan A. Kimball, The following check was made.

The index cards from Records Section were called on the above-named individuals together with all build-ups and break-downs. The cards pertaining to each individual were arranged numerically and each set of cards were compared to the cards pertaining to Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson and Robert Sharon Allen, whose cards were also set up numerically. As a result of the above comparison a number of references were obtained whereby it was noted that the name of the individual attending the conference was also listed in the same piece of correspondence or report with that of the name of Drew Pearson or Allen or Anderson. In some references it was noted that the individuals names would appear in correspondence where both the Pearson and Anderson names appear.

AJM:slw

RECORDED - 97

INDEXED - 97

DEC 29 1951

Upon the completion of comparing the index cards all references were pulled and reviewed and they failed to reflect a common incident or tie-up between the individuals attending the White House conference of December 10, 1951 and Pearson, Anderson and Allen.

However, it is of interest to note that in two instances Drew Pearson released information of a confidential nature which information was in the possession of Mr. H. Freeman Matthews who it will be noted attended the White House conference of December 10, 1951.

One of the above instances was in reference to a leak of information in the State Department in April of 1946.

In April of 1946, U. S. Ambassador Bedell Smith had a two hour interview with Premier Stalin of Russia. Ambassador Smith furnished to the State Department on April 5, 1946, in code, a message reflecting his talk with Premier Stalin. Drew Pearson on Sunday evening, April 7, 1946 broadcasted the substance of this message. Investigation by the Bureau reflected that three copies of the code message was made up one of which was delivered to Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs of the State Department, on April 6, 1946 which was prior to the Pearson broadcast of Sunday, April 7, 1946. Accordingly there is no indication that Matthews furnished the information to Pearson and the investigation failed to fix responsibility for the leak of the information to Pearson. (62-58301-210,211,214.)

The other instance of interest was information released by Drew Pearson in his column dated June 12, 1945. The information pertained to Mr. Harry Hopkins talks with Premier Stalin of Russia, in June of 1945. Investigation by the Bureau reflected that Harry Hopkins sent telegrams from Moscow to President Truman reflecting the results of his talks with Premier Stalin. Copies of these telegrams were distributed to various individuals among them being Mr. Grew, who is Acting Secretary of State and to H. Freeman Matthews, who was Director of the European Division of the State Department at the time. There is no indication that Matthews furnished Drew Pearson with the confidential information and the investigation failed to definitely fix responsibility for the leak of the information to Drew Pearson. (62-78172-42,32,52)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memo be made part of captioned case.

ACTION:

That you authorize this memorandum be filed in the captioned case.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: January 3, 1952 ✓

FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*SUBJECT: Drew Pearson (Column of 12/15/51);
Jack Northman Anderson, aka Jack Anderson;
Robert S. Allen (Column of 12/13/51).
ESPIONAGE - X

Tolson	✓
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Nichols	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/af

PURPOSE:

This is to advise that Admiral Souers was briefed on January 3, 1952, regarding the contents of the report of SAC R. B. Hood, dated December 22, 1951, and particularly regarding the degree of association between Director of Public Information, Defense Department, Mr. Clayton Fritchey and of Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair, Navy, with Drew Pearson.

DETAILS:

In accordance with your instructions, Mr. Hennrich talked with Admiral Souers of the White House on January 3 regarding the report of SAC R. B. Hood, dated December 22, 1951, which reflects the investigation of the alleged leak from the White House conference of December 10, 1951. He was briefed as to the investigation and advised of the information developed relative to the degree of association between Director of Public Information Clayton Fritchey of the Defense Department and Drew Pearson. He was also advised of the contacts between Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair of the Navy and Drew Pearson.

Admiral Souers advised that he had just about completed reviewing the Bureau's report. He indicated that he felt no further inquiries should be made in this matter and suggested that had he been handling the matter no investigation would have been requested in the first place. He said that he thought that Admiral Dennison had probably "needled" the President in connection with the request for an investigation inferring that Admiral Dennison was not aware of the problems involved in attempting to pin down responsibility for such a leak of information. Admiral Souers commented that he felt the investigation would have some good effects for a short period of time in that the various agencies involved would be more security conscious.

CEH:evf

c.c. A. J. Marchessault

RECORDED-11

INDEXED-11

EX. - 8

JAN 7 1952

61 JAN 11 1952

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[Handwritten initials and marks]

As you know, as far as the Bureau is concerned, all pending investigation has been completed. Secretary Lovett, who originally requested the investigation, has advised that in event further inquiries are desired he will so advise.

ACTION:

For your information. You will be advised of any additional developments.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-2012 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/RYSW

January 5, 1952

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Laughlin	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your kind letter of December 26, 1951, with which you enclosed a copy of the report of Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood, covering the investigation of the reported leak of information from the White House conference which was held on December 10, 1951.

I have examined the details of this report with considerable interest, and I am sincerely appreciative of your thoughtfulness in making it available to me.

Sincerely yours,



SIDNEY W. SOUERS

RECORDED - 63

165-60573-47
JAN 9 1952

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Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EX-100-100000

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SAC, Washington Field

January 4, 1952

Director, FBI

Drew Pearson (Column of 12/15/51)
Jack Northman Anderson, aka Jack Anderson
Robert S. Allen (Column of 12/13/51)
ESPIONAGE - X

Re report SAC R. B. Hood dated December 22, 1951.

You are advised that no further investigation is desired
in connection with this matter and you are authorized to close
your file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 JGJ/ptb

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Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 17
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51 JAN 14 1952

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JAN 14 1952
JAN 14 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 27, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON (Column of December 15, 1951);
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson;
ROBERT S. ALLEN (Column of December 13, 1951);
ESPIONAGE - X

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:To submit a summary of the investigation in this matter.

To advise:

1. Our investigation is completed.
2. A report has been submitted to Secretary of Defense Lovett and to Admiral Souers.
3. Admiral Dennison has been advised that report submitted to Lovett.
4. Admiral Souers is out of Washington. Will be briefed on his return January 4, 1952.

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION:

On December 13, 1951, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, advised that the President had instructed that he request the FBI to initiate an investigation of a reported "leak" of information regarding Top Secret matters discussed at a White House conference, December 10, 1951. Lovett stated Jack Anderson (leg-man for Pearson) had, on December 11, 1951, indicated to Under Secretary of the Navy Francis Whitehair that he had a column containing almost a verbatim account of what transpired at the December 10 conference. The President was notified and on his approval on December 12, 1951, General Omar Bradley sent for Anderson, reviewed the prepared column, and specifically requested deletion of two items for security reasons. Anderson had indicated entire column could not be "killed" and had already gone out on Bell Syndicate wires. He said he would recommend that two specified items be "killed."

RECORDED - 109
EX - 28

INDEXED - 109

CEH:LL

01 JAN 23 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/STP

Drew Pearson filed a column with the Bell Syndicate on December 11, 1951. It first appeared, to our knowledge, in the New York Daily Mirror on December 15, 1951. This column purported to report matters discussed at the December 10 conference and included quotes. Robert S. Allen filed a column with the Post-Hall News Syndicate on December 11, 1951. It first appeared, to our knowledge, in the New York Post on December 13, 1951. This column also purported to report matters discussed at the December 10 conference and included quotes. The Allen and Pearson columns were similar in most details. The Pearson column did include, when filed, the two items objected to by General Bradley. Pearson filed a correction to the column, eliminating these items, on December 12.

THE DECEMBER 10, 1951, CONFERENCE:

On Saturday, December 8, 1951, the President instructed Admiral Dennison to arrange for a conference to be held at the White House on December 10. The principal objective of the conference was to clear up certain matters concerning cease-fire negotiations in Korea. The specific item precipitating the President's action was an item providing for repair and rehabilitation of roads, airfields, etc. The President thought that we were being too lenient in our concessions in this regard. The President at that time indicated he would return to Washington for the conference rather than have a number of officials travel to Florida, where he was at that time. The President himself indicated those who would be present at the conference, and the arrangements were made by Admiral Dennison. The persons invited were not specifically advised as to the nature of the conference, although from pending matters under consideration they would have been aware in a general way of items which were to be discussed. There was, however, no designated or printed agenda. The conference convened at approximately 10:30 a.m. and adjourned at approximately 11:45 a.m. All persons present participated in the discussions, with the exception of General Cabell, Vaughan and Landry, and Admiral Dennison. There was extensive discussion of the cease-fire negotiations in Korea, including objectives of the United Nations Forces and concessions which could be made in order to attain a cease-fire. There was also extensive discussion regarding the NATO planning and the European situation in general. The

conference was generally of a briefing nature, but, in addition, resulted in action concerning at least one instruction to General Ridgway as to how far he could go in his negotiations with Communist China on a "cease-fire," including concessions on repair and rehabilitation.

The following persons attended the December 10 conference and they have all been interviewed, except the President:

President Truman
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Army
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air
Admiral William Fechteler, Navy
General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary France C. Pace, Army
Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, Air
Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair, Navy
Acting Secretary James E. Webb, State
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, State
Admiral Sidney Souers, White House
James Lay, National Security Council
General Harry Vaughan, White House
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, White House
General Robert Landry, White House

Mr. Joseph Short, White House Press Secretary, and others who "on a need-to-know basis" were furnished information regarding certain phases of the conference, were also interviewed.

The interviews reflected that no one took notes during the conference except James Lay, who turned them over to the President, and that no one dictated a memorandum on the conference except Secretary Finletter, whose memorandum made brief reference to the conference and was directed at what was not discussed. All copies of that memorandum were accounted for. The interviews did not indicate who might be responsible for any "leak" of information from the conference.

THE ALLEN-PEARSON COLUMNS

The columns filed by Robert S. Allen and Drew Pearson are written in a style which would indicate that the writers had first-hand knowledge of what went on at the conference, describing the President's striding into the room, grinning, shaking hands all around, etc. The columns then purport to give with continuity high lights of discussions at the conference. Both of the columns are limited to discussions on the cease-fire negotiations.

It was the consensus of those persons interviewed and who had read the columns that the reporting was relatively accurate as to the points discussed in connection with the cease-fire negotiations, but relatively inaccurate as to the quotes attributed to the individuals present. In this connection, it was noted there was considerable variance among the persons interviewed as to exactly what was said by particular individuals. It was the consensus of those interviewed who had read the columns that they were prepared with at least some information as to points discussed at the conference, particularly regarding the cease-fire negotiations, and probably from a common source. General Vandenberg commented regarding the Allen column that the article did not reflect the real purpose of the meeting. General Vandenberg believes it could have been prepared by someone who had closely followed the Korean situation and public statements of positions proclaimed by the various Joint Chiefs of Staff members, without any access to an actual account of the meeting. At the time of his interview, the Pearson column was not available. As indicated above, Pearson's column is similar in context. All others interviewed who had read the columns indicated it would have been necessary to have access to at least bits of information regarding discussions at the conference in order to prepare the columns.

At least two items of particular significance regarding cease-fire discussions were not reported in the columns; namely, General Collins made a statement that Korea could be held until 1952 (election year) - the columns attributed him as saying that Korea could be held until "hell freezes over"; also, the general theme of the discussion on concessions was conditioned upon what has

been referred to as "the greater sanction," which contemplates the laying down of broad general terms of an armistice, with the firm and final determination and declaration that if the conditions are violated, the United Nations will take strong retaliatory action, including all out war against Communist China. The columns failed to comment on this.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Investigation developed that Clayton Fritchey, Director of Public Information, Department of Defense, was visiting the Pearson home on the evening of December 12 and had exhibited to him a copy of the Pearson column. He apparently is on close, friendly terms with Pearson and his wife. Fritchey admits he has known Pearson for ten years and visits him periodically about once a month. There is no indication that Fritchey had access to information on the December 10 conference prior to December 12.

Under Secretary Whitehair had previously been visited by Pearson on two occasions, and also by Fred Blumenthal, a Pearson employee. Whitehair called Pearson on December 12, with the President's approval, for the purpose of "killing" the Pearson column. Whitehair indicated concern that he might be blamed for the "leak." Pearson told Whitehair he should not be apprehensive, for he had not told Pearson anything. Pearson commented that he was an old friend of General Bradley and that many other friends of his were at the conference. He named Finletter, Vandenberg, and Jimmy Webb in this connection.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is to be noted that interviews were initiated prior to our obtaining the Pearson and Allen columns. Certain persons interviewed had not seen the columns and their comments were not obtained regarding the accuracy of the material contained therein. Inasmuch as the objective of the investigation was the identification of any person who may have been responsible for a "leak" of information, it was not deemed advisable to reinterview those persons specifically to obtain their comments as to the accuracy of the Allen and Pearson columns, particularly since those persons who will review the report were actually present at the conference and know what transpired. The only persons who attended the conference who had no knowledge of the contents of either column at the time of the interview were General Robert Landry and Secretary Thomas K. Finletter.

ACTION:

Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett was advised of the investigation conducted to date on December 21, 1951. He commented, without identifying the source, that the theory had been presented to him that an astute newspaperman could have written the columns without actually having access to the facts discussed at the conference. He commented that many items were inaccurate and that the columns made no reference to many items discussed. At that time, he specifically stated that Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and Robert S. Allen should not be interviewed "at this time." He also stated that no further investigation was desired at this time on the basis of information developed.

A copy of the report of SAC R. B. Hood, dated at Washington, D. C., December 22, 1951, was forwarded to Secretary Lovett by letter of December 26, 1951. The letter confirms his request that no interviews should be had with Pearson, Anderson, and Allen, and specifically requests Secretary Lovett's advice as to whether further investigation is desired.

A copy of SAC Hood's report was forwarded to Admiral Souers under date of December 26. Souers is presently in Florida and will return on January 3, 1952. An appointment has been made by Mr. Hennrich to brief Admiral Souers on January 4.

Admiral Dennison has been advised that the report in this matter has been delivered to Secretary Lovett.

You will be advised of the briefing of Admiral Souers upon his return to Washington and of any further developments in this matter.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **WASHINGTON FIELD**

FILE NO.

REPORT MADE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE WHEN MADE 12/22/51	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 12/14-22/51	REPORT MADE BY R. B. HOOD, SAC
TITLE DREW PEARSON (Column of December 15, 1951) JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson ROBERT S. ALLEN (Column of December 13, 1951)			CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

On 12/11/51 JACK ANDERSON, Reporter for DREW PEARSON, approached FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Under Secretary of Navy, asked some innocuous questions concerning background of White House conference held preceding date; then confronted WHITEHAIR with statements attributed to participants at conference, requesting verification. WHITEHAIR states he rebuked ANDERSON and declined to comment on conference; reported matter to DAN KIMBALL, Secretary of Navy, and facts of proposed PEARSON column furnished President TRUMAN. On request, ANDERSON submitted pertinent portion of proposed news column for 12/15/51 release to General OMAR BRADLEY on 12/12/51. Specific objection to phraseology of two items in column made by General BRADLEY on security grounds, and PEARSON made requested changes. Column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in 12/13/51 issue of New York Post reported substantially same information as PEARSON possessed relative to Presidential conference of 12/10. Columns referred to set forth. News dispatches referring to specific items discussed at conference set forth as of interest to instant investigation. At President's request, investigation conducted to determine whether leak may have emanated from any person in attendance at White House conference. All participants at conference interviewed as well as those identified as having knowledge of items discussed there. These interviews did not result in identification of any person responsible for leak of information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8 JAB/SP-8 JAB

This copy retained see serial 45-1

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APPROVED AND FORWARDED: 	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold; text-align: center;">45- 60573-50</div>	
COPIES OF THIS REPORT 5 - Bureau 2 - Washington Field (65-6060) 3-18-88		INDEXED 10/16/77 # 108,460	

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

This investigation was initiated on a request of the President through Secretary of Defense ROBERT A. LOVETT. On December 13, 1951, Secretary LOVETT advised Assistant Director ALAN H. BELMONT and Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH that the President had requested him to inform the Bureau that an investigation should be made concerning information in the possession of JACK ANDERSON, leg man for DREW PEARSON, which information it was believed came from one of the government representatives attending a White House conference on December 10, 1951, presided over by President TRUMAN. The information concerned was of a "~~top-secret~~" nature.

At that time Secretary LOVETT advised that the Defense Department had been considering four primary points in connection with the present cease-fire discussions in Korea and which points were presently matters of conflict between the United States and the Communist peace representatives. He stated that as a result of the feeling of the President that some of these matters were in need of further discussion, a conference was called by the President for 10:30 A.M., December 10, 1951, and the White House issued invitations to those whose attendance was desired.

Mr. LOVETT stated he had determined the following individuals were present at the conference:

- / President TRUMAN
- : Secretary of Defense ROBERT A. LOVETT
- : General OMAR BRADLEY, Chief of Staff
- : General J. LAWTON COLLINS, Army
- : General HOYT S. VANDENBERG, Air
- : Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER, Navy
- : General CHARLES P. CABELL, Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff
- : Secretary FRANK C. FACE, Army
- : Secretary THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Air
- : Acting Secretary FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Navy
- : Acting Secretary JAMES E. WEBB, State
- : Mr. H. FREEMAN-MATTHEWS, State
- : Admiral SIDNEY SOUERS, White House
- : JAMES LAY, National Security Council
- : General HARRY VAUGHAN, White House
- : Admiral ROBERT L. DENNISON, White House
- : General ROBERT LANDRY, White House

Mr. LOVETT, during the interview, furnished a summary of the various matters which were discussed at the conference. Mr. LOVETT advised that because of the widespread interest which had been general in connection with the conference, newspaper reporters were present at the White House in great number and at the conclusion of the conference were clamoring for information. He advised that to his knowledge, Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, press correspondent for the White House, advised the reporters that the conference had discussed world

affairs including Korea and made no further statement.

Mr. LOVETT informed that he had taken no notes during the conference and subsequent thereto, had prepared no written record of the matters covered at the conference. He further informed that there was no recording of the conference and that no written agenda had been prepared specifying the items to be discussed.

Secretary LOVETT advised that on the afternoon of December 12, 1951, JACK ANDERSON, leg man for DREW PEARSON, contacted Acting Secretary of the Navy WHITEHAIR and showed to Mr. WHITEHAIR or read to him a story which purported to be almost a verbatim account of the important matters set forth above which were discussed at the conference. He stated that Mr. WHITEHAIR was shocked and informed ANDERSON that it would be wrong to publish this material. Mr. LOVETT stated that Mr. WHITEHAIR brought this to the attention of the President. He stated that the President informed General BRADLEY who called either PEARSON or ANDERSON and asked that the material be brought over so that he might examine it. He stated that about 7:00 P.M. on the same day ANDERSON came to see General BRADLEY and brought the story with him. He stated that the story was read by General BRADLEY and his Aides, Colonel CLIFTON and Colonel MATTHEWS.

He stated that General BRADLEY attempted to get ANDERSON to "kill" the story entirely but ANDERSON advised him that he had checked with PEARSON and that the story was already on the Bell Syndicate wires and would come out Saturday, December 15, 1951. He stated that ANDERSON informed General BRADLEY that it was impossible to "kill" the story. He further added that General BRADLEY and his Aides marked in red pencil two parts which they stated would be especially injurious to the security of this country and that ANDERSON informed General BRADLEY that he would recommend that these two parts be deleted.

Mr. LOVETT stated that the first part was a statement attributed to the President that if we did not get a cease-fire by December 27, we should arrange to extend the time. The second part related to concessions we might be prepared to make to the Communists. Mr. LOVETT advised that he did not know the full contents of ANDERSON's article. He stated that neither Mr. WHITEHAIR nor General BRADLEY had secured a copy of ANDERSON's article and that the only source from which the contents could be obtained in the government would be recollections of Mr. WHITEHAIR, General BRADLEY, and General BRADLEY's two aides. He stated that he did not know the exact excerpts of ANDERSON's article which shocked Mr. WHITEHAIR but rather was of the opinion it was the fact that ANDERSON had what appeared to be an accurate report of the conference.

Secretary LOVETT pointed out that ANDERSON's story appeared to have background which would indicate that it must have come from someone actually at the conference. He furnished as an example that the article started out by saying that the President, tanned and fit, walked briskly into the conference room and shook hands with everyone including his own White House Aides.

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INTERVIEW WITH FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR

Mr. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Undersecretary of the Navy since August 6, 1951, was interviewed at his office on December 16, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that he had attended the White House Conference on December 10 as substitute for Secretary DAN KIMBALL. At the conclusion of the conference, he departed alone, returning immediately to the Pentagon Building. He made no notes or memoranda but furnished a resume of the conference to Secretary KIMBALL the same afternoon and discussed the matter with no one else.

On the following afternoon, December 11, Mr. WHITEHAIR returned to his office between 5 and 6 p.m., at which time he was informed by an aide, Marine Captain [] that JACK ANDERSON was waiting to see him. ANDERSON had no previous appointment with Mr. WHITEHAIR, and they were not acquainted. Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that he talked with ANDERSON a short time in his office and found him to be an attractive, personable young man. He advised ANDERSON indicated he would not take much of Mr. WHITEHAIR's time, adding that he covers the Pentagon for DREW PEARSON and Mr. PEARSON wanted ANDERSON to become acquainted with Mr. WHITEHAIR. They exchanged a few pleasantries and then ANDERSON stated he understood Mr. WHITEHAIR was at the big meeting. WHITEHAIR replied, "You know there are a lot of big meetings." ANDERSON stated, "No, no, I mean the one at the White House." Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he remarked that unfortunately Secretary KIMBALL had been away, intimating that he had replaced Mr. KIMBALL. ANDERSON then asked who was present at the conference, and WHITEHAIR advised ANDERSON that the national interests precluded him from giving him this information. ANDERSON then inquired whether any jokes were told at the meeting. WHITEHAIR again advised ANDERSON that the best interests of the country made it impossible to discuss the conference. He thinks he mentioned this was merely the renewal of the bimonthly meeting of the President with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that ANDERSON thereupon pulled from his pocket a glossy yellow or gold paper folded like a newspaper and, reading from this paper, inquired if it were not true that General VANDENBERG had stated that we should reach an armistice with the Communists and thereafter withdraw. Also, General VANDENBERG had contended that we should not bomb beyond the Yalu River. Mr. WHITEHAIR declined to answer this query. ANDERSON then inquired

if JIMMY WEBB had not stated that we should reach an armistice and impose a threat to the Communists in the event the terms of this armistice were violated. Mr. WHITEHAIR refused to answer this question also. ANDERSON then inquired if Admiral FECHTELER did not oppose the above proposition of including a warning and threat to the Communists in the event of an armistice violation. Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he told ANDERSON that Admiral FECHTELER talks very little about anything. WHITEHAIR stated ANDERSON was persistent and inquired whether WHITEHAIR saw the President and he may have also asked regarding the President being tanned. WHITEHAIR advised he may have indicated that he saw the President, which was obvious, and could not recall whether he had commented on the suntan of the President. He advised ANDERSON then put the paper in his pocket and he lectured ANDERSON briefly, pointing out such material may be dangerous to the security of the United States and afford comfort to the enemy. He stressed ANDERSON should draw no inferences from anything stated by WHITEHAIR.

Mr. WHITEHAIR expressed the belief that ANDERSON's original intention was to merely obtain anecdotes or pleasantries for background or window dressing for his column and had not intended to reveal his material to WHITEHAIR, but this was a development from WHITEHAIR's refusal to cooperate from the outset.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised on early Wednesday morning, December 12, he discussed the above incident with Secretary KIMBALL relating the entire story. He understands thereafter Secretary KIMBALL related the ANDERSON incident to Admiral FECHTELER, and later in the morning Admiral FECHTELER brought the matter to the attention of Admiral DENNISON of the White House who had visited the Pentagon about 11:30 a.m. on another matter. Mr. WHITEHAIR surmised that Admiral DENNISON had informed President TRUMAN as Admiral DENNISON contacted him later in the day and reported the President desired that WHITEHAIR report this matter to the attention of Secretary of Defense LOVETT and inform Mr. LOVETT that the FBI should be advised.

Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he felt the most immediate thing was to prevent publication of the story, if possible, and at his suggestion, Admiral DENNISON obtained authorization of the President for WHITEHAIR to contact DREW PEARSON. About 5 p.m., December 12, Mr. WHITEHAIR phoned PEARSON whom he had met on several prior occasions since his appointment as Undersecretary and appealed to PEARSON to withhold the column from publication. He stated he based his request on two grounds; first, that he was newly appointed and trying to perform his job and did not wish to become involved as a result of PEARSON's action in sending his representative to make friends with WHITEHAIR and then asked a series of questions about a confidential conference. Mr. WHITEHAIR's

get pg. 4

WFO 65-6060

second and most important argument was that the disclosure of the conference discussions might well impair the security of the country. He stated PEARSON was somewhat apologetic and said he wished WHITEHAIR had called him yesterday and then told WHITEHAIR that he need not worry, that he had not told ANDERSON anything, and insisted that the statement would not hurt the President or the country and, as a matter of fact, he thought the President would like it.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that his senior aide, Captain [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USN, had listened to the conversation with PEARSON and submitted the following memorandum:

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"12 December 1951

"At about 1735 Wednesday, 12 December, the Under Secretary directed me to get Mr. Drew Pearson on the phone for him and to listen in. There follows the substance of the conversation:

"Mr. Whitehair said that as Mr. Pearson knew, Mr. Anderson was in to see him yesterday afternoon. That Mr. Anderson and he had chatted for a while and that Mr. Anderson started asking about the President's conference Monday morning, as to who was there, and if there were any jokes told, etc. Mr. Whitehair gave him some innocuous answers, to innocuous questions, but when Mr. Anderson asked other questions and brought out a notepad to take notes, the Under Secretary told him not to do that, that he could not talk about the conference. Mr. Whitehair then said to Mr. Pearson that if he planned to publish anything about this conference he wished that he would reconsider and not do it, because if he had anything it might hurt our national interests, and since it was well known that Mr. Anderson had been in to see the Under Secretary he might be blamed for the leak.

"Mr. Pearson said that he had already released a brief outline of the conference saying that the President would like a truce, providing no serious concessions were necessary, etc., but that he didn't see that Mr. Whitehair should be apprehensive, as Anderson had told him that Whitehair hadn't told him anything, and that General Bradley and he (Pearson) were old friends and had talked this situation over many times, and that many other friends of his (Pearson's) were at the conference: Finletter, Vandenberg, and Jimmy Webb.

"Mr. Whitehair protested again, stating he was new here, trying to do a job and certainly didn't want to get involved in such a matter, and that it was now known that Anderson had been to Mr. Kimball's office and hadn't

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WFO 65-6060

"gotten in to see Mr. Kimball, and had then come down to see him (Mr. Whitehair) -- Mr. Whitehair not then knowing that Anderson had tried but had been unable to see Mr. Kimball first.

"Mr. Pearson then said that Anderson was trying to see Mr. Kimball on an entirely different matter, and had had instructions to get in to meet Mr. Whitehair, and further that he (Pearson) thought the article was a pretty good one, favorable to the President and to the military, and would do the President some good, and certainly not hurt our national interests.

"Mr. Whitehair said that he was glad to hear that, and thanked Mr. Pearson."

In connection with his acquaintance with DREW PEARSON, Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that when he was General Counsel for the Economic Stabilization Administration, he had been invited to the PEARSON home, along with MIKE DISALLE, but had not accepted the invitation. Shortly after his appointment as Undersecretary of Navy, he was again invited to the PEARSON home for an informal buffet dinner on a Saturday afternoon and accepted. He recalled that he went in his car and drove Justice HUGO BLACK and his wife, who were also guests. Others present included DREW PEARSON, a sister of Mr. PEARSON, Attorney ABE FORTAS and his wife, WALTER CROMBIE, radio commentator, and [REDACTED]. Mr. WHITEHAIR also recalled that PEARSON had paid him a casual visit one afternoon on a subsequent occasion inquiring how he liked his job and exchanging pleasantries. On one other occasion PEARSON had been in the Pentagon to contact the Secretary of Navy and dropped in for a brief visit with Mr. WHITEHAIR. Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he had never furnished PEARSON with any information.

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Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he did not know ROBERT S. ALLEN. He advised that he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON prior to the meeting described above and did not know any other individual employed by PEARSON with the exception of [REDACTED]. He explained he had met [REDACTED] previously on two occasions in his office. This occurred in connection with a controversy growing out of efforts of the Harvey Machine Company to negotiate a twenty-seven million dollar loan from the Government. Considerable opposition developed because of alleged inefficiency of the Harvey Machine Company in manufacturing defective shells for the Government during the war.

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DREW PEARSON apparently had interested himself in opposing the loan efforts of the Harvey Company and sent [REDACTED] to see WHITEHAIR, at which time [REDACTED] displayed a confidential Navy document to WHITEHAIR. Sometime thereafter, [REDACTED] again visited WHITEHAIR and the latter returned the

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document to [] stating he was certain [] had made photo-static copies. He said [] was surprised, stating he thought WHITEHAIR would retain the document.

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The "New York Post" column of ROBERT S. ALLEN published December 13, 1951, was displayed to Mr. WHITEHAIR, who stated it was pretty accurate and undoubtedly based upon the knowledge of someone who had attended the conference. He stated the quotations attributed to the President and General COLLINS appeared reasonably accurate but observed that in connection with the column's statement that the Communists cannot drive us out of Korea, COLLINS had stated "For my money, the Communists cannot drive us out of Korea," rather than "until hell freezes over" as indicated in the ALLEN column. Mr. WHITEHAIR was positive General COLLINS had not said "until hell freezes over."

Mr. WHITEHAIR thought that the quotations and alleged statements of General BRADLEY were rather accurate with the exception that he did not recall that General BRADLEY had portrayed the Communists as playing off their efforts to demand concessions on airfields against the rotation of troops advocated by the U.N. He recalled that both matters were discussed in General BRADLEY's presentation of the various points at issue in the truce negotiations. With reference to the quotations of General VANDENBERG in the column, Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he could not recall that General VANDENBERG had argued particularly about airfields but possibly this was mentioned.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that his contribution to the conference touched briefly upon the fact that he was new in his job and his knowledge of the behavior and characteristics of the orientals, Koreans in particular, in the light of his many years' experience in the Far East as a Military Government Specialist and Prisoner of War Officer. He stated that based on his knowledge of oriental psychology, he offered the opinion to the conference that the Communists would prolong negotiations indefinitely and then say no, which supported the position of Admiral FECHTELER.

Concerning an alleged leak of information relative to the proceedings at the White House conference, Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he could offer no suggestions as to the identity of any person in attendance who may have been responsible for a leak, if a leak occurred.

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF NAVY DAN KIMBALL

Secretary of Navy DAN KIMBALL was interviewed at his office in the Pentagon on the afternoon of December 18, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Secretary KIMBALL advised that he was out of the city at the time of the White House Conference on the morning of December 10, 1951, and was represented at the conference by Under Secretary FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, who returned to the Pentagon before noon, at which time he furnished Mr. KIMBALL with a general summary of what had transpired at the conference. He recalled in particular that Mr. WHITEHAIR had informed him concerning the remarks made by Mr. WHITEHAIR and Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER. Mr. KIMBALL advised he had made no notes, and that no memoranda had been prepared on the above discussion or the conference. He also stated he had no further discussions with anyone concerning the conference proceedings.

Secretary KIMBALL stated that on the following afternoon, December 11, 1951, he had returned to his office about 4:30 P.M., at which time his secretary advised that JACK ANDERSON had wanted to see him. Secretary KIMBALL told the girl that he did not wish to see ANDERSON at all. However, he learned that ANDERSON had left his office and had gone down to visit Mr. WHITEHAIR. Later that evening, or early the next morning, WHITEHAIR reported to Secretary KIMBALL that ANDERSON had questioned him concerning the White House Conference and thereafter read several items from notes indicating he had been briefed on a number of matters discussed at the conference. On the same morning, Mr. KIMBALL informed Admiral FECHTELER of the above developments and Admiral FECHTELER advised he would inform Admiral DENNISON of the White House. Mr. KIMBALL understood that Admiral DENNISON had advised President TRUMAN on the same date.

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INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL WILLIAM M. FECHTELER

Admiral WILLIAM M. FECHTELER, Chief of Naval Operations, was interviewed on December 15, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM, at the office of Admiral FECHTELER, Room 4E, 632, Pentagon.

Admiral FECHTELER recalled he had attended the White House Conference held at 10:30 A.M., December 10, 1951. He advised that he did not take any notes during the conference and made no memoranda thereafter pertaining to the conference; he also advised he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone.

Admiral FECHTELER furnished the substance of his own contribution to the conference, which covered a single item. Admiral FECHTELER voiced his misgivings to an earlier State Department proposal that the sixteen member nations of the UN forces represented in Korea issue a threat to the Communists of dire consequences to be visited on them if a violation of the armistice agreement occurs. In this connection, Admiral FECHTELER urged that he did not believe in threats or in committing ourselves to a course of action which we might not be able or find desirable to effectuate at the time when some violation occurred, and he stressed he did not believe in issuing threats in any event.

Admiral FECHTELER furnished the background of instant matter as known to him, advising that he first learned of the PEARSON-ANDERSON leak on Wednesday morning, from Secretary DAN KIMBALL, as they were going to a conference together. Secretary KIMBALL related that on the previous day ANDERSON had an appointment with FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, during which ANDERSON questioned Mr. WHITEHAIR concerning the conference, and then read from a paper concerning the details of the conference, which alarmed WHITEHAIR, who reported the matter to Secretary KIMBALL. Admiral FECHTELER advised that after lunch he had occasion to talk with Admiral DENNISON, White House Attache, and DENNISON first learned of the leak from Admiral FECHTELER, and subsequently the matter was reported to the President.

Admiral FECHTELER pointed out he did not know DREW PEARSON, JACK ANDERSON, or any known PEARSON employee, and he had no specific suggestion as to how any leak may have occurred.

Admiral FECHTELER was made cognizant of the column by ROBERT S. ALLEN in the "New York Post" of December 13, 1951, which column

purported to contain the substance of the White House Conference. Admiral FECHTELER said he could not verify the accuracy of the ALLEN column as to actual quotations, but in all, considered the ALLEN column to be substantially an accurate report of remarks which were included in the conference. He expressed the belief that the ALLEN column must have been prepared with assistance from someone who was present at the conference, and he concluded he could not point out any inaccuracies in the ALLEN column.

Admiral FECHTELER was asked concerning the item reportedly in the ANDERSON column to the effect that we would seek an extension beyond the deadline of December 27, 1951, in the event details were not completed prior to that date. Admiral FECHTELER stated he did not recall the President had indicated we would seek or permit extension beyond the December 27 deadline, although he thinks the date may have been mentioned during the conference. He did recall that the President in substance said we should not make any concessions which we will regret later.

In conclusion, Admiral FECHTELER advised that during the proceedings he did not observe anybody coming into or leaving the room, and recalled when the meeting concluded, approximately 11:40 A.M., everyone left the White House at about the same time.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

General OMAR BRADLEY, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent M. A. TAYLOR.

General BRADLEY advised he was informed by the President of the leak to DREW PEARSON, which was exposed when JACK ANDERSON approached FRANCIS WHITEHAIR to confirm material obviously originating at the conference. General BRADLEY stated that about 6:00 P.M., December 12, 1951, he had visited the White House at which time the President told him of the disclosure and expressed great concern that the truce negotiations would be jeopardized through an untimely news item. General BRADLEY volunteered to see if he could prevent publication of the information in PEARSON'S possession. General BRADLEY stated he ascertained from a source at the "Washington Post" that the PEARSON column was not made up for publication in the "Post" for December 13 and 14, which would be Thursday and Friday of the week of the conference. General BRADLEY advised that his press aide, Colonel C. V. CLIFTON, thereafter telephoned JACK ANDERSON, who came over to the office of General BRADLEY about 7:30 P.M., December 12, 1951.

General BRADLEY related that when ANDERSON arrived at the office of General BRADLEY he displayed a typewritten copy of a column to General BRADLEY and his assistants, Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS and CHESTER CLIFTON. General BRADLEY read aloud the portions of the column dealing with the White House conference of December 10. His recollection was that the column referred to the conference as an important White House conference and described the President's entering the conference room, making a joking reference to his suntan, and proceeding around the conference table shaking hands with each individual present. General BRADLEY recalled the column indicated that General BRADLEY had led off by outlining the military situation in Korea, in which General BRADLEY was fairly optimistic.

Subsequently, reference was made in the column to a statement attributed to Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER to the effect that the Navy was ready to perform its mission any time, anywhere in the Korean war. General BRADLEY believed there may have been a reference to a statement allegedly made at the conference by General HOYT VANDENBERG, but stated later he believed this was mentioned by ANDERSON verbally.

General BRADLEY advised that he also recalled two items in particular which he pointed out to ANDERSON as very undesirable and which ANDERSON agreed

to change to conform with suggestions of General BRADLEY. One of these items quoted the President as saying we ought to do everything we could to get a cease-fire, but should not make any concessions we will regret later. General BRADLEY suggested changing this to simply state that the President had declared we should not make any concessions which we will regret later. The second item indicated that it was agreed at the conference that if we did not succeed in obtaining a cease-fire by the December 27 deadline we would ask for a few days extension of time. General BRADLEY advised that at his suggestion this was changed to a statement that there would undoubtedly be some details which would have to be worked out subsequent to the December 27 deadline. In connection with these changes, General BRADLEY advised that he had informed the President that the changes had been made and told President TRUMAN that the article, as modified, was not particularly harmful. He said he did not recall the President referring to the date December 27, 1951, at the conference.

General BRADLEY stated he did not request ANDERSON to kill or withdraw the story, explaining it was his understanding from talking to WHITEHAIR that it had been dispatched and he preferred not to ask favors of DRW PEARSON. General BRADLEY expressed the opinion that the column was based, in part at least, on information obtained from someone present at the conference, and that it was fairly accurate and was not particularly harmful. He stated he did not authorize the publication but could not prevent its publication, and chose to suggest the changes, which he marked on the typewritten copy at the suggestion of Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS.

General BRADLEY mentioned that ANDERSON had stated he had displayed the column to someone unnamed at the Pentagon who had stated that it was harmless and contained nothing which would violate security. General BRADLEY also had a recollection that ANDERSON had indicated that he had further information concerning the White House conference, but had refrained from including this in the watered down version for publication.

General BRADLEY, with reference to his participation in the conference, advised that at the beginning Secretary ROBERT LOVETT suggested that General BRADLEY inform the President of the military situation, which General BRADLEY did, advising him of the Communist buildup of men, planes, and equipment in the past couple of weeks, and also discussing the several points in the negotiation and mentioning that a few concessions could be made on both sides. He particularly expressed the view of the Joint Chiefs that repair and rehabilitation was equally advantageous to the UN and a ban would be unenforceable.

At this time the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN which appeared in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951, was displayed to General BRADLEY, who

read it carefully and expressed the opinion that he did not believe he recognized it as identical with that of ANDERSON, and did not believe it to be as accurate. He stated some of the quotations are pretty close to those of ANDERSON's and that the same person could have given the material to both men, relating it a bit differently, or he thought perhaps ALLEN could have obtained the material from PEARSON or ANDERSON prior to the time that ANDERSON's material was watered down in column form.

General BRADLEY pointed out several differences. He stated that at the conference General VANDENBERG had not expressed as great concern as attributed to him in the ALLEN column. He stated that the references to General COLLINS were fairly accurate, and the quotation that General COLLINS stated we could "hold the present line until hell freezes over" was accurate. With reference to General COLLINS' inclination to make concessions on the airfield dispute, he stated COLLINS' view was that four or five airfields could be conceded to the Communists.

General BRADLEY advised that with reference to the statement in the ALLEN column attributed to him, that the Reds were trying to bargain rotation against airfields, this is not entirely accurate, but that reference to the rotation of troops was made and this was discussed as one of the serious points at issue in negotiations with the enemy.

General BRADLEY advised that the quote attributed to President TRUMAN, that he was very anxious to end the fighting but would not agree to concessions we may regret later, was accurate to the best of his recollection. He also believed some reference was made at the conference to building up the South Korean Army and how soon we could withdraw safely.

General BRADLEY was questioned concerning any possible suspicions he might have concerning anyone present at the conference, and he stated he felt that no member of the Military or Naval services present was responsible for the leak. He admitted he had in mind one civilian present at the conference whom he would not trust with confidential information of this character. He said he had absolutely no facts to support his suspicions, except that this person had been reported to have leaked information on a prior occasion. He confided that he had made his suspicions known to the President and had promised the President that he would not reveal the name of this person to any other individual. General BRADLEY did not furnish any information which would point to the individual under his suspicion.

General BRADLEY advised he did not make any notes during or after the conference; thereafter, did not make any record or memorandum of the proceedings. Furthermore, he stated he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone except as indicated above.

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INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL CHESTER V. CLIFTON

Colonel CHESTER V. CLIFTON, press officer and aide to General OMAR BRADLEY, was interviewed in the office of his associate, Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS, on the afternoon of December 14, 1951, by SAs CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Colonel CLIFTON advised that at about 6:30 p.m. on December 12, 1951, General BRADLEY had returned to his office from the White House and advised that the President was greatly concerned about an alleged leak to DREW PEARSON or his reporter, JACK ANDERSON, of matters discussed at the White House conference held on the morning of December 10, 1951. Colonel CLIFTON stated he understood that ANDERSON had prepared a story containing direct quotations which were very accurate, indicating the information was authentic. He explained that he learned from General BRADLEY, that FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, acting Secretary of Navy at the conference, had been approached by ANDERSON under the pretext that he wanted to meet with Mr. WHITEHAIR, who is comparatively new as under Secretary of Navy, and thereafter endeavored to question Mr. WHITEHAIR about the conference proceedings. When Mr. WHITEHAIR declined to furnish anything, ANDERSON pulled a paper from his pocket and read descriptive material of the conference proceedings which was so accurate Mr. WHITEHAIR became alarmed, and reported the matter which ultimately reached the President. Colonel CLIFTON related that the President felt that premature or inaccurate disclosures might jeopardize our entire truce negotiations with the Communists. So, General BRADLEY volunteered his assistance in view of past experience with PEARSON in a similar matter. He recalled that on one occasion in the past when PEARSON had prepared a column dealing with top secret atomic information, General BRADLEY had requested PEARSON not to use the material in the interests of national security and PEARSON had respected General BRADLEY's request in that matter. Colonel CLIFTON related that in the light of that prior incident, General BRADLEY had volunteered to help on this occasion. Colonel CLIFTON understood from General BRADLEY that Mr. WHITEHAIR had called DREW PEARSON, who indicated that the column already had been dispatched, but insisted that nothing contained therein constituted a danger to security or a source of embarrassment. Colonel CLIFTON stated he phoned "RUSS" WIGGINS of the Washington Post, who advised him that nothing concerning the White House conference appeared in the PEARSON columns scheduled for publication December 13 and 14. Colonel CLIFTON advised that before having PEARSON again contacted by his superior, General BRADLEY, he thought he would discuss the matter with JACK ANDERSON and called him after locating ANDERSON at the Senate Press Gallery.

He stated ANDERSON assured him he did not wish to violate security and there was no security violation in the PEARSON column, but agreed to come over with the column and discuss it. At the same time, ANDERSON inquired how CLIFTON learned of the column's existence, and offered to submit the column for editing in exchange for being informed as to who told Colonel CLIFTON he had the information concerning the conference. To this Colonel CLIFTON agreed. A short time thereafter, around 7:00 p.m., JACK ANDERSON came over to General BRADLEY's office and there in the presence of ANDERSON, Colonel MATTHEWS and himself (CLIFTON) General BRADLEY read aloud the portion of the column dealing with the White House conference. Colonel CLIFTON recalled there were two points in the article which were considered objectionable, although General BRADLEY did not indicate to ANDERSON that anything in the column was accurate or indicate in any way that he approved publication of the column. Colonel CLIFTON explained this type of editing is necessary in handling stories where reporters have secured confidential information in the nature of scoops, as they are unable to prevent publication and endeavor to protect national security by persuading the reporters to delete items which greatly endanger the national interest.

The first of the objectionable items above, in substance, quoted the President as stating we would grant an extension of a few days if details of the peace negotiations were not worked out by the cease fire dead line of December 27, 1951. Colonel CLIFTON advised this objectionable item was rephrased and in substance was made to read that undoubtedly there will be some details that will have to be worked out after the December 27th dead line. The other objectionable item in substance had quoted the President as saying that we ought to do everything we can to get a cease fire, but we should make no concessions that we would regret later. Colonel CLIFTON advised this item was considered objectionable in that it would tend to make it look like we are too anxious to obtain an armistice. So, the item was changed in substance to show the President commenting we should make no concessions we would regret later. Colonel CLIFTON stated that apart from the above changes, it was agreed in ANDERSON's presence that the column was not particularly harmful and might in fact be helpful. Thereafter, ANDERSON departed with the understanding he would recommend to PEARSON that the suggested changes be inserted in the column.

Just before leaving, ANDERSON reminded Colonel CLIFTON they had agreed that on the condition of ANDERSON submitting the column, Colonel CLIFTON would tell ANDERSON how it had been learned that the column had been prepared. In reply to ANDERSON, CLIFTON told him he learned it from the President.

He stated ANDERSON appeared to be genuinely startled at this, and then as they were walking down the hall, ANDERSON shook his head and said "it must have been WHITEHAIR who told him."

To the best of his recollections, Colonel CLIFTON furnished the material contained in the PEARSON column as read aloud to him by General BRADLEY in ANDERSON'S presence. He recalled the column had started out with a description of the President entering the conference room in good spirits, and after greeting everyone made some remark, in substance, inquiring as to how they all liked his suntan. In addition to the two items above, considered objectionable and changed in accordance with General BRADLEY'S suggestions, Colonel CLIFTON recalled the PEARSON column contained a sub-title along in the middle of the column, captioned "Silent Admiral" which described a statement at the conference attributed to Admiral FECHTELER. It was Colonel CLIFTON'S recollection that in substance the comments attributed to FECHTELER were to the effect that the Navy was ready to carry on its part in the Korean war if called on, any time, any place, and under any condition. Colonel CLIFTON said he could not recall additional items in the PEARSON column, but did remember that next to the last item was the previously described objectionable reference to the granting of extensions of time beyond the December 27 deadline. In connection with ANDERSON'S protestation that the column contained no violation of security, ANDERSON had told General BRADLEY and his two assistants that he had lots more information from the conference and he had purposely left it out because there might be some question of security. In this connection, he referred to statements attributed to General VANDENBERG dealing with the air war and how it would affect us and by General COLLINS concerning troop rotation, and what we should do about it.

Colonel CLIFTON stated he is familiar with the DREW PEARSON style of reporting and his information techniques from considerable experience with ANDERSON and he feels that this information originated from an eye witness who attended the White House conference. He cautioned, however, that the entire story may not have been obtained from such a source of information and added that it may have been the work of two or more reporters working in conjunction, such as ANDERSON and McNAMARA, another PEARSON reporter, or ROBERT ALLEN and PAUL SCOTT. He also called attention to the possibility that direct quotations could have been passed on by a secondary source in the person of an assistant to one of those attending the conference. In this connection, Colonel CLIFTON stated that a surprising degree of detail can be assimilated by a man trained in this respect to receive information from the top man and be able to retain it in order to make or implement decisions.

Colonel CLIFTON stated that a leak of this nature was not the sort of thing that was handled by a telephone conversation between the source and the reporter. He said this sort of matter would almost necessarily indicate a person to person briefing with the informant giving the reporter a complete "fill-in" or "run-down" on the entire proceedings.

At this time, Colonel CLIFTON called attention to a column by ROBERT S. ALLEN, which he stated appeared in the New York Mirror December 13, 1951, but actually appeared in the "Blue Final" of the New York Post on the evening of that date. Colonel CLIFTON stated that reading the ALLEN column tended to confuse a bit his recollections of the ANDERSON material, but believed the column was in general similar to the ANDERSON column. He observed that the ALLEN column appeared to include the material in ANDERSON's column and in addition contained quotations by General VANDENBERG and General COLLINS, recalling in this connection, that ANDERSON had stated he had such items in his possession, but did not choose to use them.

After reading the ROBERT S. ALLEN column last night (December 13, 1951) Colonel CLIFTON remarked he called Mr. CLAYTON FRITCHEY, Director of Public Information, Department of Defense. They discussed the ALLEN column and Colonel CLIFTON's recollection of Mr. FRITCHEY's comment was FRITCHEY remarked that ALLEN had "scooped" PEARSON by two days. The following day, Colonel CLIFTON and Mr. FRITCHEY discussed the matter of the ALLEN and PEARSON columns and Mr. FRITCHEY told Colonel CLIFTON that he was at the DREW PEARSON residence at the time the discussion in General BRADLEY's office took place on the night of December 12. Mr. FRITCHEY told Colonel CLIFTON that he was playing bridge at the PEARSON home when ANDERSON came by the DREW PEARSON residence on his way to the Pentagon to take the column to General BRADLEY. Colonel CLIFTON stated FRITCHEY had related to him that PEARSON had showed the column to him (FRITCHEY). Colonel CLIFTON said FRITCHEY had made the observation he did not see anything harmful in the column as it had been displayed to him by PEARSON.

At the conclusion of this interview, Colonel CLIFTON summed up his observations by saying in his opinion there are two ways that the information got out: either a leak by some member actually in attendance at the White House conference, or some member in attendance told it to his respective staff and the information leaked from that point. He continued that it was his belief that the leak actually came from a person who had attended the White House conference. Colonel CLIFTON added it was his own conclusion that the same source who furnished the data to JACK ANDERSON also had given the same information to ROBERT S. ALLEN.

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On December 18, Colonel CLIFTON was reinterviewed for the purpose of displaying to him the DREW PEARSON column as published in the New York Daily Mirror, December 15, 1951. It was Colonel CLIFTON's observation that with only possibly minor editing, such as a comma here or there, he could see nothing significant in the PEARSON column as different from the original column which had been presented by ANDERSON and read by General BRADLEY. He stated he thought all the principal points were in the column. He did not believe the first paragraph in the column displayed is identical in form with the ANDERSON material, but he thought that the material that ANDERSON displayed to General BRADLEY did have an introduction containing much the same thought. He noted particularly the second sentence in the opening paragraph referring to an assurance from General BRADLEY that a cease fire could be worked out in Korea.

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL WILLIS MATTHEWS

Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS, Aide to General OMAR BRADLEY, was interviewed in his office at the Pentagon on the afternoon of December 14, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Colonel MATTHEWS confirmed the story of Colonel CHESTER CLIFTON of the return of General BRADLEY to the Pentagon about 6:30 p.m. on December 12, 1951, with the report from President TRUMAN of the news leak to JACK ANDERSON and the subsequent visit of ANDERSON to the office of General BRADLEY between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. the same evening. Colonel MATTHEWS also advised that upon arrival, ANDERSON had displayed a lengthy typewritten document on long sheets of yellow paper, resembling teletype paper, which he presumed to be a full column. He stated perhaps one third or more of the material was devoted to the White House Conference and that General BRADLEY read this portion out loud in the presence of ANDERSON, Colonel CLIFTON, and himself. He advised that ANDERSON furnished no copy to General BRADLEY and no notes were made.

Colonel MATTHEWS stated that ANDERSON indicated that the column, as prepared, did not have any items dangerous to security and informed General BRADLEY that he would delete or recommend deletion of anything constituting a security violation. He advised that General BRADLEY did not approve anything in the column or indicate that anything was accurate or inaccurate. However, General BRADLEY objected to two items and designated these items on ANDERSON's copy at the suggestion of Colonel MATTHEWS. He stated ANDERSON agreed to change the two items to conform with the suggestions of General BRADLEY and Colonel CLIFTON. He stated he was not completely clear as to the two items, but believed in one item, ANDERSON agreed to delete a statement indicating that we are anxious for an armistice and would go to considerable lengths to obtain it, and to leave in the column a statement by the President that we should not go and make any foolish concessions or mistakes which we would regret thereafter.

Colonel MATTHEWS advised that prior to the arrival of ANDERSON at the office of General BRADLEY on the evening of December 12, 1951, General BRADLEY had called Secretary ROBERT LOVETT discussing the alleged leak and informing him of the concern of the President. General BRADLEY also called Under Secretary FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, who had originally reported the leak and discussed the leak and the President's concern with Mr. WHITEHAIR.

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With reference to his recollections of the ANDERSON article read by General BRADLEY, Colonel MATTHEWS stated that it began by referring to the White House conference and indicating that the information hereafter came from an informed source or a source close to the White House. He stated it described President TRUMAN as entering the conference room, shaking hands with everybody, and making a remark about Florida and his suntan. He stated the article quoted the President and indicated that the President opposed granting the Communists the right to rebuild air fields, roads, etc. He believed some remark was made by the President to the effect that we should get along with the armistice negotiations.

Colonel MATTHEWS advised that he knew of the White House conference on December 10, in advance, but was not informed of the topics for discussion and had not discussed the conference with General BRADLEY or anyone else. He stated, so far as he knew, no notes or memoranda were made by General BRADLEY. Colonel MATTHEWS was able to furnish no individuals as suspects.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. CLAYTON FRITCHEY

Mr. CLAYTON FRITCHEY, Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, was interviewed at his office in the Pentagon on December 17, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Mr. FRITCHEY advised he possessed no information regarding the proceedings and discussions of the White House Conference held December 10, 1951, and did not know the identities of those in attendance other than from normal conjecture. Mr. FRITCHEY was advised it was understood he possessed some information regarding an alleged leak from the conference to DREW PEARSON or JACK ANDERSON, his reporter. Mr. FRITCHEY stated on the afternoon of Tuesday or Wednesday of last week, at about 3:00, 4:00 or 5:00, ANDERSON had visited him in his office. On this occasion, ANDERSON inquired as to what transpired at the White House Conference, and FRITCHEY said he knew nothing. ANDERSON replied that he had a "pretty good fill-in" on the conference, and FRITCHEY gathered from ANDERSON's manner that he considered the material authentic, but not particularly exciting, and that it had proved to be something of a let-down. ANDERSON gave FRITCHEY no details of the information in ANDERSON's possession. Mr. FRITCHEY remarked that he knew ANDERSON rather well, but that ANDERSON does not visit him very often, and added that the reporters, including ANDERSON, know who to see and who is vulnerable, indicating he was not in the latter category.

At this point, Mr. FRITCHEY stated he was able to place the date of ANDERSON's visit as Tuesday, December 11th, which was the day before he had visited DREW PEARSON's home for dinner and bridge. He mentioned DREW PEARSON does not play bridge personally, but his wife enjoys the game. FRITCHEY stated that in route to PEARSON's residence, he had gone by the home of his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel F. CLARKE NEWLON, and remarked that NEWLON did not have dinner. He explained, later in the interview, that Colonel NEWLON and his wife joined the group for bridge after dinner. Dinner guests included DREW PEARSON and wife, [redacted] and his wife [redacted] of Kentucky, and Mr. FRITCHEY.

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While at dinner, or possibly just before dinner began, JACK ANDERSON arrived at the PEARSON home, and PEARSON invited FRITCHEY into

the hallway or reception room adjoining the living room, where he was shown an article pertaining to the White House Conference. He stated it was typewritten on several pages of yellow paper longer than the ordinary letter size, and he gathered it was part of the column. PEARSON told FRITCHEY the article contained several items to which General BRADLEY or his assistant, Colonel CLIFTON, or both, objected, and ANDERSON was going to show it to these officers. At PEARSON's invitation, FRITCHEY read the article, which impressed him as being rather innocuous and pretty tame. FRITCHEY stated, however, it struck him that despite the fact the column was not sensational, the fact that it indicated a leak had occurred in such an important conference was significant and important. He stated he did not suggest this to PEARSON, nor did he suggest that PEARSON withhold publication of the column. He advised PEARSON did not ask him to approve the article or to edit it in any way, and he did not do so. He stated he supposed PEARSON showed him the column to double check the story, as this is a normal technique. He remarked that it is well-known here that PEARSON has excellent sources, and this sort of thing occurs regularly, and he did not feel it would cause any furor.

Mr. FRITCHEY advised that ANDERSON then departed, and an hour or two later returned, at which time FRITCHEY was playing bridge. He stated he did not see the column on this second visit of ANDERSON; however, PEARSON informed him that one or two changes were suggested by General BRADLEY, and PEARSON stated that the column would be changed as suggested. FRITCHEY gathered from this that the column would be dispatched, and added it was his conclusion that the column had appeared, although, perhaps, not in the "Washington Post" as editors often exercise the prerogative to delete columns or portions of columns, and in some instances, such as with the tabloids, to divide columns and publish them piecemeal in different editions.

Mr. FRITCHEY advised that shortly before noon on Saturday, December 15th, JACK ANDERSON came to his office on another unimportant, unrelated matter, at which time FRITCHEY twitted ANDERSON for being scooped by ROBERT S. ALLEN, whose column, containing information similar to that of ANDERSON, had appeared in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951. FRITCHEY advised that ANDERSON expressed surprise, which appeared to be genuine. FRITCHEY stated he had learned of the ALLEN column from Colonel CLIFTON, and thought he had a copy in his desk box; however, he could not locate the copy, and ANDERSON departed, apparently in search of a "New York Post" containing the ALLEN column. FRITCHEY stated that, on this second visit of ANDERSON, he did not mention the subject of an

investigation, nor did FRITCHEY know about the investigation at that time. FRITCHEY stated that he had first learned of any possible difficulty in connection with the column while at the home of PEARSON on December 12, 1951. He did not know who PEARSON or ANDERSON blamed for exposing ANDERSON, but gathered from Colonel CLIFTON that FRANCIS WHITEHAIR had reported the matter. He stated he presumed PEARSON knew that ANDERSON had seen FRITCHEY on the previous day, and told FRITCHEY he had a good fill-in on the conference proceedings.

Mr. FRITCHEY was asked for his recollections of the content of the original material, which he read at the PEARSON home on the evening of December 12. He stated that he read the article hurriedly, but recalled that it quoted General BRADLEY, JOE COLLINS and possibly General VANDENBERG, although he was not sure about this, and also contained a quotation from the President. He stated it appeared to him that it was pretty much a statement of positions taken in the past by these officials. He thought the President had been quoted as saying we should not make concessions which would hurt our positions, and that General COLLINS had declared he thought we could hold the present line or our present positions whether there was an armistice or not.

Mr. FRITCHEY examined the "New York Post" column of ROBERT ALLEN dated December 13, 1951, which was available at this time, and said that the material in this column pretty well paralleled that of the ANDERSON material described above, but could offer no suggestion in this connection. He stated he did not have any idea where PEARSON or ANDERSON had obtained the information on which the PEARSON article was based, nor did he have any idea whether PEARSON actually prepared it. He stated the same was true with reference to ALLEN, whom he knows, but has not seen in several months, the last occasion being when ALLEN visited the Pentagon Building to attend a regular monthly press conference of General GEORGE MARSHALL. In this connection, he mentioned that ALLEN has a leg-man, who covers the Pentagon in much the same manner as ANDERSON does for PEARSON, but he does not know the name of this reporter. Mr. FRITCHEY stated he knew no one who attended the conference, who was particularly close to PEARSON, nor anyone who had ever furnished any confidential information to PEARSON in the past. As indicated, he declared he did not know with certainty who attended the conference. He stated he did not recall any red hot tips coming out of the Pentagon since the last investigation had been made concerning PEARSON's leaks, and he thought that PEARSON may have been frightened somewhat at the time of that investigation. He suggested that the type of individual, who might furnish information to PEARSON would be one interested in politics and very ambitious, politically or otherwise.

Mr. FRITCHEY stated he had known DREW PEARSON for about ten years and visits him periodically averaging, perhaps, once a month. He did not believe he had seen PEARSON since the visit on December 12, 1951.

On December 18, 1951, Mr. FRITCHEY was reinterviewed by Agents GRAHAM and TAYLOR, at which time he was shown the DREW PEARSON column dated December 14th, which appeared in the "New York Daily Mirror" of December 15, 1951, and the DREW PEARSON column, which appeared in the "Philadelphia Bulletin" of December 15th. Mr. FRITCHEY examined both columns, and stated they are reasonably accurate accounts of the material, which ANDERSON had displayed to him on the night of December 12 at the home of PEARSON. He stated that tabloid papers have a tendency to condense and rewrite, and he thought, perhaps, the article in the "Bulletin," which is slightly different from the "Mirror" column, would be more likely to be an exact or nearly exact copy as furnished by PEARSON.

As a matter of interest, Mr. FRITCHEY advised that on the evening of December 17th, Mrs. LUVIE PEARSON, wife of DREW PEARSON, phoned him and invited him to play bridge the night of December 18, 1951, at the PEARSON residence. Mr. FRITCHEY expressed the thought that, perhaps, Mr. PEARSON contemplated making some discreet inquiries of him concerning developments growing out of the instant leak.

DREW PEARSON AND ROBERT S. ALLEN COLUMNS

The column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, reads as follows:

"Washington, Dec. 14. -- The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

"The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when HST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was 'good to be back', asked how they liked his tan.

"He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened:

"Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: 'That's a tough one'.

"Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions.

"Gen. Vandenberg, Air Chief, opposed major concessions, was adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire.

"Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotation. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale Collins warned.

"Silent Admiral

"Collins agreed 'minor concessions' should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'.

"Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out 'any mission any time any place'.

"For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blasted out of Korea, could hold on 'until hell freezes over'.

"One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N.-Communist teams, but the Reds want it by 'neutral' nations -- and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground here and it has been done.

"The principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close, with a settlement within 20 days. Some details will be left to iron out later.

"Another matter discussed was the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether -- after the armistice. The facts regarding this must not be published now."

Through inquiry at the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, it was ascertained that in the original column as dispatched by PEARSON to Bell Syndicate there appeared under the caption "Silent Admiral" the following:

"President TRUMAN's only comment was that every effort should be made to reach a cease-fire, but no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'".

On the basis of the same inquiry it was ascertained that following the dispatch of the original article to Bell Syndicate, PEARSON requested that the above paragraph be changed to read:

"President TRUMAN commented that no concessions should be granted that we would later regret."

It was further determined from the Bell Syndicate that in the original dispatch signed by DREW PEARSON the following was contained:

"The chief theme of the meeting was that a cease-fire agreement may be close at hand. All signs point to a settlement within the next 20 days. Though some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline, we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up."

Subsequent to the filing of the original dispatch and before publication, PEARSON requested that the last sentence of the above paragraph be changed to read: "Some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline." In making the request for this change PEARSON stated in addition, "In other words, omit the word 'though' and the words 'we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up'."

The New York Post for December 13, 1951, in its "Blue Final" edition attributed the following column to ROBERT S. ALLEN:

"Washington, Dec. 13. - The U.N. can have a cease-fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

"That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. Gen. Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point 'where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one'.

"'What do they want?' asked the President. 'The deadlock gets down to this,' explained Bradley. 'We are demanding the right to continue to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons. But they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand.'

"Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"'I want a cease-fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper,' declared the Air Chief of Staff. 'But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them.'

"Gen. J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of U.N. troops.

"'That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men,' Collins argued. 'I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields.'

"Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

"Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force."

"President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished. Then he told them -

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway."

Through the Post Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York City, it was ascertained that the mimeographed copy of the quoted ALLEN article reflected that the article, as filed by ALLEN, also included the following:

"He wants to increase the ROK divisions from 11 to 20. No decision was reached on the matter, but President Truman strongly approved the plan. 'I am for prompt action on that,' he said. 'It seems to me a very sound thing to do.' Similarly, the President approved moving to Korea one of the two National Guard divisions now in Japan. This has been suggested by Ridgway in order to permit the transfer of one of the battle-experienced divisions in Korea to Europe. General Eisenhower has requested that."

The original dispatch filed by PEARSON with Bell Syndicate Incorporated was received by wire at approximately 4 P.M. on December 11, 1951. The change in the PEARSON column was received at Bell Syndicate from PEARSON by wire on December 12, 1951. The dispatch from ROBERT S. ALLEN to the Post Hall Syndicate Incorporated was received by them by mail on December 11, 1951.

NEWS DISPATCHES

In order to show what details of the President's conference of December 10, 1951, were reported in general news dispatches, the items appearing in several publications were examined, and the following quotations therefrom are set forth as being of possible interest to this investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR, December 10, 1951,
by JOSEPH A. FOX

"Korea was among the subjects discussed but the meeting was not confined to that subject." (Mr. JOSEPH SHORT).

".....officials here indicated that he (the President) wanted a detailed first-hand account of recent developments in Korea with full reports on possible new moves in the armistice talks."

"The deadline for the Korean truce negotiations is December 27."

"Mr. Short said that the meeting took up European affairs....."

"President Truman also said yesterday that one of the reasons for his return was to talk with people recently in Europe."

NEWSWEEK, December 17, 1951.
National Affairs

"The actual situation: General Matthew B. Ridgway wanted instructions about what kind of truce conditions he could make, particularly concerning exchange of prisoners and inspection."

WASHINGTON TIMES HERALD, December 10, 1951.
Evening Edition

"One of the matters presumably discussed was what course the United States should follow if the present Korean truce failed to produce a complete armistice by December 27, the deadline set by truce negotiators....." (Associated Press)

NEW YORK TIMES, December 11, 1951,
by W. H. LAWRENCE

"There was said to be a strong belief that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had concluded that it was militarily impossible to expel United Nation forces from Korea and now really wanted a cessation of the fighting there....."

"In quarters that have followed closely the long drawn-out negotiations..... there was speculation that a compromise might be near on the controversial inspection-enforcement issue, which has deadlocked the truce talks since November 27....."

"Few believed that all the odds and ends of an armistice could be bargained out and agreed to by December 27, the present deadline for the negotiators to reach complete agreement on an armistice....."

"There seemed general agreement that the United Nations policy-makers would not oppose a further extension of this time limit, now only seventeen days off, if the present battlefront lull continued."

"In the cautiously optimistic reports of a possible Korean cease-fire in the not distant future, which followed in the wake of this session, the talk of compromise on the controverted inspection-enforcement issue centered on elaboration of a Communist proposal..... At that time the Communists suggested Poland and Czechoslovakia, both members of the Soviet bloc, as two 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise enforcement of an armistice..... At the same session, however, the Communist negotiators conceded, in response to Allied questioning, that they would also consider Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark as 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise the behind-the-lines inspection....."

INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ROBERT L. DENNISON

Admiral DENNISON was interviewed at his residence on December 17, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and SA KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. He advised that in pursuance of the decision of the President to have the December 10, 1951, meeting, he telephonically advised Admiral LAFOR of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the fact the meeting was to be held and furnished similar advice to Mr. WEBB of the Department of State, and informed he made both of these telephonic contacts on December 8, 1951, from Key West.

With reference to the question as to whether an agenda had been prepared and distributed to those who attended the meeting, Admiral DENNISON advised that none had been prepared. He said that in a general way those who attended the conference would know of problems which had arisen regarding world affairs and would certainly be prepared to present the views of the particular department involved in a conference of this type. He said that the persons he had called would be aware of the fact that certain questions regarding cease fire negotiations would come up at the conference by reason of a previous exchange of radio messages referring to unresolved questions.

Admiral DENNISON stated that at the time the conference broke up no particular group was observed by him to be gathered in any sort of a discussion to the extent that such a fact was brought to his attention. He advised he recalled that the President desired to see Mr. WEBB following the conference and it is his recollection that at the end of the conference, Mr. WEBB went to the office of the President. When WEBB left the Cabinet Room, he left by a door which would take him out to the corridor where the press would be aware of the fact that he had gone to the President's office. The remainder of the persons attending the conference left through another door and the press would not necessarily be aware of their specific presence at the time. Admiral DENNISON advised that he does not recall that anyone arrived at the conference following the arrival of the President. He likewise is unable to recall that anyone left before the end of the conference and did not recall any secretaries or other persons having occasion to enter the conference room during its progress. He stated that he took no material to the conference, took no notes whatever and informed that he recalled seeing no one take notes with the exception of Mr. JAMES LAY, who took notes for the President.

Admiral DENNISON advised that upon the conclusion of the conference, in view of the interest of the press in the meeting, he instructed Mr. JOSEPH SHORT of the White House staff to advise the press that at the meeting the President had discussed world affairs and no policy decisions had been reached. DENNISON stated he might not have used these exact words, but the words do reflect the sense of what he told SHORT. He stated he did not furnish Mr. SHORT any further information as to what had transpired at the conference. This statement was made after conferring with Admiral SOUERS. He was advised it has been indicated that SHORT had stated to the press that Korea had been discussed at the meeting. He said SHORT may have made such a statement, but he does not recall authorizing him to so state.

Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish the identity of all individuals with whom he had discussed the conference. He replied he had discussed the conference with no individual who had not attended it. He further advised he has made no written record of any type pertaining to any matter under discussion at this conference. He stated he does not know DREW PEARSON, does not know JACK ANDERSON and does not know ROBERT ALLEN. He advised he has not had contact with any of these individuals or any employees or representatives or associates of these persons in any way concerning the subject matter of this investigation. He does not know whether anyone who would have any connection with these persons was present at the White House on December 10.

Admiral DENNISON read the column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, and furnished his comments concerning the relative points of accuracy and inaccuracy as appearing in the article. He advised that the statement concerning the fact that the diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when the President walked into the conference room, is obviously correct. He advised that the statement that the President shook hands all around is true and that in fact the President to the best of his recollection, shook hands with all individuals in the Cabinet Room. Concerning the mention appearing in the PEARSON article of the President's tan, he stated he doubts that this is true and informed he is unable to recall any comment concerning whether the President had a suntan. With regard to the statement that the President permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do most of the talking, he stated he believes this is accurate. In the same regard, he advised with respect to the comment attributed to the President "that's a tough one," that while the President probably did not use these exact words, he might from time to time have made comments identical in sense.

Admiral DENNISON advised the statement that General BRADLEY led with a summary of the Korean situation is accurate and informed that in fact General BRADLEY did so at the direction of the President and spent perhaps as much as eight minutes in covering the Korean military situation, including in his briefing, the use of maps prepared for this purpose. He stated he is reasonably certain General BRADLEY did not, as reported in the PEARSON column, say the Reds seem ready to come to terms, but believed that from the summary furnished by General BRADLEY it could be accurately concluded he did state a cease fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions. In explaining this, he advised he does not recall General BRADLEY actually making such a statement, but informed that a conclusion based on what he did state to this effect would not be erroneous.

With regard to the comments attributed to General VANDENBERG in the PEARSON article, Admiral DENNISON advised he could not recall General VANDENBERG commented particularly on the subject matter of major concessions.

In connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS concerning the opposition to making concessions in connection with the rotation of troops, Admiral DENNISON advised he saw no particular reason to attribute this comment specifically to COLLINS, adding that COLLINS did not take any stronger position in this regard than anyone else at the conference. He stated the statement does accurately reflect the view held by many individuals. He did state General COLLINS did comment on the matter of troop rotation. He commented particularly that the wording of this portion of the PEARSON article in his opinion implies that some individuals at the conference favored the making of concessions with respect to this point and he stated such was not the case. Still in connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON informed he could not recall COLLINS making the comment that we should make minor concessions in order to receive the same. In the same regard in connection with the comment attributed to the President, to the effect no concessions should be granted that we would later regret, Admiral DENNISON advised the President did make a statement to this effect but not necessarily in the same words.

Relating to the comment concerning Admiral FECHTELER, he stated FECHTELER did speak very briefly, but he cannot recall that he made the "any mission any time any place" statement and informed that according to his recollection, such a statement does not appear at all to fit in with what the Admiral was actually talking about.

With respect to the "until hell freezes over" statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON stated he does not feel that General

COLLINS would have used this language at this conference, but informed that at the conference COLLINS expressed an optimistic attitude as to the ability of the UN forces to stay in Korea and to the best of DENNISON's recollection, put some sort of a time limit on the ability of these forces to stay in Korea.

Admiral DENNISON, commenting in connection with the section of the PEARSON article dealing with inspection behind the lines, advised he cannot recall that General BRADLEY offered the proposal attributed to him in the article, nor can he recall specific mention in the conference of the countries mentioned in the article.

Admiral DENNISON stated the conclusion in the PEARSON article that the principal theme was that a cease fire may be close, with the settlement within twenty days, is an inaccurate statement and commented similarly concerning the statement there was discussed the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether after the signing of an armistice.

Admiral DENNISON advised that to the best of his recollection, there was no discussion concerning the December 27th cease fire extension. (This relates to an item which JACK ANDERSON agreed to delete from the column after he discussed it with General BRADLEY and attributes the particular statement to the President.)

Admiral DENNISON likewise read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as appearing in the New York Post for December 13, 1951. He stated the statement that the Joint Chiefs told the President the U.N. could have a cease fire in Korea at the cost of important concessions, is inaccurate and no such statement to his knowledge has been made by the Joint Chiefs. He advised General BRADLEY did not use the words attributed to the effect that a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one, but did advise that during his comments, BRADLEY undoubtedly made statements from which such a conclusion could be inferred. With further regard to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY, Admiral DENNISON advised he would describe this portion of the article as generally accurate as to the sense of what was actually said by General BRADLEY. He added that he cannot, of course, say that these were the exact words used by General BRADLEY.

Admiral DENNISON commented on the statements attributed to General VANDENBERG by advising he could not recall General VANDENBERG stating to the effect he desired a cease fire. He believed the General had made a statement with respect to the potentialities involved in the build up of Red air strength. He stated he did not recall the General using the words "which I wouldn't put past them."

Concerning the comments attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON felt that a reading of the ALLEN article would suggest that the matter of rotation of troops was in dispute and informed that such was not the case. He stated he does not believe that General COLLINS said "it is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields." He stated that the comment attributed to COLLINS concerning the ability of the U.N. armies to hold in Korea is essentially correct. He informed that the ALLEN article is accurate in indicating the opposition of the President to the agreement on a complete freeze with respect to replacements and weapons.

Admiral DENNISON commented with respect to the statements attributed to and comments made concerning the President, and advised that the President did not, as commented in the article, listen intently to the Joint Chiefs and then make a final statement, but during the conference did, in at least a general way, express the views attributed to him.

In summarizing his views concerning both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles, Admiral DENNISON informed he felt it is likely both columns were prepared from the same basic material. He commented that it appears somewhat strange that practically no mention was made of the European situation, whereas in fact more than one half of the time of the conference was expended in a discussion of the European situation. He advised that in his opinion, it appears quite unlikely that either article could have been written by an individual who did not have at least limited access to the agenda of the conference. He described the two articles as relatively accurate as to the subject matters under discussion, to the extent to which they were reported in the columns, but as inaccurate in attributing the views indicated to the persons mentioned in the articles. He commented without attaching any significance to this fact, that both articles purported to mention only the views of armed forces personnel, including the President, and failed to mention the views of civilian persons in attendance, some of whom had very definite views and expressed them.

Admiral DENNISON observed that he was unable to see from a perusal of the PEARSON and ALLEN columns why anyone from the conference would disclose information for the press. He particularly stated he saw no interest to be served on behalf of any agencies represented. He commented that there was a remarkable degree of agreement on the part of all present concerning the items described and advised that such disagreement that did exist was primarily with respect to details or timing rather than substance. Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish any information in his possession which would reflect upon the question at issue namely, who of those attending

the conference may have furnished information to the press or who may have been responsible for information getting to the press. DENNISON stated that he had absolutely no facts upon which to base any opinion as to who might have been responsible for any information being furnished to the press. He did state that because of his intimate knowledge of certain individuals, he would state that it would be, in his opinion, psychologically impossible for them to be responsible. In this group, he placed the following:

The President, General BRADLEY, JAMES LAY, Admiral SOUERS, Secretary LOVETT, Admiral FECHTELER, General LANDRY, General VAUGHAN, and H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS.

DENNISON specifically pointed out that there should be no inference that others might be suspected by him, informing that his degree of association with the remaining individuals has been less extensive.

Admiral DENNISON, after receiving the approval of the President, reviewed for the benefit of the interviewing agents, on December 20, 1951, the notes which had been made at the December 10 conference by Mr. JAMES LAY. In conducting this review and analysis, Admiral DENNISON discussed the various points of accuracy and inaccuracy of the material appearing in the PEARSON and ALLEN columns, a substantial portion of which he had already commented on in the interview conducted on December 18. He informed upon the completion of the review of the notes, that this review had served more definitely to confirm his previously expressed opinion that both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles were written by an individual who had had access in some form to at least a limited account of the conference. Admiral DENNISON in commenting on the relation of the columns to the conference notes, pointed out that certain matters actually covered at the conference of particular security significance, were not covered in either of the columns.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HARRY H. VAUGHAN

General VAUGHAN was interviewed December 15, 1951, at his residence by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE.

General VAUGHAN advised that he had attended the conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951. General VAUGHAN stated he had made no preparations for the conference and had taken no notes while at the conference. He stated he observed that JAMES LAY had taken notes at the conference, but he was unable to say whether Mr. LAY's notes were voluminous or not. He stated that he had not prepared any memoranda on the conference and that he had not discussed it with anyone with the exception of General LANDRY, at which time he remarked to General LANDRY the wide difference of opinion of General VANDENBERG and General COLLINS with respect to the withdrawal of our troops in Korea in the event of a cease fire order.

He stated after the President left the room he, VAUGHAN, immediately started for his own office and outside of the Cabinet Room he stopped for a moment and kidded Mr. WEBB about a red tie he was wearing, and that, thereafter, he went directly to his own office.

The article appearing in the "New York Post 'Blue Final'" edition for December 13, 1951, under the by-line of ROBERT S. ALLEN, was read to General VAUGHAN. He was asked to comment as to whether this column accurately reflected the statements or views expressed at the conference by the individuals mentioned.

General VAUGHAN stated the material appearing in the article was substantially that which transpired at the conference. He stated he could not, of course, recall the exact verbiage of the various speakers at the conference, but the theme set forth in the article was substantially the same, and the statements attributed to the various individuals attending the conference were substantially the statements made by these individuals at the conference.

General VAUGHAN stated it was remotely possible, in his opinion, that a person not in attendance at the conference could have prepared the article, but he thought it was miraculous if this was done in the absence of actual attendance or access to an oral or written account of the proceedings. General VAUGHAN pointed out the person preparing the ALLEN article could have discussed the conference with someone, who had talked to a person attending the conference and who had possibly divulged what transpired at the conference with no intention of divulging these matters. In explaining this, General VAUGHAN stated it was possible some person attending the conference may have discussed what transpired at the conference with one of his subordinates and the subordinate was responsible for the leak.

General VAUGHAN stated the portion of the article attributed to the President was "pretty near on the nose", and that this could not have been gotten out of thin air. He pointed out General BRADLEY, at the conference, had mentioned the building up of the forces of the South Koreans, and stated it would be some months before those forces would be self-sufficient.

General VAUGHAN stated that during his years of experience at the White House, he had found the security of the State Department was not good, mainly because of their peculiar administrative set-up and described it as not as effective as the security maintained in other Government agencies. He explained this by saying that perhaps due to their administrative set-up, matters of highly confidential nature are filtered down within the State Department from high level to lower level subordinates. He stated he felt it was, undoubtedly, due to this filtering process in the State Department that the Department had been responsible on many occasions in the past for the untimely or premature release of confidential matters. General VAUGHAN specifically pointed out he was in no way stating the State Department or any member of that Department was responsible for the leak involved in this inquiry. He did state that if he had to give a quick answer as to the source of this leak, he would say the State Department. He stated he could not conceive of the leak emanating from the White House. He stated he had the highest regard for the White House staff, and he knew of no one on the staff whose activities gave him any cause for suspicion.

General VAUGHAN stated he is of the opinion that, if the leak occurred through an individual in the military establishment, it would not be an accidental divulgence but rather a deliberate divulgence, and he contrasted this type of divulgence to that which he had offered in connection with the State Department.

General VAUGHAN stated in his opinion, this would be true of a military establishment because it is his belief that DREW PEARSON has on his payroll at least one individual highly placed in each of the three establishments who serves as an informant for him. He stated he bases this on the

many articles which have been written by PEARSON on confidential military and political matters in the past which certainly, in his opinion, could only have come from the military establishments involved. In this connection, General VAUGHAN pointed out that when LOUIS JOHNSON was Secretary of Defense he knew Mr. JOHNSON was a close friend of DREW PEARSON, and PEARSON visited Mr. JOHNSON in his office about twice a week, and that TRIS COFFIN, a leg-man for PEARSON, was in Mr. JOHNSON's office almost every day. He stated it was his opinion that JOHNSON was PEARSON's pipeline to the Department of Defense.

With respect to DREW PEARSON, General VAUGHAN pointed out he was naturally prejudiced to PEARSON because of the continued, unjustified criticism he had received from PEARSON in his newspaper articles. General VAUGHAN was asked when he had last seen PEARSON or any of his employees. General VAUGHAN stated that he had first met PEARSON about two months ago at a dinner in the Carlton Hotel when he was introduced to him in the lobby by Commissioner F. JOSEPH DONAHUE of the District of Columbia, at which time he merely acknowledged the introduction. He said he had not seen or talked to PEARSON or any of his employees since the conference occurred on December 10, 1951.

During the interview with General VAUGHAN, with relation to DREW PEARSON, he advised in the past he had become acquainted with other leg-men working for PEARSON but had had no contact with any of these individuals with relation to the conference on December 10, 1951.

General VAUGHAN was asked if he knew JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he did know him and that he believed the last time he saw ANDERSON or spoke to him was at the Argentina Embassy, he believed in about 1948, when he (VAUGHAN) received a decoration from the Argentina Government, pointing out that ANDERSON was present at the ceremony as PEARSON's "inside man".

General VAUGHAN was asked to furnish, on the basis of his long experience in the White House and association and contact with the personnel attending various Presidential conferences of the type involved, any suspicions or suggestions which, in his opinion, might be of any possible aid to the FBI in carrying out the instructions of the President that the source of the leak in this matter be identified. He replied that the information attributed to him hereinbefore constitutes all that he is able to offer.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL ROBERT LANDRY

General ROBERT LANDRY, Air Force Aide to the President, was interviewed by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE in his office at the White House on December 14, 1951. General LANDRY advised that he had attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on December 10, 1951, in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

General LANDRY stated he made no notes at the conference, nor did he recall seeing anyone else making any notes. He stated he had not been briefed on the agenda for the conference and that no printed agenda was prepared. He stated as soon as the conference was over, he himself did not stop to talk to anyone but started towards his own office and while enroute, he stopped in the office of Mr. MATT CONNELLY and that Mr. JOE SHORT and Admiral DENNISON were there and Mr. SHORT asked General LANDRY if the President had designated someone to see SHORT about giving out a press release. General LANDRY stated that he told SHORT, "No", and suggested that he see Mr. LOVETT or the President.

General LANDRY stated at no time has he prepared a memorandum concerning what transpired at the conference nor has he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else. He further stated he has not heard of any memoranda being prepared on this conference. General LANDRY stated he had not discussed this conference with anyone other than the President.

General LANDRY stated he did not know JACK ANDERSON and that he had never met DREW PEARSON and that to his knowledge, he knows no one in the employment of DREW PEARSON. He stated, of course, he knows of DREW PEARSON and knows him when he sees him. He stated he has not talked to him on the telephone and that he did not see him in the White House at the time of the conference. He stated the last time he saw PEARSON was about a year ago.

General LANDRY was asked if he had any suspicions about anyone who would have had any connection with the alleged leak of information of what transpired at the conference and he replied in the negative, and stated he was unable to furnish any information, whatsoever, in this regard.

INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Admiral SIDNEY W. SOUERS was interviewed on December 19, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. At the beginning of the interview, Admiral SOUERS indicated that he was already aware of the fact that the President had requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to endeavor to identify the reported leak involved in this matter.

Admiral SOUERS advised during the conference he made no notes and subsequent to the conference did not dictate or record in any form any of the matters discussed at the conference. He likewise advised he has not discussed the matters considered at the conference with anyone. He advised that he did not know positively that the meeting was to be held until the morning of the meeting.

He advised, to the best of his recollection, that he received a telephone call during the evening of December 8, 1951, from a [redacted] [redacted] who called him in relation to the rumored return of the President to Washington. He advised that he furnished [redacted] no information and recalled that following the conclusion of the conference on December 10, 1951, [redacted] again called him and wanted to know what had happened, to which Admiral SOUERS responded, he could not furnish him any information whatsoever.

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Admiral SOUERS advised that he did not know of the meeting in advance, nor the specific matters which would be discussed. He advised, however, that due to his knowledge of current conditions and his position that he could surmise as to the matters which would be on the agenda. In this regard, he commented that newspaper reporters and journalists possessing an awareness of political conditions and particularly with regard to the existing situation in Korea, and having knowledge of the fact a meeting was to be held, could likewise engage in speculation as to the matters which would be discussed at such a meeting and do so with a relatively fair degree of accuracy.

Admiral SOUERS advised that upon the termination of the conference and acting on instructions received by him, he and Admiral DENNISON instructed Mr. SHORT, with respect to the making of a press release, that the reporters should be told the President discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached.

Admiral SOUERS read the article by DREW PEARSON which appeared in the "New York Mirror" on December 15, 1951, and the article prepared by ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951. In commenting on these columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that in his opinion both represented poor reporting. In explanation of this, he pointed out that according to his understanding of the matters actually discussed at the conference, four key points were involved. He stated that none of the key points is covered in either of the newspaper articles in question. He advised that both articles rather accurately reflect the atmosphere which prevailed at the conference. He did comment that it is his belief that a considerable portion of the views expressed in the two articles had already appeared in some form or other in the press prior to the conference. In support of his statement that the two columns are considerably inaccurate, he stated that to the best of his recollection General VANDENBERG did not express opposition to major concessions. Along the same line, he advised that the comment appearing in the PEARSON column with respect to Admiral FECHTELER is not only inaccurate but fails to make reference to an extremely important position expressed by FECHTELER at the conference. He stated that he is reasonably certain that General COLLINS did not make the statement, "until Hell freezes over", and with further regard to the columns, advised that the articles did not set forth an extremely important comment made by COLLINS at the meeting, the publication of which would have been of widespread interest. He stated it was particularly significant to note that whereas considerable discussion was held at the conference with relation to the European situation, neither column commented in this regard. He stated that the portion of the PEARSON article relating to yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines is untrue since this discussion was not engaged in at this conference, to the best of his recollection.

Admiral SOUERS commented that there is nothing unusual about the fact that the President shook hands with those gathered at the conference, since it is frequently his habit to do so at meetings of this nature.

With further relation to the PEARSON article, Admiral SOUERS commented that in his opinion the statement that the "principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close" was inaccurate. On the other hand, in commenting as to the last paragraph of the PEARSON article pertaining to the discussion of the withdrawal of U.N. troops, he advised in his opinion the inclusion of this statement in the PEARSON article definitely lends some credence to the viewpoint that at least some of the information reflected in the article was obtained from a person having knowledge of the conference.

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In analysing the quality of the information contained in the columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that it appeared to him the major portion of the two articles could have been written by an individual sufficiently knowledgeable as to international affairs, who had at least some degree of access to what was actually covered at the conference. In the same regard, he advised it appeared to him from a study of the two columns that the information perhaps was made available through a subordinate of an individual who attended the conference.

Admiral SOUERS was asked as to whether he recalled any mention at the conference by the President as to possible extension of the December 27 cease-fire deadline. He stated he did not recall this.

Admiral SOUERS advised that he was unable to furnish any specific suggestion that he felt would assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in carrying out the request of the President.

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INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, FRANK C. PACE

Secretary PACE was interviewed on December 15, 1951, in his office by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE.

Mr. PACE advised that he had attended the conference at the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951.

Mr. PACE stated he had not been briefed on what was to be discussed at the conference, but he had taken no notes at the conference and had not noticed anyone else at the conference taking notes. Mr. PACE stated since the conference he had prepared no memoranda, nor had he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else pertaining to the conference, and, likewise, advised that he has discussed the conference with no one, with the exception of Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. FINLETTER. He pointed out that he does not specifically recall discussing the conference with Mr. LOVETT or Mr. FINLETTER, but since the three of them returned to the Pentagon from the White House in Mr. LOVETT's car, immediately after the conference, it is quite possible that the three of them did discuss or at least mention certain items which had been brought up at the conference.

The article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as published by the "New York Post 'Blue Final'" edition of December 13, 1951, was read to Secretary PACE. Secretary PACE was asked if the material appearing in the article was discussed at the meeting, and he replied in the affirmative. He pointed out that he could not recall the exact verbiage used by the various individuals at the conference, but that the material appearing in the article reported substantially the views of the individuals mentioned as expressed at this conference.

Secretary PACE was asked if, in his opinion, the ALLEN article could have been prepared by anyone who had not been in actual attendance at the conference or had had access to a substantially complete and accurate written or oral report of the conference. He replied that it was within the realm of possibility, but during his discussion of this point, indicated his view that the article could not have been written without aid of some type.

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He pointed out, however, with respect to the views of General COLLINS as reported in the article, that these were substantially General COLLINS' views, but that he was positive that the verbiage used in the article was not accurate, particularly where General COLLINS is quoted as having said "until hell freezes over". He stated that he knows that General COLLINS did not say that. Secretary PACE stated that he is not certain that General COLLINS, at the conference, made as complete a statement of his views as is reported in the ALLEN article, and doubts that COLLINS did do so.

Secretary PACE, with respect to the statements attributed in the ALLEN article to General BRADLEY, advised it is his recollection that, during the conference, General BRADLEY did comment on airfields in North Korea and rotation of troops. Secretary PACE stated that he can't recall that General BRADLEY tied these two items together in making his comments at the conference. He stated that he cannot recall whether, at the conference, General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS or not. With respect to the remarks made by the President, as quoted in the Allen article, he stated that this was substantially what the President said at the conference, although he could not recall the President's exact words. He stated that, with respect to the build-up of the South Korean Army, this matter was discussed by himself at the conference.

Secretary PACE advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON, and that he had met PEARSON only on about two occasions, both at social functions, and that on both of those occasions, the only conversation he had had with PEARSON was of a social nature. He stated that the last time that he saw or spoke to DREW PEARSON was six or seven months ago. He stated that the only employee he knows of DREW PEARSON is TRIS COFFIN, whom he has met on about two occasions, and had never discussed with COFFIN any matters concerning the Department of Defense. He stated that he would say that he had not seen or talked to TRIS COFFIN for at least three months. He stated that he does not know and has never talked to ROBERT S. ALLEN.

Secretary PACE was asked whether he could furnish any information or make any suggestions which would assist the FBI in carrying out the desires of the President in this matter that the source of the alleged leak of information be identified. Secretary PACE replied that it was inconceivable to him that anyone who attended the conference had passed on or divulged anything that

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was discussed at the meeting. However, he stated that it was his opinion that the material appearing in the ALLEN article came from someone who attended the conference or someone who knew why the President had called the meeting. Secretary PACE stated that, otherwise, he was unable to be of any assistance. Secretary PACE was asked if he knew of or was suspicious of any security weakness in the Departments represented at the conference which might suggest a source for this leak, and he responded negatively.

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS K. FINLETTER

THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Secretary of the Air Force, was interviewed on December 14, 1951, in his office in the Pentagon by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. Mr. FINLETTER advised he attended a conference held in the Cabinet Room at the White House on December 10, 1951.

Secretary FINLETTER advised that prior to the commencement of the conference, he was not briefed concerning the agenda in any way. He recalled that General VANDENBERG came to his office sometime before the meeting on the morning of December 10, and said something about the meeting at the White House, but he did not recall exactly what was said by General VANDENBERG or discussed in this connection.

Secretary FINLETTER advised he had gone from his office to the conference with Secretary PACE. He stated that upon conclusion of the meeting, he went downstairs from the conference room with Secretary LOVETT. He stated that Secretary PACE was detained a minute or two and joined Secretary LOVETT and him downstairs and they all three rode together back to the Pentagon in LOVETT's car.

He stated he is positive he took no notes of any sort at the conference, and advised that during the conference, he could possibly have made a single note. He stated that if he did make such a note, he left it behind him at the conference or took it with him and destroyed it later. He advised that any note he did make was extremely brief and in no way could be considered to be approximate full notes. He stated he can almost positively state he did not put pencil to paper. He advised he cannot recall seeing anyone else at the conference taking notes.

He advised that following the Presidential meeting, he met General VANDENBERG at 12:00 Noon, and then at 1:00 P.M., had luncheon with the Secretary of Defense and a group of labor representatives. He advised that he dictated no memorandum or writing of any sort with direct and immediate relation to the meeting. He advised he has seen no memoranda or material of any sort written by anyone relating to the conference concerned with this investigation.

He advised he is positive he has discussed the meeting only with VANDENBERG and LOVETT. In qualifying this, he advised that even these discussions were not as to the actual conference but pertinent more to matters which were logical follow-throughs and outgrowths of the items discussed at the conference and the views expressed of those in attendance.

Mr. FINLETTER stated that on the day of the conference, General VANDENBERG came to his office about 12:00 Noon and dictated a rough draft memorandum to [REDACTED] [REDACTED], concerning the views on the withdrawal of troops from Korea in the event of a cease-fire order. He stated that after this memorandum was typed up, he destroyed it and dictated to the same secretary another rough draft memorandum of his own (FINLETTER) along the same lines, the original of which was furnished to Mr. LOVETT during the latter part of the afternoon of December 10, 1951. He stated that the following day he prepared a new memorandum for Mr. LOVETT pertaining to the same matter. Mr. FINLETTER made a copy of this memorandum available and is set forth as follows:

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"December 10, 1951

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"1. The conference with the President today on the Korean situation failed to bring out certain important points.

"2. At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire.

"3. What wasn't said, however, is that once we get a cease-fire, from that moment on our military position deteriorates. The Chinese, free from our interdiction campaign, can bring in men and materiel - and no inspection teams of ours are going to stop them. Our morale will go down. Our fighting ability will go down. And our domestic support for the operation will go down further than it already has.

"4. Moreover, the attaining of the cease-fire may fail to defeat the Russo-Chinese plan of pinning down large quantities of our military power in Korea. This results from the fact that an agreement to permit the gradual withdrawal of UN and Communist troops, without a firm decision in advance by the UN to punish a violation of the cease-fire by aggressive means, is not to our interest, and cannot be carried out without risking all we have fought for in Korea. Once we withdraw our troops they are going to be very hard to put back. On the contrary it would be easy for the Communists to withdraw beyond the Yalu and come back whenever they want to.

"In short, a cease-fire without a firm position and statement as to what the UN intends to do if the terms of the cease-fire are broken and without provision for the rapid withdrawal of UN troops, is a disadvantageous operation from our point of view.

"5. The question arises what then should we do? The following is suggested:

"a. Make a provision in the cease-fire arrangements which will result in the United Nations ground troops being pulled out as rapidly as they can be after the signing of the cease-fire.

"b. Leave a thin line of South Korean troops, and maybe even a token United Nations force, in South Korea.

"c. Make arrangements with our major allies to issue a joint statement, approved by the UN, serving notice on China that we no longer intend to hold the Korean front by great ground forces as at present, but that if the Chinese run over our modest forces that will bring down vast retaliatory action by the UN on the mainland of China. We should also consider whether this statement might not contain a request to Russia to use her best efforts to prevent the Chinese from violating the cease-fire agreement.

"d. We must agree with our friends in the UN what this vast retaliatory action means. It

presumably would mean a naval blockade, harassment of the lines of communication by bombing, continuing the use of guerrilla troops, and maybe releasing Chiang for action on the mainland. The question of certain other special air action would have to be considered; also the use of the A-bomb. These are, however, in a way, questions of detail. The important thing is to get agreement with our friends in UN to be ready to go through with a good tough campaign, but without the use of ground troops other than Chiang's.

(Signed) Thomas K. Finletter"

With respect to the final memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER, he had in his office, at the time of the interview, eighteen copies of this memorandum. He advised that the original had gone to Mr. LOVETT and he believed that another copy went to General VANDENBERG. He stated an original and nineteen copies of this memorandum were prepared.

In connection with the VANDENBERG rough draft memorandum and the rough draft memorandum of FINLETTER, these were located at the time of the interview in Mr. FINLETTER's office torn in pieces, and it was not possible, at the time of the interview, for his secretaries to piece together all of the copies of the memoranda, but they were able to piece together from the confidential waste in his office the originals of these two rough draft memoranda.

Secretary FINLETTER advised all of the memoranda in question were dictated to [redacted]. He advised the security regulations in his office are very exacting and are of the type to prevent the entrance of any outside individual during the daytime. He advised that during the evening hours all confidential material is securely locked up. He advised the material handled in his office, and particularly the memoranda under discussion, would have been seen only by himself, [redacted] and his aide, Colonel WILLIAM HIPPS. He informed top secret material handled in his office would not be examined even by official military and civilian personnel outside his immediate staff, as identified above. He stated he is completely certain of the security of his office and stated it to be his opinion that it would be most irregular for any individual, other than himself

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and the three members of the staff, to see these memoranda. With further relation to the security of the memoranda involved, he stated that he recalls he personally delivered the original to Secretary LOVETT.

In connection with this memorandum Colonel WILLIAM HIPPS, aide to Mr. FINLETTER, subsequently furnished a case history concerning these memoranda prepared by General VANDENBERG and Secretary FINLETTER relative to the meeting at the White House on December 10, 1951. General VANDENBERG's memorandum was typed once with original and three copies. All copies accounted for ordered destroyed by Secretary FINLETTER. Mr. FINLETTER had prepared one draft original and three copies, all accounted for and ordered destroyed. Mr. FINLETTER prepared a second draft with original and six copies, the original of which was given to Mr. LOVETT with no signature, the remaining six copies accounted for. The third draft original and seven copies all accounted for. The final memorandum, a copy of which is set forth above, was prepared as an original and nineteen copies. The original was given by Mr. FINLETTER to Mr. LOVETT and copy number nine was given to General VANDENBERG. The copy furnished General VANDENBERG was returned and all other copies have been accounted for in Mr. FINLETTER's office. Secretary LOVETT advised Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent CARL A. GRAHAM that he had in his possession the original memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER. In connection with the original of the rough draft which was delivered to Mr. LOVETT by Mr. FINLETTER, Mr. FINLETTER advised and had at the time of the interview this original rough draft memorandum which he stated he obtained from Mr. LOVETT's office so that he could prepare the final memorandum for Mr. LOVETT on this matter.

He was asked as to whether he knows JACK ANDERSON, an employee of DREW PEARSON, and he informed he knows no individual by this name. In response to questions, he likewise advised he does not know any employee or associate of DREW PEARSON. He stated that some years ago he did know an individual, whose name he could not recall, who was employed as a "leg-man" for PEARSON, but has had no contact with this individual. He advised he is acquainted with DREW PEARSON, but advised he has not seen him for months and stated positively he has not discussed the matter under investigation with PEARSON in any way. He stated he discussed this meeting only with General VANDENBERG and Secretary LOVETT and on the basis indicated herein before. He recalled that on December 11, 1951, he had luncheon at 1:00 P.M. at the

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Metropolitan Club with Admiral SOUERS and in this regard informed that it is possible he may have mentioned the meeting during his luncheon with SOUERS, but does not think this occurred and advised that if it did occur, it was merely a mention and not a discussion. He was specifically questioned as to whether he had in mind any suspects who might have been responsible for the leak of information involved, or whether he possessed any other information of possible aid or pertinence to this investigation, and in response thereto advised he possesses no information whatsoever.

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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG,
CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG was interviewed on December 17, 1951, at his office by Special Agents KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE and THOMAS J. JENKINS.

He stated on December 8, 1951, General BRADLEY told him that the President was making inquiry about a message the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General RIDGWAY concerning the peace negotiations, and they drew the conclusion that the President possibly would come back to Washington to discuss the reasons behind the message and the conditions being discussed in the peace negotiations.

General VANDENBERG stated he had been officially informed of the meeting by his Aide, Brigadier General R. A. GRUSSENDORF, who had been informed by General ROBERT LEE that Admiral LALOR, Assistant Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received word that the meeting was to be held on December 10, 1951. He stated that on December 9, 1951, in preparation for this conference, he requested his office to have on his desk on the morning of December 10, 1951, the available air strength and composition of the Air Force in Korea and other Far Eastern units, and also a paper which had been prepared a week before on the location of all F-86 planes other than those in Korea. He stated that he desired this information so that he would have it available at the meeting at the White House in the event the President made any inquiry concerning these matters. He stated that on the morning of the conference and just prior to the conference he had discussed with Mr. FINLETTER the information on the F-86 planes, advising him that this information should be available at the meeting in the event the President made any inquiry concerning it.

In connection with the question as to whether he had prepared any memorandum or other record with relation to the matters covered at the conference, General VANDENBERG explained that he had an alternate proposal on the peace negotiation insuring protection of the 8th Army. He stated at the time of the conference at the White House he had this alternative proposal in mind and mentioned it at the conference without giving any details. In this connection General VANDENBERG stated that what he said at the conference was substantially as follows: "There

is a possible additional approach to this question. If the UN could come out with a very strong statement to the effect that if there was a violation to the present line of contact, there would be a new war with no holds barred, and we might be able to afford to pull out practically all troops immediately after a cease-fire and let the Reds put in as many airfields and troops as they desired." He pointed out at the conference this statement by himself, which was the only statement he made at the conference, was discussed for about a minute and a half by those present.

He stated shortly following the conference on the same day he conferred with Mr. FINLETTER about this alternate proposal, and together they prepared a memorandum for Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense. He stated after the memorandum was prepared he and Mr. FINLETTER personally delivered the original to Mr. LOVETT. He stated there was nothing in the memorandum that had been discussed at the President's conference, and, in fact, specifically described its contents as relating to matters which had not been discussed at the White House conference. General VANDENBERG stated that he had a copy of this memorandum, and he had given it to his aide, Colonel CHARLES V. MURPHY, for possible use of the State Department in the event the proposal appeared to have any merit. He stated Colonel MURPHY was an officer on a special assignment in his (VANDENBERG's) office to assist him for speech writing.

General VANDENBERG stated since the conference he had discussed it only with Secretaries LOVETT and FINLETTER.

General VANDENBERG read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN as appearing in the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951.

He stated in connection with remarks in the article attributed to himself, they were definitely not stated by him at the conference although he has made similar remarks at the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferences and has stated them in public.

General VANDENBERG stated he believed that the article was largely in error on what actually transpired at the conference. He stated he was of the opinion that any person who had access to what transpired at the conference could have written a far better article unless the writer had deliberately slanted it, pointing out that the ALLEN article did not reflect the real purpose of the meeting. General VANDENBERG

further stated he believes the ALLEN article could have been prepared by someone who had closely followed the Korean situation and the public statements and positions proclaimed by the various Joint Chiefs of Staff without access to an actual account of the meeting.

With respect to the material in the article attributed to General BRADLEY, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall General BRADLEY saying that the UN could have a cease-fire in Korea. He pointed out that no one is sure of a cease-fire and that everyone is wondering if a cease-fire can be obtained. He further stated with respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY concerning rotation of troops and the building of airfields in North Korea, General BRADLEY may have said this but it certainly was not the main subject matter of the conference. He pointed out the main reason for the conference was not the concessions that would be made but how far the United States would go before ceasing the negotiations. General VANDENBERG further pointed out that he did not think General BRADLEY would say the Communists refused to agree with the UN view relating to the rotation of troops because the negotiations are still being carried on and that the matter concerning the rotation of troops has not come to the breaking point. General VANDENBERG stated that as far as he knows the Reds have not tried to trade on the issue of new airfields as against the issue of rotation of troops. He pointed out the U.S. has insisted as one of the points in the negotiation that there were to be no new airfields constructed in North Korea. He stated he does not recall General BRADLEY stating that the Reds have indicated they would make a concession on troop rotation if allowed to build some airfields in North Korea. He feels positive that if General BRADLEY had made such statement that he certainly would have remembered it, pointing out that the United States' position has always been positive on not allowing the construction of new airfields in North Korea, and therefore, this point was not discussed at the conference because it was an accepted fact.

With respect to the material attributed to General COLLINS, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall this matter being brought up at the conference but it had been discussed at previous Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. He is positive that General COLLINS did not relate the points concerning rotation of troops to the points concerning the construction of new airfields in North Korea. He stated he is of the opinion that General COLLINS has always maintained that the UN forces

are strong in Korea and that we can hold the peninsula; however, he did not recall General COLLINS saying this at the conference, and he is positive that General COLLINS made no remarks concerning the airfield point. General VANDENBERG stated that he would have been extremely surprised if General COLLINS had made the remark at the conference "Until hell freezes over". He stated that this meeting was much more dignified, and he believes that General COLLINS would not have spoken to the President in such language, and if General COLLINS had so spoken, he (VANDENBERG) would have certainly remembered it.

Concerning that part of the article which states General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS, he stated he does not recall this at the conference or does he recall any mention of the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force.

With respect to that part of the article which refers to the President listening intently to the military leaders and saying nothing until they had finished, General VANDENBERG stated that was not what happened at the conference. He stated the President first had General BRADLEY brief those present on the Korean situation and then the President told the conference what was troubling him concerning the instructions sent to General RIDGWAY. He stated General BRADLEY and Secretary LOVETT together with Acting Secretary WEBB did most of the talking. He stated General COLLINS and himself had very little to say.

With respect to that part of the article attributed to the President concerning the President's anxiety to bring the fighting to an end, General VANDENBERG stated that he couldn't recall the President saying this, but that the President could have stated it, and he would expect the President at such a conference to say substantially what is attributed to him in the article. He pointed out he is definite that the President did not say "but I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on". He stated the President had not made this point in that way. He stated that the article makes it appear that the President thought the members attending the conference wanted peace at any price. He stated, however, actually such was not the case. He stated at the conclusion of the conference the President agreed with those present on their reasons for sending the negotiation instructions to General RIDGWAY.

General VANDENBERG advised with respect to the statement in the article that the buildup of South Korea was discussed, that this was true. He pointed out, however, this is not unusual and this question is normally discussed at all meetings of this type because of the importance of this question.

He was asked to state whether he recalled any comment by the President during the conference as to a possible extension of time in the event a cease-fire order was not achieved by December 27, 1951. It is to be noted that a reference to such an alleged statement on the part of the President was contained in the PEARSON article in the possession of JACK ANDERSON. General VANDENBERG advised to the best of his knowledge the President made no such reference.

General VANDENBERG stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any other employee or associate of DREW PEARSON. He stated he has only met DREW PEARSON on one occasion which was about two years ago when he was introduced to him in the Pentagon Building. He stated the last time he had any contact of any sort with ROBERT S. ALLEN was when the latter was the Intelligence Officer for General GEORGE PATTON in Europe during World War II.

He was asked if he could furnish any information or had any suggestions which might assist the FBI in carrying out the desire of the President in this matter. He replied in the negative.

WFO 65-6060
MAT:CEG/bjg

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS

General J. LAWTON COLLINS, Army Chief of Staff, was interviewed by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM in his office, Room 3E668, Pentagon, on December 17, 1951.

General COLLINS advised he attended the White House conference Monday, December 10, 1951. General COLLINS stated that he followed Mr. WHITEHAIR as speaker and related he made three points, speaking at two different times. General COLLINS advised he first directed remarks to the question as to whether a U.N. statement containing a threat would have any deterring effect on the Communist enemy. It had been suggested that it would have an effect on the Russians and possibly on the amount of aid afforded the Chinese by the Russians. Admiral FECHTELER doubted the wisdom of including any threat to be contingent on breach of an armistice agreement as no one knows what action we may find desirable several years from now when the agreement may be violated. General COLLINS said his own views in the matter were that he did not agree with Admiral FECHTELER's position, but rather concurred with the position that while the Chinese Communists might disregard a warning, it still might have a good effect on the Russians. General COLLINS stated while he was speaking, he covered another matter, namely, that the armistice might be all we will get, that we may not get a peace treaty for several years, and that we may want to stay there a long time; and that whatever the conditions of the armistice, we will want to rebuild and make repairs in the rear areas. General COLLINS continued that he also stated he would favor everything in connection with repairs and rehabilitation except in connection with permitting military airfields to be built and pointed out we may have to give in on one or two commercial airfields.

General COLLINS remarked that at a later time during the proceedings of the conference, the President expressed great concern over the air build-up of the Communist forces and the possibility that we might not be able to maintain our forces in Korea. General COLLINS stated this was the reason that he again spoke. General COLLINS stated he assured the President that if this was what was causing the President's concern, he would guarantee that we will not be thrown out of Korea.

The article prepared by columnist ROBERT S. ALLEN which appeared in the "New York Post" December 13, 1951, was displayed to General COLLINS. That column in substance indicated General COLLINS favored some terms on

the airfield dispute but insisted the Communists be required to agree on troop rotation, pointing out the lack of troop rotation would effect the morale of our men. In addition General COLLINS was reported by ALLEN to have stated our army could hold the present line "until hell freezes over." General COLLINS related the ALLEN article substantially set forth his position in this matter and that part of the remarks attributed to him by ALLEN actually may have been made by him. He related he may have made some mention of troop rotation at the conference but he was not sure that he did mention it.

General COLLINS was not absolutely certain as to the language he employed in the above statement and advised he may have used the phrase I will "put my money" or "for my money," we will not be thrown out, but is certain that he did not say that our forces can hold on in Korea "until hell freezes over." He commented that this is not an expression which he uses and added that he would not have used it before the President at a formal conference.

The ALLEN news column quoted the President as having remarked in substance that he was anxious to bring the fighting to an end if possible but would not agree to concessions that we may regret later on. Also the President warned the necessity of being careful lest in our eagerness to secure truce we sell ourselves short. Concerning this statement attributed to the President, General COLLINS stated it was essentially what the President had said but not a word for word quotation. The ALLEN column was noted to attribute to General VANDENBERG in substance he was vigorously opposed to giving any ground on the matter of permitting the Communists to build airfields, pointing out bases in North Korea would be of great combat value in the event the Communists decide to break the truce next spring. General COLLINS stated ALLEN's remarks attributed to General VANDENBERG were essentially correct although not as complete as General VANDENBERG had outlined his position. The ALLEN column in substance set forth General BRADLEY as having pointed out the issues of the deadlock on the matter of rotation of our troops along with the Communists' insisting on a freeze on replacements and weapons. Also General BRADLEY was reported as having indicated the Communists would make concessions on rotation if they were permitted to build some airfields. General COLLINS related that the ALLEN column was essentially accurate but he did not believe that General BRADLEY had indicated the Communists were trading a rotation of troops against airfields as stressed by ALLEN.

General COLLINS could offer no suggestion as to how a leak had occurred and expressed the belief it would be possible for someone to have prepared the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN from bits of information picked up here and there from individuals receiving the information second or third

hand from an official who attended the conferences, such second or third hand sources being persons possessed of intimate knowledge of the subject matter and previous conferences. As for the personnel present at the White House conference, General COLLINS advised he had no personal suspicions concerning any member present.

General COLLINS advised that he did not make any notes during or after the conference, and thereafter did not make any record or memorandum of the proceedings of the conference. Furthermore, he stated he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone.

General COLLINS recalled his acquaintanceship with DREW PEARSON dated back several years when he was Chief of Public Information shortly after the war. He advised his first meeting with PEARSON came about following a PEARSON article which had criticized General EISENHOWER unjustly so he invited PEARSON to his home to talk the matter over. At that time, General COLLINS advised he and PEARSON reached a "gentlemen's agreement" that whenever PEARSON received any complaints or allegations of inefficiency, dishonesty, or other malfeasance in connection with the Army, he would first make them known to General COLLINS, who would in turn ascertain and furnish the true facts to PEARSON. If the facts were as alleged, PEARSON could publish them; but if he could show they were false or inaccurate, PEARSON would refrain from publication. General COLLINS related that this working arrangement with PEARSON had been satisfactory for a considerable time. General COLLINS recalled that sometime during the period of the GARRSON brothers fraud investigations, PEARSON had called him one Sunday to inquire whether the Army had a contract for the manufacture of caskets and in which contract the GARRSONS had an interest. General COLLINS advised he ascertained that the information presented by PEARSON was not true and so advised PEARSON, who refrained from making any mention of it. Sometime later General COLLINS recalled PEARSON had published a critical article containing erroneous information, so he had PEARSON to lunch in the Pentagon and called his attention to PEARSON's having violated their "gentlemen's agreement". General COLLINS advised he recalled no further incidents thereafter.

General COLLINS stated that he had never engaged in any social dealings with PEARSON and had never visited in his home or received him except on the one occasion. As a matter of fact, he has not seen PEARSON in more than a year. General COLLINS added that he knows who JACK ANDERSON is, but never had met him; likewise, he did not know the identity of any other of PEARSON's employees. Concerning ROBERT S. ALLEN, General COLLINS stated he knew ALLEN, but had not seen nor talked with him in more than a year.

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL

Major General CHARLES P. CABELL, United States Air Forces, Director, Joint Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E928, Pentagon, on December 15, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM.

General CABELL advised that he had attended the White House conference held at 10:30 AM, December 10, 1951, as an observer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He advised he had taken no part in the actual proceedings. He stated he did not discuss anything which occurred at the conference with anyone with the exception of a conversation with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reference will be made to this conversation with General ROBBINS hereinafter. General CABELL made no notes or memoranda during or following the conference. He returned to the Pentagon immediately following the conference.

General CABELL stated he was unaware that any leak had occurred or that an investigation was in progress at the time he was interviewed. He declared he was not acquainted with ROBERT S. ALLEN or JACK ANDERSON or any other of DREW PEARSON'S employees. He stated he thought he may have met DREW PEARSON on one occasion at a cocktail party but was not certain of this.

General CABELL also stated that Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER had spoken briefly concerning the question of introducing into the truce negotiations a threat that in the event of breach the Communists could expect the war to be widened, which threat we later might not be able or desire to carry out. In connection with this, General CABELL advised he had a subsequent discussion with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS, although it is recalled with reference to the alleged newspaper column prepared by JACK ANDERSON some reference was made about extending the cease-fire negotiations deadline beyond December 27, 1951. General CABELL advised that he did not recall that President TRUMAN or the others made specific reference to the cease-fire date or indicated that an extension beyond this date would be sought or granted. He stated he was not certain whether the deadline had been mentioned at all, but that if so it was not belabored in the discussion. General CABELL recalled that that question and all other questions pertinent at the Presidential conference previously had been discussed at great length in various Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings attended by General CABELL.

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN dated December 13, 1951, which appeared in the "New York Post," was displayed to General CABELL for his examination. He expressed the belief it was not an accurate account of the proceedings at the White House conference, but that it contained a continuous thread to indicate the author, ALLEN, had an informant who attended the conference. For example, General CABELL stated that the ALLEN column indicates that the Communists were bargaining the rotation of troops issue against concessions from us on their airfield demands. He stated he did not believe General BRADLEY placed emphasis on the airfields versus rotation items and that these were merely two items mentioned in connection with the negotiations. He stated that there is some feeling that the Communists are using the rotation question to wrangle concessions generally, but he did not believe this was specifically brought out in the White House conference.

With reference to the statement attributed to General COLLINS in the ALLEN column to the effect that General COLLINS was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute, General CABELL stated this was an oversimplification and not strictly accurate. He stated that it appeared that this reflected some views which COLLINS may have expressed in the past at previous meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General CABELL referred further to the ALLEN column and to the statement in it attributed to the President. General CABELL advised he considered it an accurate summation, although not a verbatim quotation.

WFO 65-6060
PJT:JAC/agg

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR.

Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR. and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 15, 1951.

Mr. LAY advised that he attended the President's conference at the White House on December 10, 1951, as a representative of the National Security Council. At this time, he explained, the National Security Council was preparing a draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

Mr. LAY commented in detail as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals attending the aforementioned conference.

Mr. LAY advised that there was no written or oral agenda or program for the conference. He added that no minutes were kept, and there was no record of any actions to be taken. He did not recall anyone taking notes, with the exception of Secretary FINLETTER, who may merely have been "doodling."

Mr. LAY advised that he made notes at the conference for the President's benefit. He brought the notes directly from the conference to his office and placed them in a safe. He described the notes as the personal property of the President. He advised that, to his knowledge, no one but himself has seen the notes. He added that his secretaries have access to the safe where his notes are maintained, but did not think anyone who did not have a thorough understanding of what went on could decipher the notes. He explained that the notes consisted of personal abbreviations, etcetera. The [redacted] office are [redacted]

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Mr. LAY advised that, following the conference, he informed his Deputy, Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals who attended the conference. He explained that he and GLEASON worked together on the NSC aspects of the Korean problems, and in this connection, he advises GLEASON of all important matters in connection therewith. He stated he attempts to keep GLEASON as well informed as himself concerning all details of current developments in connection with the NSC.

Mr. LAY advised that, subsequent to the conference, the "Time" magazine representative at the White House, whose name he could not recall, telephoned him, asking two questions: (1) He, facetiously, asked Mr. LAY if the latter were the cause of the President's sudden return to Washington from Key West, to which question Mr. LAY answered, "No." (2) Mr. LAY was then asked if a reported request of General EISENHOWER to be replaced was discussed at the

conference. Mr. LAY informed that he advised the newspaperman that he was unable to say anything about the conference.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. LAY advised that he could not recall any discussions at the conference concerning a recommendation of the President that there be an extension of time in the event an armistice were not obtained by December 27, 1951. Mr. LAY advised that the conference did relate to concessions which might be made to the Communists.

Mr. LAY advised that he does not know, nor has he spoken to DREW PEARSON or PEARSON'S leg-man, JACK ANDERSON. He was unable to furnish any information as to a possible source of the leak of information from the White House conference.

Mr. LAY furnished the following information concerning indicated portions of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN in the "New York Post" of December 13, 1951:

Quotes from ALLEN Column

"The UN can have a cease fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds. That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. General BRADLEY declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point 'where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one'".

"General HOYT VANDENBERG vigorously opposed giving any ground on that. (Referring to concessions on the Communists' airfield demand). He wanted a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper declared the Air Chief of Staff, but I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them if they decide to break the truce next Spring which I wouldn't put past them".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of General BRADLEY'S remarks at the conference. He also advised that General BRADLEY'S ideas in this respect conceivably could have come from another source, inasmuch as he believed that they had been previously discussed.

Mr. LAY advised that this statement, as to VANDENBERG'S expressions at the conference, is false. VANDENBERG generally agreed with the statement of General BRADLEY at the conference. He explained that General BRADLEY clearly indicated that later in the negotiations, the UN might be willing to make concessions as to airfields if the number of airfields were, appropriately, limited.

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Quotes from ALLEN column

A statement attributed to General COLLINS relating to concessions on rotation of UN troops that "it is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields".

Statement attributed to General COLLINS that "our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over".

The statement attributed to the President that "as you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men".

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY could not recall General COLLINS making a statement to this effect.

Mr. LAY described this as correct in thought, but considered the words "until hell freezes over" as wrong. To his recollection, General COLLINS assured the President the Army troops could hold the line for the next year.

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of the views expressed by the President at the conference. Mr. LAY advised that, in his opinion, this information, in particular, could have come from no source except through an individual who was in attendance at the conference on December 10, 1951. He explained that he did not feel that anyone who attended the conference had a clear idea of the President's views on matters discussed at the conference. Mr. LAY based this conclusion on the fact that the President had been at Key West for sometime prior to the conference.

Mr. LAY advised that the matter of building up the South Korean Army was discussed at the conference, as indicated above.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB

Mr. JAMES E. WEBB, Under Secretary of State, was interviewed at his home, 3407 Rodman Street, Northwest, on the evening of Friday, December 14, 1951, by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY. Special Agent RALPH ROACH of the Liaison Section of the Bureau was also present during the interview.

Mr. WEBB advised that he was in attendance at the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished general background information of events leading up to the conference and also details as to the comments of various individuals in attendance at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that there was no formally prepared agenda for the conference. He further advised that he took no notes during the conference, and that he does not know whether anyone else present took notes.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. WEBB advised that he did not recall any discussion at this conference concerning a suggestion by the President that in the event an armistice was not reached by December 27, 1951, arrangements should be made for an extension of the time.

The conference terminated between 11:30 and 11:35 A.M., at which time, pursuant to the President's specific request, Mr. WEBB stayed with the President and went into his office for a further conference with respect to the impending visit of British Prime Minister CHURCHILL to the United States. WEBB then returned to his office and dictated a brief memo to include (1) that no notes or instructions had been taken at the President's conference in connection with the discussion of the proposed draft to be issued to General RIDGWAY, inasmuch as Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS was present during the discussion and was in a position to see that the necessary action required by the State Department would be taken. (2) The second part of WEBB'S memo dealt with the necessary data that would have to be prepared to brief the President on matters that would be discussed with Prime Minister CHURCHILL.

WEBB stated he had not discussed the details of the conversations in the President's general conference on December 10, 1951, with anyone. He stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, who is associated with Columnist DREW PEARSON; that he does know DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for at least six months. Nevertheless, he has seen other newspapermen subsequent to December 10, one of whom was JIM FREE, Washington correspondent for the Raleigh News and Observer at Raleigh, North Carolina. Another was JOHN HIGHTOWER, who covers the State Department with Associated Press, and the third and last was JAMES KESTON, associated with the New York Times. HIGHTOWER raised two points in questioning WEBB: (1) Was there a world crisis? (2) Was Europe discussed? WEBB gave HIGHTOWER this background:

The President is furnished with a great number of written reports concerning the world situation. He takes his position seriously, and takes the whole situation seriously. The President wants to get the full "flavor" of the thinking of the top people, as it is the President's policy to keep in close touch with what goes on around the world. WEBB gave this information to HIGHTOWER for background.

JAMES RESTON contacted WEBB on Tuesday, December 11, 1951, and he was given generally the same background information concerning the December 10th conference as was given to HIGHTOWER. RESTON'S inquiries of WEBB also touched on the reported resignation of Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON. WEBB briefed RESTON on the very close relationship between ACHESON and the President, and stated such a report of ACHESON'S resignation was not true. RESTON inquired concerning CHURCHILL'S visit, and wanted to know the policy of the United States as to CHURCHILL. WEBB advised him that the Government was making a very careful study of the background and problems in connection with our relations with Great Britain in Europe and the Far East, and indicated that this country would be prepared to discuss these problems whether CHURCHILL talked about them or not. WEBB advised that RESTON in recent articles has been throwing rather sharp barbs at the State Department with respect to some of its actions, and he felt that RESTON should be briefed as to the Department's activities as set forth above. RESTON also inquired as to recent changes in the State Department, and WEBB discussed the significance and history of these changes.

Mr. WEBB was also contacted by [redacted] concerning the statement in the December 10, 1951, issue of the "New York Times" to the effect that he, WEBB, contemplated resigning. He stated [redacted] is a representative of his hometown newspaper and was interested in this article.

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Mr. WEBB was re-interviewed in his office at the State Department by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 17, 1951, to make available to him the contents of the news column of ROBERT S. ALLEN, as it appeared in the December 13, 1951, issue of the New York Post "Blue Final" edition. His comments on this column follow:

The column quotes General BRADLEY to the effect that the truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one." The column also attributes to the President the question "What do they want?", and BRADLEY'S response was "The deadlock gets down to this." Mr. WEBB stated the President did not say "What do they want?" The President's inquiry was more along these lines, "Why are we willing to go this far with them?" Mr. WEBB made it clear that it was not the position of anyone, including

BRADLEY, that the talks had reached the stage of a deadlock. While this could possibly be the opinion of General MATTHEW RIDGWAY who is conducting the negotiations, responsible officials in Washington have never regarded the status of these talks as reaching a deadlock. They have always felt that we will get an armistice for two reasons, (1) the Communists in North Korea have been very badly hurt, (2) the United Nations forces in Korea are in a position of strength and can hold their present lines. It is felt that while we want an armistice from the position of global strategy, the Communists are anxious to obtain an armistice because of their present weakness in their position. Therefore, Mr. WEBB reiterated that these negotiations have never gotten to a deadlock stage and to quote that they have is not correct.

With respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ROBERT ALLEN to the effect that the Communists would make concessions on our stand on rotation of troops if we made concessions that allowed them to build some airfields in North Korea, Mr. WEBB stated that this topic was discussed at the conference, and he felt that perhaps this information could have come from someone in attendance at the conference. However, in WEBB'S opinion, this information was also available to others not in attendance at the conference who had previously sat in on discussions in the Defense and interested Departments and who, prior to the conference, knew General BRADLEY'S position concerning these points at issue. Therefore, in Mr. WEBB'S mind such a well informed person could have anticipated what remarks General BRADLEY would make when these topics were discussed.

The December 13, 1951, column of ROBERT ALLEN attributes the following statement to General VANDENBERG:

"I want a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper, but I do not see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build air fields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

Mr. WEBB stated that this was an erroneous statement of General VANDENBERG'S position, that at the present time the Communists have a powerful air force in North Korea which is well known. WEBB stated that VANDENBERG'S position in this connection was that if a cease-fire is obtained with the threat of a "greater sanction," that air power would be the sanction, and that he would withdraw all air power from Korea for re-deployment in Japan and other strategic areas. VANDENBERG went so far as to recommend that if a cease-fire is obtained that ground troops could be removed from South Korea so that in the event the cease-fire is later violated they would not be destroyed by the Communists. He suggested that they, too, be reassigned to other strategic locations.

With respect to the position of General J. LAMTON COLLINS, wherein he insisted that Communists be required to agree to the rotation of UN troops and is quoted in the column as follows:

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"That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men. I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields. Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Mr. WEBB'S opinion was that this quotation of COLLINS had a strong "flavor" of someone who was in attendance at the conference. He stated that it was COLLINS' position that it would be impossible to maintain ground forces without rotation.

WEBB described the ALLEN column as a whole not as "upsetting as it might be" from the security point of view. He added that from reading the column, one might gain the impression that United States top officials had decided to get tough with the Communists, whereas actually the discussions at the President's conference were concerned with granting concessions to the Communists. Mr. WEBB considered references in the column to discussions of building up the South Korean Army as harmful from the security standpoint, inasmuch as he felt that they did not want this fact released for general information. Mr. WEBB advised that references were made to building up the South Korean Army at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that after considering the column as a whole, he was of the opinion that possibly someone attending the conference gave a newspaperman too much detailed background concerning the conference, thus enabling a column such as the ALLEN column to have been written. Mr. WEBB was questioned as to who might be the source of the information contained in the ALLEN column. He advised that he had no suspects as to the source of the leak.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Room 5121, New State Department, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY, on December 14, 1951. Special Agent RALPH ROACH of the Liaison Section of the FBI was also present at the interview:

Mr. MATTHEWS advised that he attended the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished in detail information relating to comments of various individuals in attendance at the President's conference.

With respect to the item in the material shown by JACK ANDERSON to General BRADLEY on the evening of December 12, 1951, wherein it was stated that the President had indicated we would grant an extension of time if cease-fire were not obtained by December 27, 1951, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that to his recollection this matter was not discussed at the conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS returned directly to his office from the December 10, 1951 conference, and told ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, of the President's approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft of instructions to General RIDGWAY, and that the opinion of those attending the conference was unanimous to the effect that an armistice was extremely desirable at this time. MATTHEWS said that other than talking to JOHNSON, he spoke to no one else concerning the events taking place at this conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS stated that he did not take any notes during the conference and prepared no memorandum or record concerning it thereafter; also, to the best of his recollection, no one came in or went out of the conference room during the conference. He stated there was no agenda available prior to the conference as to the topics to be discussed.

Mr. MATTHEWS does not know JACK ANDERSON. He has previously met DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for the past few years. Mr. MATTHEWS had no suggestions or suspicions as to where, or in what manner, the alleged leak occurred.

Mr. MATTHEWS was reinterviewed by Special Agents CONNORS and TIERNEY on December 17, 1951.

The contents of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "Blue Final Edition" of the New York Post, December 13, 1951, concerning the White House conference of December 10, 1951, were exhibited to Mr. MATTHEWS for his perusal and comments.

With respect to the initial comments attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN to the effect that truce negotiations have reached the point where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that the General did indicate that a stage had been reached where things might break quickly, and suggested that we make concessions on minor issues. Mr. MATTHEWS stated that a careful review of the communiques and news bulletins for the ten days immediately prior to the President's conference on December 10 would contain this information. He commented that if the New York Times was obtained to cover this period, it would be apparent that this statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN was common knowledge. However, this was BRADLEY'S position at the conference. To Mr. MATTHEWS' recollection, General BRADLEY did not make the statement that "They are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the air field demand."

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statements attributed to General HOYT VANDENBERG as being inaccurate. He explained that VANDENBERG favored the "greater sanction" theory and suggested a withdrawal of the air force and ground troops from Korea and their re-deployment in strategic areas such as Japan.

In connection with the statements attributed to General J. LAWTON COLLINS concerning rotation of UN troops, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that COLLINS may have discussed rotation, but that the matter of rotation was not a point in issue at the conference since there was complete agreement as to the position of the United Nations on rotation. Mr. MATTHEWS advised that from the article it would appear that there was much argument at the conference on the rotation issue which is not true. Mr. MATTHEWS could not recall General COLLINS' making a statement to the effect that the Reds were demanding concessions as to rotation in order to force us to give in on airfields.

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statement attributed to General BRADLEY as to "the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful air force" as being incorrect since it is common knowledge that the Communists already have a powerful air force.

In connection with the statements attributed to President TRUMAN by ALLEN, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that the President may have said that we were trying to bring the war to an end and may have remarked that we might be making too many concessions, but to his recollection these statements were made at the beginning of the conference. He did not recall that the President made this statement: "We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

In Mr. MATTHEWS' opinion the ALLEN column was an inaccurate report of what had occurred at the White House conference on December 10. He felt

WFO 65-6060

that if ALLEN had obtained his information from someone attending the conference, he would have received much more accurate information. He also described that ALLEN column as a "poor job" of reporting the conference. In conclusion, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that any good newspaperman who had been closely following truce negotiations as released to the press prior to the White House conference and who maintained close contact with the lower echelon of individuals at the Pentagon working on topics of discussion would have been in a position to write ALLEN'S column without ever having had contact with anyone in attendance at the White House conference.

WFO 65-6060
MAT:bar:ddj

INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.

Rear Admiral THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E1010, on the afternoon of December 19, 1951, by Special Agent MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Admiral ROBBINS advised that he possessed no information concerning the proceedings at the White House Conference on December 10, 1951, with the exception of a single item which was brought to his attention, probably at noon on the day of the conference, at the regular briefing of Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER, attended by Admiral ROBBINS and about eight other senior officers. He mentioned these briefings are held on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday.

Admiral ROBBINS advised Admiral FECHTELER had informed the group at the briefing that he had attended the White House Conference and desired to apprise them of his remarks opposing a certain course of action in Korea.

Admiral ROBBINS stated that subsequently it became necessary for his committee to consider this point in order to prepare certain recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated this item was only one of a number in the preparation of their report. At 4:30 P.M. on Friday, December 14, he conferred with Major General CHARLES CABELL, ALONZO P. FOX and Colonel E. C. CRESS, who constitute the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and discussed the above point raised by Admiral FECHTELER. On Monday, December 17, Admiral ROBBINS contacted General OMAR BRADLEY in the presence of Major Generals CHARLES CABELL and EIMER J. ROGERS, and advised General BRADLEY that in connection with the positions taken by his Committee on the point in question, they were aware of the remarks of Admiral FECHTELER at the White House. Admiral ROBBINS advised that this constituted all knowledge in his possession concerning the White House Conference and all discussions in which he had participated on this subject.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. S. EVERETT GLEASON

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 17, 1951.

Mr. GLEASON advised that Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, immediately after returning from the White House conference on December 10, 1951, advised Mr. GLEASON that the conference would not necessitate any changes in a draft with which Mr. GLEASON was concerned. Mr. GLEASON explained that he and a small group of individuals had been working on a National Security Council draft which contained recommendations relating to the present truce negotiations in Korea and which possibly would be affected by the conference. At this time, the information furnished Mr. GLEASON by Mr. LAY concerning the conference was only enough to assure Mr. GLEASON that the draft would not have to be changed.

GLEASON stated that at approximately 4:00 P.M. on December 10, he contacted JOHN EMERSON, Planning Officer, Far Eastern Bureau, Department of State, who was also working on the NSC draft and advised EMERSON that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference on that date. According to GLEASON, he furnished EMERSON no further information. EMERSON advised GLEASON that he understood from his superiors in the State Department that no changes would be necessary.

GLEASON stated that he may have telephonically contacted [redacted] who is the Department of National Defense representative assisting in the preparation of the draft, and advised him that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference. GLEASON could not definitely recall if he had contacted [redacted] in this connection.

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According to GLEASON, [redacted] is on the staff of Mr. FRANK NASH, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense LOVETT.

GLEASON advised that on midmorning, December 12, 1951, Mr. LAY orally advised him in more detail as to the position taken by various individuals at the White House conference on December 10. This briefing of GLEASON took place in Mr. LAY'S office. No one else was present, GLEASON took no notes, and GLEASON has not discussed with any other individual the detailed briefing furnished him by Mr. LAY.

GLEASON advised that to the best of his recollection LAY indicated that General VANDENBERG suggested pulling out our air force in the event a cease-fire was obtained in Korea, and that the President expressed some concern lest the North Koreans drive all the way down to Pusan. As he further recalled, General COLLINS assured the President that the Army could hold the line.

In connection with LAY's briefing, Mr. GLEASON recalled that the President indicated a willingness to follow along the lines suggested by General BRADLEY and that previously he had been worried that the United States might be making too many concessions.

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the New York Post December 13, 1951, was exhibited to Mr. GLEASON. He stated that from his understanding the statements attributed to General BRADLEY and to the President by ALLEN expressed the thoughts of these individuals as relayed to him by LAY.

GLEASON advised that prior to attending the conference on the morning of December 10, LAY may have mentioned to him the fact that the President was concerned over the matter of concessions. He added that he definitely did not mention this fact to anyone nor had he had any knowledge as to whether other individuals in Washington were aware of the President's attitude prior to the conference.

GLEASON advised that his social life was limited to his family and very close friends of long standing whose intelligence precluded them from ever making inquiry as to the nature of his assignments. He has no newspaper friends and does not know columnist DREW PEARSON, JACK ANDERSON, or any of their representatives. Mr. GLEASON stated that he had been concerned about this matter and had been considering the whole thing in his own mind. From past experience, he knew that in some instances stories are "planted" with columnists in order to accomplish some objective that would benefit the individual giving the story. In analyzing this possibility as applied to the facts in instant case, he could see no objective to be obtained by so doing. He stated there has been no "knock down fight" on any matters of policy and that contrariwise there had been a high degree of unanimity of thinking by all individuals at the conference concerning the issues involved, and therefore it was his conclusion that the story appearing in the newspaper had not been "planted."

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOHN K. EMERSON

Mr. JOHN K. EMERSON, Planning Officer, Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY in his office, Room 3011, New State Department Building, on December 18, 1951.

Mr. EMERSON advised that he was one of several individuals who with Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, National Security Council, were preparing a National Security Council draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

According to Mr. EMERSON, on December 10, 1951, subsequent to the White House conference, his superior, Mr. ALEXIS JOHNSON, indicated to him that as a result of the conference no changes in the draft on which EMERSON was working would be necessary. Mr. JOHNSON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

Mr. EMERSON advised that subsequently Mr. GLEASON telephoned him also indicating that no draft changes were necessitated as a result of the conference. Mr. GLEASON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Office, Secretary Defense, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Far East Specialist, Room [REDACTED] Pentagon, was interviewed on December 18, 1951, by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY.

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Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON previously indicated that he may have called [REDACTED] when he, GLEASON, learned that as a result of the White House Conference on December 10, that it would be unnecessary to make any changes in the draft of a NSC paper that [REDACTED] had assisted in preparing. Mr. GLEASON was doubtful at the time of the original interview with him that he had called [REDACTED] nevertheless, [REDACTED] was personally contacted and questioned whether he had received a call from Mr. GLEASON concerning this matter. He stated that he had not, and further that he was advised by no one of any details relating to the President's conference of December 10, 1951.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Mr. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY, on December 18, 1951.

WFO 65-6060

JAC/PJT:fk

Mr. JOHNSON advised that he had worked on the draft of instructions prepared for General MATTHEW RIDGWAY with H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary, State Department, CHARLES BOHLEN, Counselor, State Department, and others. Mr. JOHNSON was interested in the decisions reached at the White House conference on December 10 only in so far as it affected the draft which he helped prepare for General RIDGWAY. When Mr. MATTHEWS returned from the President's conference he called Mr. JOHNSON and told him that the draft had been approved as drafted. He did not go into any detail at this time. Later in the afternoon he spoke with Mr. JOHNSON in a general fashion and told him that the general philosophy of the men who had worked on the draft had been adopted at the White House conference and that there was no objection to the message being transmitted to General RIDGWAY. He did not furnish Mr. JOHNSON with a detailed summarization of the views of those present at the conference. Mr. JOHNSON in turn advised Mr. ROBERT J. McCLURKIN, his principal assistant, who is Assistant Director in the Office of North East Asia Affairs which handles Korea and Japan, and told McCLURKIN that their draft had been approved. He stated that this was all he told McCLURKIN as actually it was all he knew. He also indicated that he possibly told the same to JOHN EMERSON, Planning Officer, Planning Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs.

The DREW PEARSON column appearing in the New York Daily Mirror of December 5, 1951, was exhibited to Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. JOHNSON advised that he had no previous knowledge of the existence of this column. He stated that he was in no position to comment as to whether the column accurately portrayed the White House conference of December 10 because he had never been advised as to the details thereof.

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CEH:iam

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INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOSEPH SHORT

Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, Press Secretary of the White House, was interviewed by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. He advised that he possessed no prior knowledge as to the matters which were to be discussed at the White House conference on December 10, 1951. Mr. SHORT informed that upon the termination of the conference, he was authorized by the President, following consultation with Admiral DENNISON and Admiral SOUERS, to release to the press, the statement that the President had discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached. Mr. SHORT stated that because of his lack of knowledge as to the actual discussions of the conference, he was, of course, necessarily limited to the authorized statement in his contact with the press. He produced from his files, in substantiation of his statement, and furnished a typewritten copy which he informed fully covers all comments and questions made at this press release.

Mr. SHORT said that [] of DREW PEARSON'S office, at times covers the White House. He was unable to state whether BLUMENTHAL had been present on December 10, but indicated he was relatively certain he did not see him on this date. He was unable to furnish any statement which would indicate who may have been responsible for the leak of information from the President's conference of December 10, 1951. In discussing this matter, Mr. SHORT furnished certain background and activities which had come to his attention concerning DREW PEARSON, which he indicated had served as confirmation for his opinion as to the unscrupulous nature of PEARSON, but in relating this background, was unable to tie any of these activities into the instant investigation.

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P E N D I N G

WFO 65-6060

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

LEAD

THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.:

Will await Bureau instructions as to what, if any, further investigation is desired.

Previous correspondence in this case has carried the title as follows:

DREW PEARSON;
Alleged Leak from White House Conference;
December 10, 1951,
to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for DREW PEARSON
Espionage - X

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED PER OGA LETTER DATED 5-02-2013

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *pl*
 FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*
 SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 26, 1951

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 Rosen _____
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

[General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of CIA, advised Liaison Agent Bates of the following information on the afternoon of December 21. General Smith, while speaking with the President recently, furnished him with this information.] *(S-1)(u)*
 Anna Rosenberg informed General Smith that she was recently at a dinner party and the following persons were seated at one table: Clayton Fritchey of the Department of Defense, Drew Pearson [redacted] a disgruntled former employee of CIA who was involved with Jay Lovestone and Kay Halle, "sweetheart of Clayton Fritchey." General Smith stated he had no specific information regarding any leak at this dinner party, but desired the Director to know of the people who attended and who were evidently in conversation with each other. He stated he felt sure that Kay Halle, in her relation with Fritchey, had received much "across the pillow" intelligence from Fritchey. He stated that Halle was known for her loose talk at cocktail parties.] *(S-1)(u)*

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General Smith stated he felt the Director might desire to know the above facts in view of the alleged leak from the White House conference. *(S-1)(u)*

CWB:slw

12/17/91 9803 RDD/ACM
 Classified by
 Declassify on: OADR
 Comp. #293983

ADDENDUM - CEH:LL - December 26, 1951

We have developed no information indicating that Clayton Fritchey was in possession of any information regarding the conference prior to the preparation of the Pearson column.

FOI/PA # 265, 255; 293983
 APPEAL # _____
 CIVIL ACT. # _____
 E.C. # 12356
 DATE 3-28-88 INITIALS *SP8/ab*
 12/17/91 *alm*

RECORDED - 76

INDEXED - 76

EX - 76

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 MARKED PER CIA letter
 65 JAN 25 1952 of 11/6/91

MAR 25 1952

March 6, 1952

10:00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-22-88 BY SP-8 JTB

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS

JACK ANDERSON

Admiral Souers, Special Consultant to the President, called and stated he was very much interested in my memorandum to the Attorney General dated February 20, 1952 regarding Drew Pearson. He stated he had tried to prevent the request for such investigations since we would not be able to prosecute and would only antagonize good newspapermen who would rush to Pearson's defense following the mistaken belief that the freedom of the press was involved. Admiral Souers stated that he had briefed the President about my memorandum. I indicated to him that I was concerned about the waste of thousands of dollars and manpower. Admiral Souers stated he had straightened out Joseph Short, Secretary to the President, and he told me that Short had told him to stop all the investigations but the Admiral stated of course we could not do this as some of these investigations may be based on the possibility of espionage but it might be possible to stop those that the President had specifically requested. The Admiral stated he was not doing this officially now but was just talking to me on a personal basis and I told him I understood perfectly. He stated he told the President he was going to show this memorandum to Mr. Short and to Admiral Dennison, Naval Aide to the President, and he had told the President of the procedure followed by the NSC in tracking down leaks whereby each agency was responsible for locating its own leak. I stated I had tried to point out in my memorandum that there are literally hundreds of people in some of those cases who have access to classified and top secret material and there should be a tightening up of the distribution of a lot of this information. Admiral Souers stated that the President had told him hereafter to track down the leaks according to the procedure he had indicated NSC had followed. Admiral Souers then inquired if we had many more current investigations of Pearson and I told him we had practically finished; that I thought there were no more pending.

Very truly yours,

151 J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED-137

MAR 11 1952

25

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 6-45-PM
DATE 3-6-52
BY W. J. J.

7 MAR 18 1952

copy; b1

February 15, 1952

MR. TOLSON

L. B. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-10

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2B
The Attorney General called on February 13, 1952, and stated that he had a recollection that the Director recently informed him that in connection with one of our investigations of Drew Pearson we had learned of a group of individuals who are meeting at Drew Pearson's house, one of whom was Clayton Fritchey of the Defense Agency. The Attorney General stated that McKinney of the National Democratic Committee was thinking of bringing Fritchey into the National Democratic Committee and the Attorney General had told McKinney to hold up until he could check. Likewise, he stated he had heard that Fritchey was being considered for a White House appointment and the Attorney General felt that under the circumstances, Fritchey would not be a good security risk.

The Attorney General also asked if our investigation of Drew Pearson, growing out of the use of the McArthur messages in 1950 was conclusive.

After talking to the Director, I advised the Attorney General that the Director had talked to him about the investigation of Drew Pearson and had pointed out that Fritchey was an old friend of Pearson and played bridge at Pearson's house on the average of once a month and was at Pearson's house on the evening that General Bradley had talked to Jack Anderson and had succeeded in killing a portion of Pearson's column. I told the Attorney General that what the Director had in mind was that an official of the Government could not play bridge at periodical intervals with a close friend without being pumped. The Attorney General stated this was sufficient.

With reference to the McArthur investigation, I told the Attorney General he might prefer to have the Criminal Division go over our reports which had been sent to the Department and give him an opinion since it would be inappropriate for us to draw any conclusions. In response to his inquiry, I told him that our investigation had been brought to a close after it had been determined that the McArthur messages had been given very widespread dissemination.

cc - Mr. Ladd
Mr. Belmont
LBN:mb

165-60573
NOT RECORDED
71 FEB 29 1952

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EXCLUDED FROM ORIGINAL

62-116647-1

ORIGINAL FILE IN

3/26/52

MR. TOLSON:

Ed Nellor told me last night that Ernie Cuneo was conferring with some people on the McCarran Committee as one section of the McCarran Committee is now investigating Drew Pearson and the incident involving leaks from the Pentagon.

We, of course, had not heard of this before.

L. B. Nichols

LBN:hmc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/pt

RECORDED - 29

65-60573-53

APR 2 1952

INDEXED 29

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76 APR 11 1952

March 1952

FORMATION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assistant Attorney General
James M. McInerney

April 10, 1952

Director, FBI
RECORDED - 159
DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

54

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 1, 1952, your reference, JMM:CEN:bjn, in which you requested to be apprised of statements made by White House Press Secretary, Joseph Short, during the course of our investigation, as reflected in the report of Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood, dated December 22, 1951.

In compliance with your request, please be advised that Mr. Short also stated that it was his belief that Drew Pearson extensively uses newspaper reporters who are associated with reputable news media and who feed to Pearson, for a price, off-the-record comments, which are made in the course of legitimate interviews and which the news media represented by the particular reporter, would not use because it is "off-the-record." In this connection, Mr. Short stated he understood that Gene Davis, formerly of Trans - Radio Press, and Tris Coffin, while employed by CBS, were among those "peddling" information to Pearson. He further stated that it was his understanding that the above two individuals had been caught, but that he had no doubt there were others.

65-60573

DECLASSIFIED BY 4080 Ed/MP
ON 10/16/77

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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APR 10 4 43 PM '52
DIRECTOR

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 29, 1952

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN *WAB*SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BT/SL

Tolson	_____
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In connection with Mr. Nichols' memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated June 16, 1952, entitled "Confidential Files Maintained in Room 6527," it was requested that pertinent files maintained in the above room be reviewed for the purpose of determining whether or not there was still a need for the maintaining of the same.

File 65-60573 has been reviewed and it is requested that due to the nature of the content of this file it still be maintained in Room 6527.

The above file reflects the investigation requested by Mr. Robert Lovett, Secretary of Defense, which request was based on instructions received from the President. The investigation concerned classified information revealed by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen relative to a White House Conference on December 10, 1951. The Conference was called by President Truman and attended by a number of key civilian and military personnel. At this Conference, the Korean War situation was the main topic of discussion and far-reaching decisions were made, which decisions were classified as "Top Secret." In view of these far-reaching decisions, it is felt that only limited access should be had to the file until the Korean War is over. At the conclusion of the Korean War, this file can be maintained in the General Records Files Section.

The above file should be made available for review; however, the information contained therein should not be disseminated without prior approval of the Espionage Section.

65-60573

AJM: je s

RECORDED-113

JUL 30 1952

EX-28

619
AUG 5 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: March 27, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: LEAKAGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
TO DREW PEARSON CONCERNING A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
ESPIONAGE

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In accordance with your request, there is attached a memorandum concerning the results of the Bureau's investigation in the case entitled "Drew Pearson" (Column of December 15, 1951); Jack Northman Anderson, aka Jack Anderson; Robert S. Allen (Column of December 13, 1951); Espionage - X. Both Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen published information discussed at a White House Conference held December 10, 1951, which was classified "Top Secret" information. The investigation reflected a close association between Mr. Clayton Fritchey, Director, Office of Public Information, and Drew Pearson, although no information was developed that Mr. Fritchey had prior knowledge of the material published in Pearson's column. This investigation did not determine the source from which Pearson obtained his information.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum may be forwarded to the Attorney General.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP844/10

EX - 107

RECORDED - 68
INDEXED 63

65-60573-59

Attachment *sent*

66 APR 8 1953

Handwritten signatures and initials:
Ladd
W.C. Sullivan
F.D.

SECURITY INFORMATION

March 27, 1953

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

DREW PEARSON (COLUMN OF DECEMBER 15, 1951);
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson;
ROBERT S. ALLEN (COLUMN OF DECEMBER 13, 1951)
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-22-88 BY SP-1 JAL

65-60513
Drew Pearson, in the column in the "New York Daily Mirror" on December 15, 1951, and also Robert S. Allen, in an article in the "New York Post," on December 13, 1951, purported to report matters discussed at a White House Conference held December 10, 1951, in regard to the cease-fire discussions concerning Korea. The information was classified "~~Top Secret~~." This Bureau conducted an investigation at the request of the then Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett. The inquiry revealed the White House Conference was presided over by President Truman and attended by sixteen key civilian and military personnel. Those in attendance were:

President Truman
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Army
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air
Admiral William Fechteler, Navy
General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary Frank C. Pace, Army
Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, Air
Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair, Navy
Acting Secretary James E. Webb, State
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, State
Admiral Sidney Souers, White House
James Lay, National Security Council
General Harry Vaughan, White House
Admiral Harry L. Dennison, White House
General Robert Landry, White House

The civilian and military personnel attending the conference were interviewed, and all denied any unauthorized disclosure of the matters discussed at the conference. Mr. Joseph Short, White House Press Secretary, and others who had been furnished the information on a "need-to-know basis," were also interviewed with similar results. The

RECORDED - 67

SECURITY INFORMATION

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DECLASSIFIED BY 6080

ON 10/6/77

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Gandy _____

79 APR 7 - 1953
F 175

MAR 20 12 19 PM '53

RECEIVED

DIRECTOR

The Attorney General

March 27, 1953

interviews reflected that no one took notes during the conference except James Lay, who turned the notes over to President Truman, and no one dictated a memorandum concerning the conference except Secretary Pinletter. All copies of that memorandum were accounted for. Both the columns written by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen indicated the writers had a firsthand knowledge of what occurred at the conference, such as the manner in which the President strode into the room, grinning and shaking hands all around. The columns purported to highlight the discussions, and both were limited to the discussions on the cease-fire negotiations.

It was the consensus of those persons interviewed who had read the columns that the reporting was relatively accurate as to the points discussed in connection with the cease-fire negotiations, but inaccurate as to the quotations attributed to the individuals present. Individuals interviewed believed the columns had been prepared with at least some information as to the points discussed and particularly with regard to the cease-fire negotiations.

The investigation developed that there had existed a social relationship of long standing between Drew Pearson and Mr. Clayton Fritchey, Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. Mr. Fritchey admitted he had known Drew Pearson for ten years and visited with him periodically about once a month. He had been at Drew Pearson's home playing bridge on the evening of December 18, 1951, at which time Pearson exhibited to him an article pertaining to the White House Conference, which Mr. Fritchey read. Mr. Fritchey stated that the article impressed him as being rather innocuous, but, despite the fact that it was not sensational, it indicated a leak had occurred in a very important conference, which of itself was significant. He stated he did not suggest this to Pearson, nor did he suggest that Pearson withhold publication of the column. Mr. Fritchey stated he did not know the source of Pearson's information but that it was a well-known fact that Drew Pearson had excellent sources of information and that this sort of thing occurred regularly.

The Attorney General

March 27, 1953

The investigation did not develop information that Mr. Fritchey was in possession of the facts regarding the White House Conference prior to the date that Pearson showed him this article. Secretary of Defense Lovett advised that so far as he knew Fritchey was not in possession of such information.

Information was also developed that the Acting Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Whittehair had been visited previously by Drew Pearson on two occasions and also by Fred Blumenthal, a Pearson employee. Mr. Whittehair had called Pearson on December 12, 1951, with the President's approval, for the purpose of attempting to prevent the publication of Pearson's column. At this time, Mr. Whittehair indicated concern to Pearson that he might be blamed for the leak, but Pearson told Whittehair he should not be apprehensive since he had not told Pearson anything, and Pearson commented that he was an old friend of General Bradley and many other friends of his were at the conference and he named the then Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, General Hoyt Vandenberg, and the then Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb. (U) REMAINS UNCLASS PER NAVY KTR 6/15/92
SP7 CW 1/24/98

The results of the investigation conducted by this Bureau were made available to the then Attorney General Howard J. McGrath, the then Deputy Attorney General A. Devitt Vanech, the then Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and the then Administrative Assistant to the President Admiral Sidney S. Souers.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: 1/13/54

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT:

DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X11-3-97 PWD/A 6-3-94 (revised)
SP7C/10/10 #43,828
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8ay/ab

Tolson	✓
Ladd	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
Clegg	✓
Glavin	✓
Harbo	✓
Rosen	✓
Tracy	✓
Laughlin	✓
Mohr	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Rm.	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

Mr. Walt Yeagley of the Department on January 13, 1954, mentioned that the Department is still actively considering our investigative reports concerning instances wherein Drew Pearson published allegedly classified information. He said the Department wants to be sure that Pearson could not put up a defense that the information he published came from official sources, and particularly high sources in the Department of Defense who would have the authority to declassify the information. Pursuant to this, the Department has contacted Roger Keyes, Under Secretary of Defense, who has given assurance that the information in question was not declassified and could not have been legitimately obtained by Pearson. The Department is pursuing this further by checking to see what witnesses could be produced by the Department of Defense to show that this material was classified and could not have been obtained legitimately.

Mr. Yeagley did not know whether the Department will call Pearson before a Grand Jury or whether any action will be taken as a result of the present study being afforded the case.

For your information.

52 JAN 25 1954

AHB:tlc

RECORDED 13

EX-124

65-605-62
JAN 15 1954
DS-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 9,
1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON BROADCAST
SEPTEMBER 3, 1955ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8ugj/et

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated September 6, 1955, pointing out that Jack Anderson substituted for Pearson on the September 3, 1955, broadcast and the memorandum also set forth items of possible interest to the Bureau. One of the items stated "Our atomic scientists have simplified the complex H-Bomb and designed an H weapon so self-compact that it can be carried on a fighter bomber. This baby H-Bomb has a one megaton punch that is equal to one million tons of TNT." The memorandum stated that this matter was being checked with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

On September 8, 1955, Liaison Agent Bates contacted [redacted]; Colonel Jack Armstrong of the Division of Military Applications, AEC; and Mr. William Burke of the Security Division, AEC. [redacted] and Colonel Armstrong both indicated concern over the above statement in that it appears to report latest up-to-date development in this particular field. They both felt that this amounted to a disclosure of sensitive and classified information.

b6
b7C

Mr. Burke commented that he would obtain a copy of the Pearson broadcast from the AEC Public Information Office and would have it officially reviewed by the AEC's Classification Division for an official opinion as to whether or not the statement contained classified information. Mr. Burke stated if so, the AEC would then direct a letter to the Bureau pointing out its concern and possibly asking for investigation.

ACTION:

This matter will be followed with AEC and you will be kept advised.

CWB:fjb/17
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Brannan

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bates

RECORDED - 70

65-60523-13
b6
b7C

SEP 13 1955

SEP 22 1955

CS - Belmont
Wacks

Assistant Attorney General (orig. & 1)
William F. Tompkins

October 10, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED-32 65-60573-65

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-12/10/88

EX-121

JACK ANDERSON,
"The Washington Post and Times Herald"
Article Entitled "Talk of Impeaching FPC
Head Heard," in September 8, 1955, Issue
ESPIONAGE - X

Reference is made to your communication dated
September 14, 1955, in which you requested that appropriate
officials of the United States Air Force be asked certain
questions with respect to the captioned article.

By memorandum dated October 1, 1955, the
Department of the Air Force advised that the pamphlet
in question, prepared at the Air War College of the Air
University, is entitled "The Air Force and National
Security Policy," and is not classified. The Department
of the Air Force advised that portions of the captioned
article may be found in the following excerpts from the
aforementioned pamphlet:

(1) "Under the former concept atomic munitions
were to be employed only against an atomic aggressor who
had directly attacked the United States or one of our
allies. This was a pattern of general war. It has been
pointed out that now the policy of 'massive retaliatory
capability' loosens the restrictions on offensive air
power, brings into consideration the question of a choice
in the use of munitions, and thus gives the opportunity
for a degree of flexibility and versatility which previously
was not present. It could now be possible for the tremendous
force in question to be used in other than general war as
a powerful deterrent to lesser aggressions. Accordingly,
an aggressor could no longer assume that the United States
would be willing to permit him to select the geography and
munitions of another contest." (Section VI, pages 2 and 3)

(2) "In terms of hot war, the United States is
readying for a decisive air war to be fought principally
with nuclear weapons. This type of hot war has been
accepted as the likeliest by both the military and the
higher governmental authorities." (Section VI, page 5)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JFW:hpf
(5)

50 OCT 17 1955

MAILED 11
OCT 10 1955
COMM - FBI

OCT 10 11 55 AM '55

RECEIVED - BOARDMAN

Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

(3) "The current U. S. military strategy does not tie us down to an all-out war. We do not have to empty a whole basket of eggs for each emergency. Neither do we have to trot out a heavy-weight boxer if the welter-weight type can do the job and get out without getting killed himself." (Section VI, page 15)

The Department of the Air Force also advised as follows: "The pamphlet was circulated in May, 1954, to Air Force Commanders as unclassified material which should be handled and retained in Air Force channels only. It is not known how Mr. Anderson obtained the quoted excerpts.

"Specific answers to the questions you raised are not being made since the document in question is not classified. In the event additional information is desired, it will be furnished upon request."

It is requested that you advise whether you desire any further investigation by this Bureau in this matter.

3 - Liaison
Wacks

65-60573

65-60573-67

BY COURIER SERVICE

RECORDED-66

Date: November 15, 1955

To: Director of Special Investigations (orig. & 1)
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JACK ANDERSON, "THE WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD" ARTICLE ENTITLED
"TALK OF IMPEACHING FPC HEAD HEARD,"
IN SEPTEMBER 8, 1955, ISSUE
ESPIONAGE - X
(Your file 34-0-936)

Reference is made to your communication
dated November 4, 1955.

On October 14, 1955, Assistant Attorney
General William F. Tompkins advised that since the
pamphlet entitled "The Air Force and National Security
Policy" was not classified, no further investigation
was being requested. Accordingly, this matter is not
being pursued further by this Bureau.

JFW:hpf
(5)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

BY COURIER SVC.

NOV 16

COMM - FBI

NOV 23

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 17, 1957

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAL-TV
2:15 P.M., 6/16/5711-3-97 P.W. OVA 10-23-92 (u)
50721/624
#243, 628
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8WJ/fah
8-1Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Entire telecast was devoted to Pearson's version of the "Inside Story" of how the American people were fooled concerning the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. Pearson contends that the American people were influenced by a very strong Chinese lobby and that the Chinese Nationalists are not pro-American.

The following was noted as of possible interest to the Bureau:

Pearson made the following quote from what he alleged to be a Central Intelligence report: "I have here an excerpt from Central Intelligence Report marked [] which states that CHIANG Kai-shek withdrew 40 million dollars from the Bank of China for propaganda work and bribery in the United States. I am quoting. Thirty-five million of the total was paid January, 1949, by the Bank of China on the direction of O.K. Yui (phonetic) to Madam CHIANG Kai-shek. Other payments were Sun Fo (phonetic), \$2,400,000; Chen Li-fu (phonetic), \$1,500,000; Bishop Paul Yu-pin (phonetic), one million dollars; Hu Shih, one million dollars. Bank officials refused to pay but finally did so when directed by O.K. Yui (phonetic) who said the money was to be used for propaganda in the United States which would require bribery of American officials. End of quote."

Above allegation previously received from CIA and investigated by Bureau during the investigation of so-called "China Lobby" in 1953. Allegations could not be verified. Copies of all our investigative reports submitted to Department and other appropriate agencies. The above CIA report mentioned by Pearson was furnished to Bureau in 1953. Report was classified secret by CIA.

COMMENT:

EX 105

INDEXED - 78
RECORDED - 78

3 JUL 8 1957

In view of Pearson's admitted access to a classified CIA report, this is being routed to Supervisor J. F. Wacks, Espionage Section, for appropriate handling. Contact with CIA will be made to determine if Pearson has authorized access to this report and whether or not it is still classified.

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Wacks
Mr. Crowley
Mr. Deegan (2)

JGD:mpp (7)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

The Attorney General . . . 1)

January 17, 1956

Director, FBI

JOSEPH ALSCO;
STEWART ALSCO
AFFIDAVIT - X
(Bufile 100-354477)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 JFB/JS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/2/77 BY 26

DREW PEARSON;
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON
AFFIDAVIT - X
(Bufile 65-59762)

DECLASSIFIED BY 10080 Sed/LAP
ON 10/12/77

At your conference of January 12, 1956, you stated you understood Congressman John E. Voas (Democrat-California) is proposing to hold a hearing shortly as a result of complaints made by the Alsops to the effect they were being intimidated by investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to their sources of information through which they have been able to obtain and publish confidential information.

Enclosed is a memorandum, copies of which are also being furnished to Mr. Rogers and Mr. Tompkins, which sets forth seven instances since 1950 in which we have had to investigate matters involving the Alsops and sixteen instances since 1943 in which we have had to investigate Drew Pearson and his staff, with brief statements as to the results obtained in each case. Details of these cases have been furnished to the Department previously.

This material reflects that Pearson and the Alsops have refused to identify their sources of official information and that the classified information published had been given widespread dissemination throughout the Government, in some cases to thousands of individuals in several departments and agencies. As a result, our investigations were not productive.

Enclosure
62-9922

DET:hpf
(12) ENCL. (Serial 1-11-56)

NOT RECORDED JAN 20 1956
145 JAN 24 1956

NOTE: Cover memo Belmont to [unclear] dated 1-11-56 prepared by DET:hpf re same caption.

COMM - FBI
JAN 18 1956
MAILED 20

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Sizoo
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Attorney General

We shall continue to follow the policy of requesting the Department's opinion as to whether investigation is warranted prior to conducting investigations of alleged disclosures of classified information in the press, first obtaining, however, for the Department's assistance, statements from the interested agencies as to whether the information published related to the national defense and was classified properly; the origin of the information and the extent of its official dissemination; whether collateral related material had been published previously sufficient to make speculation possible; and whether the information can be declassified for purposes of prosecution.

The problem of unauthorized publication of national defense information is one which I do not believe can be solved by continuing investigations by this Bureau. It is essentially an administrative matter to be corrected by stricter procedures for controlling the information within the various Government departments and agencies involved.

cc - 1 - Mr. William A. Rogers (Enclosure)
Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General (Enclosure)
William F. Tompkins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L. V. Boardman

1-13-56

A. H. Belmont

JOSEPH ALSOP;
STEWART ALSOP
ESPIONAGE
(Bufile 100-354477)

✓ DREW PEARSON;
JACK ANDERSON
ESPIONAGE
(Bufile 65-59762)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 [signature]

The Director's memorandum of 1-12-56, received last evening, requested us to prepare a memorandum to the Attorney General, with a copy to Mr. Rogers, setting forth briefly the number of instances in which we have had to investigate matters involving the Alsops and Drew Pearson, with a brief statement as to the results obtained, inasmuch as the Attorney General had advised the Director it was his intention to go before the Moss Committee hearings in connection with the Committee's proposed hearings concerning the Bureau's investigation of the Alsops.

This matter was assigned immediately and supervisors worked late last night reviewing necessary material. There have been approximately 30 cases involving Pearson and the Alsops and it will be necessary to review and summarize each case. Work on this project will continue over the weekend and it is anticipated the memorandum will be completed by Monday, January 16, 1956.

ACTION:

For your information. This matter is being followed closely.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

CC: 62-99229 (Moss Committee)
DEF:ss CC: LVBoardman
 AHBelmont
 DETold

(6)

✓ 60573
NOT RECORDED
191 JAN 17 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Tic: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Wacks

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

(ORIG. & 1)

July 3, 1957

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 780 65-60573-68

DREW PEARSON TELECAST
STATION WMAI-TV

2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 uyl/elt

DECLASSIFIED BY 6855
ON 11/28/77 DMJ/CAM

During the course of the captioned telecast, which was devoted to Pearson's version of the "inside story" of how the American people "were fooled" concerning the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, Pearson made the following statements:

"I have here an excerpt from Central Intelligence report marked [redacted] which states that CHIANG Kai-shek withdrew \$40,000,000 from the Bank of China for propaganda work and bribery in the United States. I am quoting. Thirty-five million of the total was paid January, 1949, by the Bank of China on the direction of O. K. Yui to Madam CHIANG Kai-shek. Other payments were Sun Fo, \$2,400,000; Ch'en Li-fu, \$1,500,000; Bishop Paul Yu Pin, \$1,000,000; Hu Shih, \$1,000,000. Bank officials refused to pay but finally did so when directed by O. K. Yui who said the money was to be used for propaganda in the United States which would require bribery of American officials." End of quote."

With respect to this withdrawal of funds, you are referred to the memorandum which is captioned "China Lobby, Registration Act" and is dated January 30, 1953, from Assistant Attorney General Charles B. Murray to MM-FBI this Bureau, in which he requested investigation in this matter. You are also referred to the results of this investigation set out in this Bureau's investigative MAILED 19 reports captioned "China Lobby, Registration Act," dated April 30, 1953, July 23, 1953, and November 2, 1953.

Concerning the data disclosed on Pearson's telecast of June 16, 1957, [redacted] Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, on June 27, 1957, advised that the Central Intelligence Agency report number [redacted]

NOTE: Memo classified Secret because it quotes from a CIA document so classified.

JFW:amc
Classified by [redacted]
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of [redacted]

JUL 22 1957

SECRET
ON 10/6/77

L. V. Boardman

1-16-56

A. H. Belmont

Tico - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Todd
Mr. Weeks

JOSEPH ALSOP;
STEWART ALSOP
ESPIONAGE - X
(Bufile 100-354477)

DREW PEARSON; @
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON
ESPIONAGE - X
✓ (Bufile 65-58782)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/4/88

The Director's memorandum 1-12-56 instructed us to furnish brief summaries to the Attorney General and Mr. Rogers of cases involving Drew Pearson and the Alsops which we have had to investigate.

Since 1949, we have investigated 16 matters involving Drew Pearson; since 1950, we have investigated 7 matters involving the Alsops. Investigative reports have been furnished to the Department previously.

ACTION:

Attached are the requested summaries for the Attorney General and Mr. Rogers and also a copy for Mr. Tompkins. We are stating in our letter of transmittal that the solution to unauthorized publication of defense information is not through Bureau investigations, but is an administrative matter which requires stricter control of the information by the interested Government agencies.

DET:hpf
(8)
Enclosure

cc - 1 - 62-99229

65-60573-
NOT RECORDED
44 JAN 20 1956

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

71 JAN 25 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-354477-195

~~SECRET~~

(Continuation from FDPS page 325)

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

~~SECRET~~

continues to carry the classification of ~~Secret~~; that Pearson was not given authorized access by the Central Intelligence Agency to this report or to its contents; that copies of this report were disseminated to the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as to this Bureau; and that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently conducting an inquiry within its own Agency in order to establish the extent of the report's dissemination within that Agency. You will be furnished any additional information received from the Central Intelligence Agency. It is noted that the copy of the above Central Intelligence Agency report furnished to this Bureau is in our files.

Unless you request to the contrary, this Bureau will conduct no investigation with respect to Pearson's disclosures on his telecast of June 16, 1957.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 26, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAZ-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/CLT
11-3-97 BJOBA 10-23-92

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 17, 1957. On his TV broadcast, June 16, 1957, Drew Pearson made reference to the contents of a specific Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report dealing with expenditures of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Pursuant to instructions, the Liaison Agent contacted [redacted], Office of Security, CIA, on June 24, 1957, to ascertain if Pearson had authorized access to the report in question and to also determine whether or not the particular report was still classified.

On June 25, 1957, [redacted] advised that a preliminary check made by him indicated that the report was still classified and that Pearson did not have authorized access to the document. [redacted] stated that he was still checking on this matter and that the Liaison Agent should not accept the foregoing as CIA's complete and official reply.

ACTION:

Liaison will follow this matter closely with CIA and report the results.

SJP:bjt
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Wacks
- 1 - Mr. Crowley
- 1 - Mr. Deegan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 78

INDEXED - 78

JUL 13 1957

DECLASSIFIED BY 6855
ON 11/29/92

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 28, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAL-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957

Tolson ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Boardman ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mason ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm ☒
 Nease ☒
 Winterrowd ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holloman ☒
 Gandy ☒

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 26, 1957. On his TV broadcast on June 16, 1957, Drew Pearson made reference to the contents of a specific CIA report dealing with the expenditures of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Liaison has been following this matter with CIA in order to establish if the CIA report was still classified and, furthermore, to ascertain if Pearson had authorized access to the report.

On June 27, 1957, [redacted] Office of Security, CIA, advised that the CIA report from which Pearson quoted several statements continues to carry the classification of "Secret." [redacted] further advised that Pearson has not been given authorized access by CIA to the report or its contents. [redacted] stated that copies of the report were disseminated to the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Bureau. He advised that CIA is currently conducting an inquiry within its own agency in order to establish the extent of the report's dissemination within CIA proper.

ACTION:

Liaison will follow this matter with CIA.

SJP:bjt
 (8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Wacks
- 1 - Mr. Crowley
- 1 - Mr. Deegan
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 78

JUL 8 1957

33 JUL 1 1957

Classified by 6080 [redacted]
 Exempt from GDS Category 1
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED BY 6855 [redacted]
 ON 11/29/82

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/CL

11-3-97 12N 06-19 10-23/92 [redacted]
 5061/66
 228, 228

b3

Tic:

ardman
lmont
n (4)
Mr. Sanders

EX-160

RECORDED - 14

65-60573-71X2
94-4-350-883

VIA LIAISON

Date: August 2, 1957

DECLASSIFIED BY 6855
ON 11/29/71 DM/CA

To:

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

From:

John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DREW PEARSON TELECAST
STATION WIAL-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957
ESPIONAGE - X

113-97 AN OGA N-25-2
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8/JS

In connection with the captioned telecast in which Mr. Pearson quoted from CIA Report Number [redacted] Assistant Attorney General Tompkins has requested this Bureau to determine and advise him of the following:

Whether the disseminated copies of the report contained a security classification stamp, and whether the particular page of the report from which Mr. Pearson quoted contained a security classification stamp. (The FBI copy of the report contains only one page).

Whether the information quoted by Pearson, standing by itself, contained information relating to the national defense as of the date of disclosure, that is June 16, 1957.

Whether the information disclosed can be declassified in the event of prosecution.

It is requested that the information requested by Assistant Attorney General Tompkins be furnished to this Bureau at your earliest convenience. It is also requested that the identity of the individual who can testify concerning the first two items be furnished.

Cover memo Boardman to Belmont, ESS:sls, prepared 8-1-57 same subject.

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ since letter refers to a specific broadcast and identity of document disclosed by Pearson on the broadcast.

orig. rec'd Pearson
8-7-57
delivered to Fred Hall
Office of Security C & A
8-8-57 by CMB
REC'D-READING ROOM
AUG 2 12 17 PM '57

TELETYPE AGENCIES
P (C) CT
TE

SENT FROM
TIME
DATE 8-6-57
BY

8/2/57
SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL

- Tolson
- Nichols
- Boardman
- Belmont
- Mason
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

Pearson made the following note from the CIA classified document referred to in the attached letter:

b3

"I have here an excerpt from Central Intelligence Report marked [] which states that CHIANG Kai-shek withdrew 40 million dollars from the Bank of China for propaganda work and bribery in the United States. I am quoting. Thirty-five million of the total was paid January, 1949, by the Bank of China on the direction of O.K. Yui (phonetic) to Madam CHIANG Kai-shek. Other payments were Sun Fo (phonetic), \$2,400,000; Chen Li Fu (phonetic), \$1,500,000; Bishop Paul Yu Pin (phonetic), one million dollars; Hu Shih, one million dollars. Bank officials refused to pay but finally did so when directed by O.K. Yui (phonetic) who said the money was to be used for propaganda in the United States which would require bribery of American officials. End of quote."

The investigation requested by the Department will be instituted. CIA has been conducting an administrative inquiry within its own agency regarding this document and most of the ^{answers to the} questions raised by the Department can be obtained through CIA.

WVC:jdd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/fab

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *1607/12/57*

DATE: July 11, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

 SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAL-TV
 2:15 P.M. JUNE 16, 1957

 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

 DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/ab
 11-3-97 Pw/DA 10-23-92
 SP10/102 & 293, 828

 Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to previous memoranda captioned as above relating to Drew Pearson's quoted statements from a classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report on the subject of alleged expenditures of the Chinese Nationalist Government. CIA advised, through Liaison, that it was giving consideration to approaching Pearson and asking him for the return of the document from which he made his statements, and also to ask him for the identity of the individual who transmitted the information to him. CIA indicated that such action would not be taken without first checking with the Bureau in order to make certain that nothing was done to conflict with our interests.

This is to advise that on July 10, 1957, [] Office of Security, CIA, was advised by the Liaison Agent that an approach of Pearson by CIA, as indicated above, was a decision to be made by CIA. It was made clear to [] that under no circumstances should CIA have the impression that any approach on this matter made by CIA was contingent upon the approval of the FBI.

b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

 SJP:bjt
 (6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Wacks
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 34

 Classified by *1080*
 Exempt from GDS, Category *2*
 Date of Declassification Indefinite *10/1/77*

66 JUL 10 1957

 DECLASSIFIED BY *6855*
 ON *11/2/83*

Office M

UM • UNITEI

VERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 8, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAI-TV
2:15 P.M. JUNE 16, 195711-3-97 P.W. 00-4 10-23-92
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8 BTJ/ab

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 28, 1957. On his TV broadcast June 16, 1957, Drew Pearson made reference to the contents of a specific Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report dealing with the expenditures of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Liaison ascertained that the report's contents quoted by Pearson were classified "~~Secret~~" and that Pearson had not been given any authorized access to the CIA report. In the referenced memorandum I reported that CIA was conducting an inquiry within its own agency in order to establish the extent of the report's dissemination within CIA proper.

On July 5, 1957, [] Office of Security, CIA, advised that his agency was giving consideration to requesting Pearson to release the document from which he read to CIA. CIA also plans to ask Pearson for the identity of the person who gave him the CIA information. [] pointed out that the foregoing was only under consideration and CIA would not initiate the action described without first checking with the Bureau in order to make certain that nothing was done to conflict with the Bureau's interests.

ACTION:

Liaison will continue to follow this matter with CIA. Dept being advised -

SJP:bjt (6)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Wacks
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED

EX 105

DECLASSIFIED BY 6555
ON 11-29-92

Classified by 6080 led/rad

Exempt from GDS, Category 7

Date of Declassification Indefinite

53 JUL 18 1957

~~SECRET~~

5- Jan

Office Memorandum • UNIT

VERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 18, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8 BTJ/EL

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TV BROADCAST
STATION WMAL-TV
2:15 P.M., 6/16/57

11-3-97 AM 06-A 1023.92 (provided) R
SP7 ci/da #293,828

Tolson ☒
Nichols ☒
Boardman ☒
Belmont ☒
Mason ☐
Mohr ☐
Parsons ☒
Rosen ☒
Tamm ☐
Nease ☐
Winterrowd ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Holloman ☐
Gandy ☐

Drew Pearson, on his TV broadcast of 6/16/57, quoted from what he alleged to be a Central Intelligence report relating to the expenditure of large sums of money by CHIANG Kai-shek in the United States for propaganda work and bribery. The information related by Pearson appears in a CIA report, a copy of which was furnished to the Bureau in 1953 with the classification of ~~Secret~~ thereon.

My memo of 6/17/57, to you stated that we would contact CIA to determine whether Pearson has authorized access to the report and whether or not the report is still classified. Mr. Tolson inquired as to why this action was being taken.

Since Pearson was publicly quoting from a document which to the Bureau's knowledge is classified ~~Secret~~, Pearson would be in technical violation of the espionage statutes. It was our intention to determine from CIA whether the information is still classified ~~Secret~~, and in the event that it is, we intended to refer the matter to the Department and take no other action. It is believed that we have a responsibility to determine whether or not there is actually a violation. If material is now unclassified, there would be no violation and, of course, no action at all will be taken.

ACTION:

This memo is submitted pursuant to Mr. Tolson's inquiry.

Tics: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Wacks

Mr. Crowley
Mr. Deegan
Mr. Sanders

ESS:dmn
(7)

RECORDED - 95

T. Belmont
Roach
Sanders

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins
Director, FBI

September 10, 1957

RECORDED - 6

65-60573-72

DREW PEARSON TELECAST
STATION WIAL-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957
ESPIONAGE - X

DECLASSIFIED BY 2909 per CIA let
ON 6/8/88 (CA) 6/5/88

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8/BJB
11-3-97 BY SP-6/BJB
SP-6/BJB #283-88

Reference is made to your memorandum of July 25, 1957, which requested that we determine the extent of dissemination within the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and this Bureau of the document from which Mr. Pearson quoted on June 16, 1957. Referenced memorandum further requested that it be determined whether the disseminated copies contained a security classification stamp; whether the page from which he quoted carried a security classification stamp; whether the information quoted by Pearson, standing by itself, contained information relating to the national defense as of the date of disclosure; and whether the information disclosed can be declassified in event of prosecution.

By letter dated August 29, 1957, the Central Intelligence Agency furnished the following information:

"You are advised that the disseminated copies of [] consisted of only one page per copy and were prepared on a ditto process with the classification ~~Secret~~ appearing in ditto on each copy of the report.

"The report and the information contained therein had not been declassified as of 16 June 1957. However, after a careful review we have determined that the information quoted by Mr. Pearson, standing by itself, does not contain information relating to the national defense as of the date of disclosure, that is 16 June 1957.

ESS:dmn
(6) mm

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ since information so classified is quoted from the CIA letter.

- Tolson _____
- Nichols _____
- Boardman _____
- Belmont _____
- Mason _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Nease _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

MAILED 11
SEP 10 1957
FBI COMM-FBI

SEP 23 1957

FBI
MAILED 600

W.B.S.

W.H.

~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

"In connection with your request for the identity of the individual who could testify concerning the classification of the specific report and whether or not it contained information relating to the national defense, you are advised that there are a number of individuals who could testify. Since some of these individuals are assigned to different locations from time to time, the names are not being furnished at this time although we would be pleased to make an individual available at your convenience if you so desire."

\$

Inasmuch as the document in question was disseminated in December of 1949, the Army and Air Force are having some difficulty in determining the extent of dissemination of the document after receipt by those Departments. The Army has advised that its information is contained in microfilm records in dead storage which are now being checked. It is expected that the information concerning the extent of dissemination by the Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force and State will be available within a few days and it will be furnished to you immediately upon receipt.

A Photostat of the document in question was furnished to Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III with memorandum dated March 12, 1953, which was captioned "China Lobby, Registration Act." No other dissemination of the document has been made by this Bureau.

Office Memorandum

UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 1, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

cc - Mr. Boardman

Mr. Belmont

Liaison (4)

Mr. Sanders

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON TELECAST
STATION WMAL-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957ESPIONAGE - X
DECLASSIFIED BY

ON

11-3-97 PM OGA 10-23-92
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8/BJB/STPTolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

By memorandum of 7-25-57 AAG Tompkins referred to Bureau memorandum of 7-3-57 which advised that Pearson quoted from a classified CIA document on his telecast on 6-16-57. Tompkins requested Bureau to determine dissemination of document within State, Army, Navy, FBI and Air Force; whether disseminated copies contained a security classification stamp and whether the page from which Pearson quoted carried a security classification stamp; whether the information quoted by Pearson, standing by itself, contained information relating to the national defense as of the date of disclosure; and whether the information disclosed can be declassified in event of prosecution. The Director inquired, "Did we send memorandum of July 3 on our own or at request CIA?"

On Pearson's 6-16-57 telecast he read from a CIA document; Bufiles contained copy of document from which Pearson quoted and as of 1953 it was classified ~~Secret~~ (the document is Number [redacted] subject "Funds of Nationalist Leaders," country-China, Bufile 97-3076-40). Since Pearson apparently had unauthorized possession of classified information, had reason to believe it could be used to the injury of the U.S. or to advantage of a foreign nation (since it was classified), and willfully communicated the information to persons not entitled to receive it, it appeared that he was violating Section 793, Title 18, USC. We checked with CIA to determine whether information still classified and whether Pearson had authorized access since these factors would determine whether he might be violating the statute. CIA advised Bureau on 6-28-57 that information still classified ~~Secret~~ and Pearson had no authorized access. We were additionally advised CIA was conducting inquiry within CIA to determine extent of dissemination in CIA. Copies of document had been disseminated to State, Army, Navy, Air Force and Bureau.

Classified by 6080 [redacted]
Exempt from GDS, Category 2

Since Bureau policy in classifying information involving leaks to the press has been to refer them to the Department for decision as to whether investigation warranted, the 7-3-57 memorandum was addressed to Tompkins furnishing facts of case and advising we would conduct no investigation unless he requested to the contrary. This action taken to preclude any criticism of Bureau for taking no action where a violation had apparently occurred. CIA did not request Bureau to take action. Tompkins' memorandum of 7-25-57 requested Bureau ascertain certain specific items of information.

RECORDED - 14

EX-160

65-60573-73
8 AUG 13 1957

SENT DIRECTOR

FOR APPROVAL

Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman
Re: Drew Pearson Telecast
Station WMAL-TV
2:15 P.M., JUNE 16, 1957

ACTION:

Attached is suggested letter to CIA advising that Tompkins has requested certain information and requests that CIA furnish the information to Bureau.

Through Liaison we will determine to which office in Army, Navy, Air Force, and State, copies of the documents were sent by CIA and when. We will then through liaison determine in those offices the extent of the dissemination of the documents in those agencies as requested by AAG Tompkins.

It is noted that numerous instances of such leaks have been called to the Department's attention in the past including the results of detailed investigation in a number of cases. However, the Department has taken no prosecutive action and it appears pointless to waste manpower and money on fruitless investigations of this type. Henceforth, we will not take the initiative in calling items of this nature to the attention of the Department unless a specific complaint is received by the Bureau requiring reference to the Department.

See that this policy is
repeatedly followed
henceforth

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : *W.S.* MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 1-10-62

FROM : W. S. TAVEL

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
BUFILE 65-60573

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-28-88 BY 5884 JTB
#265,953

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

There are two sections to this file. See memorandum W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont dated 7-29-52 (65-60573-56) for the previous authorization to maintain this file in the Special Mail Room.

LWB:wjs
(2)

W. A. Branigan to Belmont 7/29/52 (a.56) recommended this file be maintained in Special File Room until conclusion of Korean War when file should be maintained in General Records Filing Section. It is not now necessary to continue to maintain this file in Special File Room.

*SA JF Warner
1-23-62*

68 JAN 29 1962

REC-72

EA 101

25 JAN 23 1962

65-60573-74